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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to make sense of why (sometimes) philosophers reject past 
theories of x (reality, knowledge, morality, etc.) while they acknowledge at the same time that 
the theories being rejected contain philosophically interesting truth about x (philosophers will 
typically say things like: “Theory θ gets things wrong about x, but there’s a grain of truth (about 
x) in it,” “Philosopher Φ is mistaken about x, but he’s on to something,” and so on). The answer I 
want to explore is partial truth, construed not intensionally, i.e., as truth “in part,” but 
extensionally, i.e., as truth of a part (of an object). A description of the Statue of Liberty, for 
instance, that goes: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the 
date of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, (and so on)” can be both 
rejected and acknowledged to contain interesting truth; the former, because only a part of the 
Statue of Liberty is being described, not the Statue of Liberty simpliciter; and the latter because 
that is a part of the right object (i.e., the Statue of Liberty and not, say, the Eiffel Tower). I 
suggest that something analogous, in a more complex way, can be seen to (sometimes) happen in 
philosophy. If this view is correct, I argue, an interesting explanation can be given of why 
(sometimes) philosophers have rejected past theories of x while acknowledging at the same time 
that the theories being rejected contain philosophically interesting truth: because those 
philosophers have believed the theories being rejected were partially true in the sense just 
sketched. As examples, I propose J. P. Sartre on previous theories of consciousness, M. 
Heidegger on previous theories of human being, and G. W. F. Hegel on previous theories of the 
Absolute (God). I conclude by suggesting that my model can be extended to additional figures in 
the history of Western philosophy, and that my model of partial truth can tell us interesting 
things about the nature of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise. 
 
In Chapter 1, I make three claims supporting the view that the notion of partial truth (in an 
extensional sense) can be especially helpful in philosophy when combined with the notion of 
standpoint (perspective, stance, point of view). First, I claim that the relation between part and 
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whole that in many cases applies to objects can be seen to apply also to standpoints toward 
objects (although, in this case case, “part” and “whole” must be understood in a metaphorical 
sense, not in a literal one). I say that a standpoint is “part” of another standpoint when the former 
is grounded on the latter, i.e., when the latter makes the former possible, but not the other way 
round (still in different words, and using current analytic terminology, when the former 
supervenes on the latter). If that’s the case, I say that the former standpoint is secondary with 
respect to the latter, which is basic. Second, I claim that adopting a secondary standpoint toward 
an object (as opposed to a basic one) might in some instances be the reason why we are able to 
observe only part of that object; adopting a basic standpoint toward that object, by contrast, 
might allow us to observe the object in its entirety. Third, I claim that philosophical objects differ 
from ordinary ones in so far as, for them, it is crucial to adopt the right standpoint in order to 
observe the right object in the first place. Taken together, I conclude, these three claims support 
the view that there can be partial truth of philosophical objects (again, extensionally understood) 
on account of the fact that a secondary standpoint toward them, as opposed to a basic one, is 
being adopted. I then suggest that this circumstance might be employed to give an interesting 
explanation of why three significant philosophers in the Continental tradition of philosophy 
(Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel) have rejected previous theories of a philosophical object 
(consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, respectively) while acknowledging at the same 
time that the theories being rejected contain philosophically interesting truth.  
 
In Chapter 2, I argue that Sartre both rejects the best previous philosophical theories of 
consciousness and acknowledges that they contain philosophically interesting truth. As instances 
of the best previous philosophical theories of consciousness according to Sartre I propose 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s. According to Sartre, I argue, Descartes and Husserl are committed to 
the view that consciousness is best studied via reflection, that is, from a reflective standpoint. 
Sartre agrees that by adopting a reflective standpoint toward consciousness we can discover 
philosophically interesting truth about it. However, I take Sartre to contend, the reflective 
standpoint is, unbeknownst to Descartes and Husserl, grounded on a more basic one, which takes 
precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place: the unreflective one. By observing 
consciousness from a secondary standpoint, Descartes and Husserl are able to observe only a 
“part” (i.e., an aspect) of consciousness. Because they describe only a part (aspect) of 
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consciousness, Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories must according to Sartre be rejected; but 
because they describe part of the right object, they contain philosophically interesting truth. 
 
In Chapter 3, I argue that Heidegger both rejects the best previous philosophical theories of 
human being and acknowledges that they contain philosophically interesting truth. As an 
instance of the best previous philosophical theories of human being I propose the blanket term 
“the philosophical tradition.” According to Heidegger, I argue, the philosophical tradition is 
committed to the view that human being is best studied qua object-of-theory, that is, from a 
theoretical standpoint. Heidegger agrees that by adopting a theoretical standpoint toward human 
being we can discover philosophically interesting truth over it. However, I take Heidegger to 
contend, the theoretical standpoint is, unbeknownst to the philosophical tradition, grounded on a 
more basic one, which takes precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place: the 
pretheoretical one. By observing human being from a secondary standpoint, the philosophical 
tradition is able to observe only a “part” (i.e., an aspect) of it. Because it describes only a part 
(aspect) of human being, the theory of the philosophical tradition must according to Heidegger 
be rejected; but because they describe part of the right object, it contains philosophically 
interesting truth. 
 
In Chapter 4, I argue that Hegel both rejects the best previous philosophical theories of the 
Absolute (Spirit) and acknowledges that they contain philosophically interesting truth. As 
instances of the best previous philosophical theories of the Absolute I focus on Kant’s and 
Fichte’s. According to Hegel, I argue, Kant and Fichte are committed to the view that the 
Absolute is best studied from (what Hegel calls) a reflective standpoint. Hegel agrees that by 
adopting a reflective standpoint toward the Absolute we can discover philosophically interesting 
truth about it. However, I take Hegel to contend, the reflective standpoint is, unbeknownst to 
Kant and Fichte, grounded on a more basic one, which takes precedence over it and makes it 
possible in the first place: the speculative one. By observing the Absolute from a secondary 
standpoint, Kant and Fichte are able to observe only a “part” (i.e., an aspect) of it. Because they 
describe only a “part” (aspect) of the Absolute, Kant’s and Fichte’s theories must according to 
Hegel be rejected; but because they describe part of the right object, they contain philosophically 
interesting truth. 
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In Chapter 5, I argue that, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, partial truth about 
consciousness, human being, and the Absolute is philosophically negative, not merely 
incomplete or insufficient. That is why, according to these philosophers, the best past theories 
must be rejected, as opposed to completed or supplemented. I suggest that this happens because, 
according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, consciousness, human being, and the Absolute are 
themselves standpoints toward entities, in addition to entities; moreover, they are what can be 
called global standpoints toward entities (i.e., standpoints toward all entities, over the whole of 
that there is). What is negative about the best past theories about consciousness, human being, 
and the Absolute, is that, by being based on a secondary standpoint, as opposed to a basic one, 
the assertions contained in them are true of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute qua 
entities, not qua standpoints, which is what is fundamental. On this account, the theories don’t 
simply fail to capture the nature of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute; they 
positively misrepresent it. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OBJECT, STANDPOINT, AND PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
 
This dissertation is a study on the notion of partial truth in philosophy. Philosophers are in the 
business of finding out the truth about reality, and the obvious thing they want to fight is, in the 
first instance, falsehood.1 A look at the history of philosophy shows, however, that philosophers 
have in many instances been equally anxious to fight theories they take to be inadequate, but not 
exactly false. This circumstance raises interesting and challenging questions, which is the goal of 
this dissertation, at its most general, to put on the table. Let’s start with the most obvious one: if a 
philosophical theory is (deemed) not (to be) false, what can be inadequate about it? Now there 
surely are various things other than falsehood that can make a philosophical theory inadequate.2 
What I want to do in this dissertation is to focus on what I take to be a case of its own, deserving 
a closer look than it has received so far: partial truth.   
 
Suppose I have never been to New York and I ask you to describe the Statue of Liberty, so I can 
figure out how it looks. Suppose you answer something like: “It’s a man wearing jeans and a T-
shirt, holding a baseball bat in his right hand and a newspaper in his left one.”3 Given that the 
Statue of Liberty represents a woman wearing robes, holding a torch in her right hand and a 
tablet evoking the law in her left one, your description is false. Now suppose you answer 
something like: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date 
of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776,” and you proceed to describe this 
tablet with minute detail. In this case, your description is inadequate too, but not exactly false. As 
a matter of fact, your description is true, at least in the sense that the female figure that the statue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At a deeper level, ignorance. 
2 For instance, obscurity, inconsistency, intuitive implausibility, lack of sound logic, and so on (I’ll come back to 
this; see in particular pg. 18). 
3 I’ll claim this description of the Statue of Liberty is false (i.e., the sentences making up the description are false of 
the Statue of Liberty); but someone might object that a man wearing jeans and a T-shirt and holding a baseball bat, 
etc. has some structural (anatomic) similarity to a woman wearing robes holding a torch, etc. (which is what the 
Statue of Liberty represents); so perhaps this description isn’t false after all (at least, false simpliciter). To take care 
of worries along these lines, the reader is invited to consider alternative descriptions like: “It’s an elephant sitting on 
the tip of a wooden chair,” “It’s a piece of cheese on which two olives and glass of water stand,” “It’s an isosceles 
blue triangle,” and so on. I take all these descriptions to be false of the Statue of Liberty (i.e., false simpliciter, not 
false “in a sense”). 
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represents is holding the tablet as you describe it. What makes your description inadequate is that 
instead of describing the Statue of Liberty, you’re describing only a part of it. 
 
Something similar, I hold, can be seen to happen sometimes in philosophy.  Or, rather, I will 
suggest, this is what (some) philosophers in history have (sometimes) seen their predecessors as 
doing. Obviously philosophers are not in the business of describing statues, nor bigger physical 
entities, nor physical reality in its entirety; arguably, what philosophers aim at describing is 
reality simpliciter.4 Suppose now that reality (simpliciter) is composed of physical material, 
numbers, and God. Suppose further that a philosopher describes reality as being composed of 
physical material and numbers. In this case, it’s plausible to hold that this philosopher’s 
description of reality is inadequate but not exactly false: what the description says is true but, 
instead of describing reality, the description is describing only a part of it. In this way, something 
analogous to the example of the Statue of Liberty can be seen to happen in philosophy.5 
 
My primary goal in this study is to offer three instances of what I see as being partial truth in 
philosophy along similar lines (Chapters 2 to 4).6 My secondary goal is to draw on these three 
instances to argue that the notion of partial truth, in the way I construe it, can help to make sense 
of a sort of relation holding between philosophers and their predecessors that, I shall suggest, 
constitutes a significant pattern in the philosophical praxis and the history of philosophy, and to 
which more attention than it has received so far should be paid (Chapter 5).  
 
1.1 OBJECT, STANDPOINT, AND PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
1.1.1 Object and Standpoint 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Philosophers (metaphysicians at any rate) aren’t interested in physical reality but in reality simpliciter. Whether 
reality simpliciter coincides with physical reality is, philosophically speaking, an open question. 
5 The two cases are somewhat different, as in the former only one part of the whole is being described, whereas in 
the latter all the parts except one, are being described (and, of course, “part” means different things in both 
examples: in the former, it is a proper, physical part; in the second, one element of a series). What is essential for my 
present point is that both descriptions fail to describe the whole.  
6 Or rather, as we will see in a minute, three instances of what three philosophers in history (not me) have seen as 
being partial truth in philosophy along similar lines. 
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I have already suggested that the objects philosophers are typically interested in are of a more 
abstract nature than the Statue of Liberty.7 Furthermore, I want to add now, philosophers aren’t 
only interested in objects taken in isolation, but sometimes, and in the first place, in how we 
access objects.8 Accordingly, two things are going to happen in the three examples I will provide 
in this study as offering evidence of partial truth in philosophy. First, what philosophers are 
going to be describing in them isn’t a statue or a toy reality made of three elements, but 
something of a more abstract and complex nature. Second, philosophers in my examples are 
going to consider how we access these objects, in addition to thinking about these objects 
themselves. It will turn out that partial truth in the way I want to construe this notion goes hand 
in hand with the idea that some ways of accessing some objects are more basic than others. But 
before developing this idea, let me pause for a moment and comment on the distinction between 
objects and ways to access objects, as this distinction will play a major role in the defense of my 
thesis. 
 
Let’s come back to the examples of the Statue of Liberty and of a toy reality made of three 
elements. These two examples have in common a description and something being described. 
We have already established that the description is not false in so far as the right object is being 
described (the Statue of Liberty and reality, respectively);9 but it’s still inadequate in so far as 
only a part of the object, as opposed to the object simpliciter,10 is being described. The two 
examples present, of course, important differences: in one case we have a physical object; in the 
other, a toy (i.e., a highly simplified) reality. Now it’s open to debate what reality is, but at least 
in so far as we oppose objects to access to objects, it’s plausible to consider it an object too. Of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It won’t do to object that philosophers are interested in statues (for instance in ontology, mereology in particular). 
Statues work in this case as examples of objects about which a philosophical question is raised. To consider statues 
from a philosophical standpoint involves eo ipso to consider them qua objects of an abstract nature.  (See section 
1.2.2. below for further discussion)  
8 In philosophical jargon, philosophers aren’t interested only in entities, that is, in ontology, but also in how we get 
to know entities, that is, in epistemology (broadly construed: some ways of accessing objects need not involve 
knowledge). 
9 Of course, there’s going to be qualms about my contention that this description is not false. It can be argued that a 
description of the Statue of Liberty that goes: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law, etc.” is false. I 
will come back to this in Chapter 5. By now I stick to the point that in this description (part of) the right object is 
being described (i.e., the Statue of Liberty), as opposed to the wrong one (say, the Eiffel Tower). I take this to 
involve interesting truth; more precisely put, to involve the possibility of making assertions about the relevant object 
containing interesting truth about them (however “interesting truth” is subsequently spelled out). 
10 I prefer the contrast pair part of an object/object simpliciter to part of an object/object in its entirety (or part of an 
object/the whole object), as truth talk about the latter suggests that there can be exhaustive truth about an object (i.e., 
truth about every single part (physical or otherwise) of an object), an idea that is problematic. 
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course, by this I’m not suggesting that reality is a big object out there, but that, whatever it is, it’s 
something we meaningfully talk about, philosophize about, observe, and so on. Accordingly, I’ll 
be using the umbrella term “object” from now onwards for anything we can meaningfully talk 
about, philosophize about, observe, and so on.11 
 
Suppose now that, when prompted to describe the Statue of Liberty, what you do is to think, first 
of all, about different perspectives you might adopt towards it, as you believe that some of them 
work better than others. For instance, to observe the Statue of Liberty from the front, at a 
medium distance, seems to work better than to observe it from the front, at a very short distance, 
in which case you wouldn’t have an overall view of the human figure; or from a helicopter flying 
on top of it, in which case you wouldn’t be able to see its face; or from its base, in which case 
you wouldn’t be able to read what is inscribed in the tablet being held by the human figure in her 
left hand; and so on. From all these different perspectives you’d be able to see the statue; but it 
seems as if some of them work better than others (or at any rate some of them don’t work as 
well), at least for some specific purposes (such as, for instance, describing the statue). 
 
Drawing on this thought about adopting different perspectives toward a physical object, what I 
propose to do in this study is to consider partial truth with a significant shift of focus, from 
objects to perspectives over objects. Given, however, that the term “perspective” suggests a 
visual model of accessing to objects, I’d like to introduce a more abstract term allowing for the 
possibility of accessing objects in ways not necessarily tied to visual perception (or even 
perception simpliciter). This term is “standpoint.” Preliminarily, we can take a standpoint to be a 
perspective broadly construed. A standpoint is thus a perspective, but also a point of view, a 
stance, and so on; that is, “somewhere” (it doesn’t need to be a physical place) from where an 
object appears to us in such and such way, with the possibility of the object appearing in different 
ways, if we change the standpoint toward it. We have just seen that adopting different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Thus, I am using “object” in roughly the same sense in which, with quite different purposes, Bertrand Russell 
(Principles of Mathematics) uses “term:” “Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false 
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I 
shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every 
term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e., is in some sense. A man, a 
moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term; and to 
deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false.” (Russell [1903] 1938: 43) (This quotes just 
illustrates my use of the expression “object”; nothing of what I say depends on any thesis defended by Russell). 
 5	  
perspectives (i.e., standpoints) over an object (in this case, the Statue of Liberty) can make a 
difference in how we observe it and thus describe it. I intend to apply this idea to philosophical 
objects.  
 
Before thinking about how this idea can work, let’s consider first of all general differences 
between an object and a standpoint toward an object. What I take to be the biggest difference is 
that, whereas an object is, as said, something we observe, meaningfully talk about, philosophize 
about, and so on, a standpoint is something more elusive and difficult to grasp. By this I don’t 
mean to suggest that a standpoint can’t be observed, talked about, philosophized about, and so 
on; it obviously can. For instance, I can say that observing the Statue of Liberty from a helicopter 
flying on top of it allows me to see the top of the head, but not the woman’s face nor the tablet 
evoking the law the woman is holding. This is an assertion which is prima facie true, and is about 
a standpoint toward the Statue of Liberty. What happens in the case, however, is that a 
standpoint has become an object, something we can talk about, philosophize about, observe, and 
so on. But a standpoint qua object, I want to contend now, is something different from a 
standpoint qua standpoint. In this study I will take the notion of standpoint in what I take to be a 
pregnant sense, standpoint qua standpoint. Essentially, I will assume that a standpoint is 
something we adopt, not something we observe. In other words, I will assume that a standpoint 
is something that occurs in first person, not in third one. A standpoint, still in different words, is 
a genuine standpoint when it does the observing, not when it’s observed itself.  
 
1.1.2 Standpoint: Secondary and Basic 
 
So far I have established two things. First, this is a study on the notion of partial truth in 
philosophy, with a shift of focus, from objects to standpoints (perspectives) toward objects. 
Second, this study focuses on the notion of standpoint as something we adopt, not as something 
we observe; as something we experience in the first person, not in the third one. I now proceed to 
discuss what I see as potentially novel in this shift of focus. The novelty is based on two insights. 
My first insight is that a standpoint toward an object can, as much as the object, be seen as 
having parts and wholes (not in a literal sense though, but in a metaphorical one; I’ll get back to 
this in a minute). My second insight is that this circumstance can be exploited to offer a 
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potentially interesting explanation of why, in some instances, philosophers can observe only a 
part of an object instead of the object simpliciter (here “part” will also turn out to have a 
metaphorical sense); the idea being that, by adopting a standpoint toward an object that is “part” 
of another standpoint, what philosophers can observe of that object is, correlatively, only a part 
of that object (more on this below). This circumstance can in turn explain why, according to 
some philosophers, their predecessors have been able to observe only a part of an object (again 
in a metaphorical sense); the idea being that, according to the former, the latter were adopting a 
standpoint toward the object which, unbeknownst to them, was a “part” of another standpoint 
(again, more on this below). This circumstance, finally, can in turn explain why (sometimes) 
philosophers in history have rejected past theories about x (reality, knowledge, morality, etc.) 
while acknowledging at the same time that the theories being rejected contain philosophically 
interesting truth, a fact which is the goal of this study to explain (or, more modestly, bring to the 
attention of my readers as something puzzling).  
 
Let’s start discussing my first insight: standpoints, as much as objects, can be seen as having 
parts and wholes. The first point I want to make here is that “parts” and “wholes” shouldn’t be 
understood in this case in a literal sense, but in a figurative one. This follows from what I said at 
the end of the last section, namely that standpoints, considered as something we adopt in first 
person (not observe in third one), aren’t objects we observe, but something more elusive and 
difficult to grasp. But what does this figurative sense amount to? The idea is that a standpoint can 
be seen to be grounded on another standpoint if the latter takes precedence over the former and 
makes it phenomenologically possible in the first place. If this happens (assuming the possibility 
is accepted as philosophically meaningful and legitimate), the former can thus be seen to be 
phenomenologically “included” in, and thereby be a “part” of, the latter. Using alternative 
terminology, we can say the former standpoint phenomenologically supervenes on the latter.12   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 My use of “to supervene” here could be disputed. First off, supervenience as a philosophical term of art is 
typically taken to apply to things (what I above call objects), rather than to standpoints toward things (McLaughlin 
and Bennett 2011). Secondly, what is typically stressed in the concept of supervenience is the idea of covariance: the 
properties supervening and the properties being supervened on must necessarily covary McLaughlin and Bennett 
2011, Kim 1990: 7, 9); but this covariance leaves it undecided as yet whether the properties supervening are (i) 
dependent on, but (ii) not reducible to, the properties being supervened on (Kim 1990: 9). 
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Let’s think of a simple, preliminary example to illustrate this idea. Suppose you are looking at 
the Statue of Liberty from somewhere far off (for instance, a boat sailing away), and you use 
binoculars to observe the statue. It’s clear, first of all, that observed through binoculars the statue 
appears in a different way than if you observed it with the naked eye. The statue looks of course 
bigger (at the expense of other areas of your previous visual field, which will likely fail to appear 
in the new visual field), and you can observe parts of it in greater detail than you did before (for 
instance, you might be able to describe with minute detail the tablet evoking the law, something 
that, due to the distance, you weren’t able to do when you were observing it with the naked eye). 
With the naked eye, conversely, the statue looks of course smaller, and you aren’t able to 
observe many of the details that you’re now able to see with the binoculars. Now if we construct 
“perspective” in terms of visual location, it doesn’t seem as if observing the statue with 
binoculars involves adopting a different perspective than observing it with the naked eye (for the 
perspective, strictly speaking, hasn’t changed; what changes is the size, sharpness, and accuracy 
of what you can see in the visual field). What I want to say instead is that observing the statue 
with binoculars involves adopting a different standpoint than observing it with the naked eye 
(here’s where a more abstract term than “perspective” helps). I will accordingly say that when 
we observe the Statue of Liberty with the naked eye and when we observe it with binoculars, we 
are observing it from two different standpoints.  
 
My contention now (and this is the important point) is that the standpoint we adopt toward the 
statue when we observe it through binoculars is grounded on the standpoint we adopt toward the 
statue when we observe it with the naked eye.13 When you use binoculars, everything that 
appears in your visual field is “contained” in what appears in the visual field when you look with 
the naked eye.14  That is, something appears in the visual field you can observe through the 
binoculars because it appears in the visual field you can observe through the naked eye in the 
first place: something not included in the visual field you can observe through the naked eye 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 There’s an ambiguity here that needs to be taken care of: the term “standpoint” can concern the phenomenology, 
the “what it is like” of a perception, as well as its mechanics (physics, physiology, neurology, etc.). Given that, as I 
established, this study focuses on the idea of standpoint as something we adopt, in the first person, not as something 
we observe, in the third one, my claim here concerns the phenomenology. 
14 Again, “contained” here should be taken in a figurative sense, not a literal one. 
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can’t appear in the visual field you can observe through the binoculars.15 Of course, what 
appears in the visual field you can observe through the binoculars does so with a bigger size and 
sharpness; but however bigger and sharper it appears, it does appear at all because it was already 
there (namely, in the visual field of the naked eye) to start with.16  
 
Perhaps a simpler example of how a standpoint can be seen to be phenomenologically grounded 
on (and, thereby, be a “part” of) another is vision through colored glasses. If I put on glasses 
whose lenses are, say, pink, I will see everything pink-colored. It’s plausible to hold then that 
how things look to me with these glasses on is grounded on how things look to me without them. 
Perception through pink glasses is thus phenomenologically grounded on perception through the 
naked eye. Using alternative terminology, perception through pink glasses phenomenologically 
supervenes on perception with the naked eye.   
 
If these two examples are accepted as plausible, we get the following result: some standpoints 
(for instance, visual perception through binoculars or pink glasses) are (or can be seen to be) 
grounded on others (for instance, visual perception through the naked eye). If that’s the case, I’ll 
say that the former standpoint is secondary with respect to the latter, which is basic.  
 
If, moreover, the circumstance that a standpoint is grounded on another holds unbeknownst to the 
person who is adopting that standpoint, the claim that the secondary standpoint is grounded on a 
more basic one can become a philosophically interesting thesis. This can be shown with the 
following fictional example.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Someone might object that this isn’t true of things like telescopes or microscopes: given their power and 
sophistication, these instruments allow us to see things prima facie not included in the visual field of our naked eye 
(for instance, Jupiter’s satellites or a virus). Is it the case then that what we can observe through a telescope or a 
microscope is phenomenologically grounded on what we can observe through our naked eye? I am committed to the 
view that it is. What’s going on in this case, I respond, is that the phenomenological grounding doesn’t occur in one 
single step (like in the case of the binoculars), but in a more complex manner. The starting point is that there’s a 
phenomenology of what appears in the telescope or the microscope because there is a phenomenology of what 
appears in the visual field of our naked eye to begin with: our naked eye makes a phenomenology of the telescope or 
microscope possible, but not the other way round. 
16  What “grounded” exactly means here merits further spelling out as, once again, we’re talking of a 
phenomenological, not ontological, grounding relation. 
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Imagine a race of human beings, call them the “binocularians,” who are born with binoculars 
incorporated to their eyes, whereby their visual perception always works through binoculars (a 
story should be told here about how binocularians are able to handle short-distance perception; 
suppose that they can get along with only long-distance perception). If there were philosophers 
among the binocularians, they might wonder whether visual perception through binoculars is the 
most basic way they have to visually perceive the world, or whether there is some way to do so 
which is still more basic (the analogous question for “normal” philosophers would probably be 
whether there is some way to access the world which is more basic than perception simpliciter). 
If the binocularian-philosophers were insightful enough to realize that the binoculars are 
“technologically”17, not naturally, incorporated to their eyes, and that their naked eyes should be 
able to see on their own, they might come to the conclusion that perceiving the world with their 
naked eyes must be more basic than perceiving it with the binoculars (assuming acceptance of 
my claim before that perceiving the world through binoculars is grounded on perceiving it 
through the naked eye). This thesis would be defensible even if the binocularian-philosophers 
couldn’t get to actually see things with their naked eyes because the binoculars can’t be removed 
(it could be defended, so to say, on “a priori” grounds). On the other hand, acceptance of the 
thesis wouldn’t necessarily mean that binocularian-philosophers believe that the things they 
observe through the binoculars aren’t actually there (in other words, the binocularian-
philosophers need not be skeptics about what they see through the binoculars). Rather, it’d mean 
that, according to binocularian-philosophers, perceiving the world through binoculars is 
secondary with respect to a more basic standpoint, which takes precedence over it and makes it 
possible in the first place: perception through the naked eye. This fictional example illustrates the 
idea that, sometimes, to claim that a given standpoint is secondary with respect to another one, 
which is more basic, can be a philosophically interesting thesis, if the circumstance in question 
takes place unbeknownst to the person adopting the secondary standpoint.18  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In some convoluted bio-technological way, for by hypothesis binocularians are (naturally) born with binoculars 
incorporated to their eyes. 
18 In the examples of partial truth I will offer in my central chapters I will show that the claim that such and such 
standpoint towards x (a philosophical object) is secondary with respect to a more basic one is common to the three 
philosophers I will consider (and my suggestion is that it is furthermore common to a wide array of philosophers of 
different traditions in the history of philosophy). 
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At a more abstract level, it’s plausible to hold that a number of standpoints are grounded on 
others in significantly different but still analogous ways. For instance, if we agree that imagining 
or remembering something, for instance the Statue of Liberty, is possible only if we have 
perceived it beforehand, it’s plausible to hold that imagining or remembering something is 
grounded on having perceived it beforehand. The point here isn’t that we can imagine or 
remember things, for instance the Statue of Liberty, “on the grounds” that we perceive them first 
(that is, the point isn’t a causal story about how imagination and memory work). The point is 
that how a thing (for instance, the Statue of Liberty) looks like in imagination or memory is 
grounded on how that thing looks like in perception.19 Arguably, whatever you imagine or 
remember of the Statue of Liberty was “contained,” and thus grounded on, what you perceived 
of the statue in the first place, whereas the converse doesn’t hold: how things look like in 
perception isn’t “contained” in how things look like in imagination or memory. It is then 
plausible to hold that what phenomenologically appears in my imagining or remembering the 
Statue of Liberty is grounded on what it appears in my perception. Once again, we can 
alternatively say that imagination or memory phenomenologically supervene on perception. 
 
Examples of how some standpoints can be seen to be grounded on others can go higher in level 
of abstraction. For instance, we can distinguish a scientific standpoint toward reality from a 
common sense one. It’s clear that “standpoint” here has a more abstract sense than in the case of 
the binoculars and of imagination and memory; but still is a standpoint, for how objects appear to 
us from either one can be seen to be different than the other. From a common sense standpoint, I 
see the world as containing tables, chairs, other people, and so on. From a scientific standpoint, I 
see the world as containing energy fields, atoms, electrons, quarks, and so on. It makes sense to 
defend both that a common sense standpoint toward reality is grounded on a scientific one (for it 
can be defended that we see tables, chairs, other people, and so on, on account of physical 
properties holding among the physical entities that scientific theories assume to exist), as well as 
to defend that a scientific standpoint toward reality is grounded on a common sense one (for it 
can be argued that we see energy fields, atoms, electrons, quarks, and so on only because we see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Again, the claim here concerns the phenomenology of a standpoint, not its mechanics. My suggestion is that there 
is a phenomenological grounding relation, besides an ontological one (much more discussed in the literature, 
especially in the last 10 years or so). 
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ordinary objects in the first place, of which scientific theories provide more sophisticated 
descriptions). 
 
If all these examples are accepted as plausible (more examples along similar lines could be 
provided), I take myself to have established a first important result: some standpoints can be seen 
to be grounded on other standpoints. This happens when the latter takes precedence over the 
former and makes it possible in the first place. If that’s the case, I’ll say that the former 
standpoint is secondary with respect to the latter one, which is basic. In some analogical sense, 
we can then say that the former standpoint, the secondary one, is a “part of,” because it is 
“contained in,” the latter (of course, again, this holds in an analogical sense). I take the idea that 
a grounding relation can hold for standpoints toward objects, as much as for objects,20 to be of 
potential interest for philosophy, especially if we are sympathetic to the view that what 
standpoint we adopt over an object can make a significant difference in how we think 
philosophically about that object, indeed in what (philosophically considered) the object really is 
in the first place.  
 
1.1.3. Secondary Standpoint Gives Partial Truth  
 
Let’s discuss now my second insight, which runs as follows: the circumstance that standpoints 
can, as much as objects, be seen to have parts and wholes21 can be exploited to give a potentially 
interesting explanation of why, in some instances, philosophers have been able to observe only a 
part of an object, instead of the object in its entirety. The idea here is that, in some cases, 
adopting a standpoint toward an object which is “part” of another standpoint22 might be the 
reason why what we can observe of that object is, correlatively, only a part of that object, instead 
of the object in its entirety. But how is this idea going to work? 
 
It’d be good to start with an example to illustrate this idea, but here we start coming up with 
difficulties, as visual perception doesn’t illustrate it very well (it’d be interesting to ask why, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In other words, once again, the idea that there is a phenomenological grounding relation (as opposed to an 
ontological one). 
21 Where, per section 1.1.2., “part” and “whole” shouldn’t be understood literally but figuratively, i.e., some 
standpoints are grounded, or “supervene,” on other standpoints. 
22 I.e., adopting a standpoint towards an object which is grounded on a more basic standpoint towards that object. 
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there must be a philosophically interesting reason23). Here is, however, a first shot at an example. 
Observing the Statue of Liberty through binoculars, we established, is grounded on (i.e., is a 
“part” of) observing the Statue of Liberty through the naked eye (again, as far as its 
phenomenology is concerned) . Well, it turns out that, although what we can see through the 
binoculars shows bigger and in greater detail, things that were in the visual field of the naked eye 
are likely to stay out of the picture. To this extent, it can be held that the binoculars allow us to 
see less, in fact a part of a bigger whole. It therefore seems plausible to hold that adopting a 
secondary standpoint toward an object (in this case, observing the Statue of Liberty through 
binoculars) allows us to see a part of that object instead of the whole; whereas, conversely, 
adopting a basic standpoint toward the same object (in this case, observing the Statue of Liberty 
through the naked eye) would allow us to see the whole. 
 
Here’s where this preliminary example doesn’t work quite well: even though using binoculars to 
see (i.e., adopting a secondary standpoint toward) the Statue of Liberty allows us to see only a 
part of it, it still allows us to see (part of) it in bigger size and greater detail. It isn’t clear 
therefore that what we can see through binoculars is partial with respect to what we can see 
through the naked eye, rather than the other way round (since in degree of sharpness and size, 
what we can see through the naked eye can be said to be partial with respect to what we can see 
through the binoculars). The idea would be more effectively illustrated if, in degree of sharpness 
and size, what we can see through binoculars and through the naked eye stayed the same (in 
other words, if we applied a sort of caeteris paribus clause to the example making it the case that 
perceiving a part versus a whole were the only way in which observing something through 
binoculars and through the naked eye differ). 
 
Accordingly, I will change a little bit the example to illustrate better the idea behind my second 
insight (although this example will have the disadvantage of construing the notion of standpoint 
a bit clumsily, in terms of physical location and distance, plus other ad hoc circumstances). 
Suppose you are inside a room with a very narrow window facing the Statue of Liberty and, 
because the window is so narrow, it only allows you to see a part of the statue, for instance the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 My sense is that the reason has to do with the distinction, which I will introduce later, between ordinary and 
philosophical objects: visual perception allows us to access ordinary objects; I will be arguing, however, that the 
idea I am now introducing will hold only for philosophical objects. 
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tablet evoking the law that the woman is holding in her left arm (suppose, moreover, that you’re 
tied up in such a way that you can’t move closer to the window, which would allow you to peek 
closer and have a more ample perspective over the statue). In this case, it’s plausible to say that 
you can see only a part of the Statue of Liberty, instead of the whole, on account of the fact that 
you’re placed somewhere (i.e., you’re adopting a certain standpoint) which allows you to see 
only that part. 
 
Suppose now there is another place that would allow you to see the Statue of Liberty in its 
entirety, for instance, the uncovered deck of a boat. If that’s the case, you can observe the Statue 
of Liberty in its entirety on account of the fact that you’re placed somewhere (i.e., you’re 
adopting a certain standpoint) allowing you to do so. What we have so far is a scenario 
illustrating how, from two different standpoints, a room with a very narrow window and the 
uncovered deck of a boat, you can see, respectively, only part a part of the Statue of Liberty and 
the Statue of Liberty in its entirety. 
 
Just as a final twist, suppose that the first standpoint is a “part” of the second. (Given that in this 
example I am construing “standpoint” in terms of physical location, “part” here turns out to have 
a literal sense, and this is why the example doesn’t illustrate my idea very effectively; in the 
examples I will present in this study a “part” of a standpoint won’t be a literal part; as explained 
before (see section 1.1.2.), “to be a part of” will mean “to be phenomenologically grounded on”). 
Suppose, for instance, that the “room” with a very narrow window facing the Statue of Liberty is 
a little cabin built on top of the deck of the boat. In this case, we have two standpoints you can 
adopt over the Statue of Liberty, a cabin with a very narrow window and the uncovered deck of a 
boat. From the former you can only see a part of the statue, whereas from the latter you can see it 
in its entirety. Moreover (and this is now the important point), the first standpoint is part of the 
second; in other words, the first standpoint is grounded on, or is secondary with respect to, the 
second (again, we can alternatively say that the first one “supervenes” on the second).  
 
If this scenario is accepted as plausible, my claim now is that by drawing on the notion of 
standpoint we can give an interesting explanation of why only a part of an object, instead of the 
object simpliciter, is being observed: because a secondary standpoint toward the object, instead 
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of a basic one, is being adopted. In the case of the present example, you can see only part of the 
Statue of Liberty because you are adopting a standpoint (a cabin with a very narrow window) 
which is “secondary” with respect to a more basic one (the uncovered deck of a boat). (Here’s 
where the example fails, among other things: there is no reason why we couldn’t see the statue 
simpliciter from the secondary standpoint too, if only some circumstances were different; for 
instance, if the window wasn’t so narrow. Moreover, the grounding relation between the 
standpoints is here physical, not phenomenological: the deck is physically grounded on the 
boat24). To say that you’re describing the tablet instead of the statue is to say that you’re offering 
a partial description of it, which isn’t very helpful. To say, by contrast, that you’re placed 
somewhere allowing you to see only the tablet, instead of somewhere else that would allow you 
to see the whole statue, is to say a) why you’re offering a partial description in the first place; b) 
what the solution is; what you would need to do to have a view of the whole. 
 
If these examples are accepted as plausible, I take myself to have established a second important 
result: in some instances, the reason why we are able to observe only a part of an object instead 
of the whole is that we are adopting a standpoint toward that object that is secondary with respect 
to a more basic one (again, my examples so far don’t show this idea very effectively; I hope to 
demonstrate in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 that this idea works better for philosophical objects). This 
gives us a first, preliminary reason to believe that my shift of focus regarding partial truth, from 
objects to standpoints toward objects, promises to be philosophically interesting. The reason is 
this: different from statues and other ordinary objects, the objects philosophers are typically 
interested in aren’t usually around for us to observe, whereby it arguably requires big 
philosophical insight to get to “observe” the right philosophical object; but this means that the 
notion of standpoint acquires a big importance in philosophy, as coming to “observe” the right 
philosophical object crucially bears, in many instances, on adopting the right standpoint toward 
it.  
 
Before moving on, let me make a final preliminary point about the notion of partial truth. It’s 
important to realize that there is an ambiguity in the expression “partial truth” and derivatives, as 
“partial” can be understood extensionally or intensionally. In the latter case, “partially true” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Additionally, “grounded” here just means “(physically) resting on, being supported by.” 
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means “not wholly true” or “not totally true,” that is, “approximately true,” but still true (if at all) 
of the object in its entirety (or, rather, the object simpliciter). In the former case, by contrast, 
“partially true” means “true of a part,” but still completely so (not “approximately”). For 
instance, the assertion “The Statue of Liberty represents freedom” can be said to be “partially 
true” in the sense of approximately true (or true “in a sense”): what the Statue of Liberty 
represents is not literally freedom, but a woman wearing robes and holding a torch, and so on, 
which is a symbol of freedom. Still, the predicate “… represents freedom,” if true of the Statue of 
Liberty at all (even if “approximately”), is true of the statue as a whole (or the statue simpliciter), 
not of a part of it. By contrast, the assertion “The Statue of Liberty represents a tablet evoking 
the law; on this tablet is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 
1776, (and so on)” can be said to be partially true in the sense that is true of only a part of the 
Statue of Liberty (but still completely so, not “approximately” or “in a sense”). This study, I hope 
it’s clear by now, focuses on the latter, not the former sense of “partially true,” that is, its 
extentional one: not as meaning “approximately true,” but as meaning “true of a part.”25   
 
1.2 PHILOSOPHERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS 
 
Let us turn now to the idea, which is going to be central in this essay, that there is an interesting 
connection between the notions of standpoint and of philosophical object. This idea prompts a 
number of preliminary questions: What exactly is a philosophical object?, How does it differ 
from an ordinary object?, How can the notions of object, standpoint, and partial truth be seen to 
apply to it?, Is the difference between the way these notions apply to philosophical objects and 
the way they do to ordinary ones a difference of degree or, rather, of essence?, and so on. These 
are all important questions that will require the rest of this essay to find adequate response (or, 
more realistically, a beginning of a response); but it’d be good to start discussing them now. 
Before doing that, however, let’s think for a minute about the notions of object, standpoint, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Incidentally, I think my focus on the extensional sense of partial truth, rather than on the intensional one, involves 
a shift of focus too with respect to the current philosophical literature. It has become a trend in the last decades to 
analyze (and vindicate the importance of) of the notion of partial truth in the sense of “approximately true” (or 
“pragmatically true”); but as far as I know little importance has been given to the notion of partial truth in the sense 
of “true of only a part,” which is what I propose to do here. For an analysis of partial truth (in the sense of 
“approximately” true) in philosophy of science, see da Da Costa and French. 2003. Further literature on the notion 
of partial truth: Mikenberg et al. 1986, Bueno and Da Costa 2007, and Elgin 2011. 
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partial truth and their importance in philosophy. Why should philosophers care about these 
notions at all? 
 
1.2.1 Partial Truth More Explanatory than Falsehood 
 
This study is motivated by the belief that there is a philosophically interesting puzzle concerning 
a relation often established between philosophers and their predecessors, and that the notions of 
object, standpoint, and partial truth can give us an interesting answer (or at least beginning of an 
answer) for a significant amount of cases. I hinted at the puzzle by pointing out at the very 
beginning of this chapter that philosophers have sometimes been anxious to fight philosophical 
theories they take to be inadequate, but not exactly false (pg. 1). The puzzle is straightforward: 
what exactly is inadequate with a philosophical theory that is not false? Why should 
philosophers worry about it? I take this to be a genuine puzzle because, whatever the deficiencies 
a philosophical theory can be seen to have, as long it’s not seen to include false claims 
(assertions, theses) in it, it arguably shouldn’t be seen as contributing anything philosophically 
negative (as opposed to insufficient or not positive enough). (I will take care in a minute of the 
objection that deficiencies other than falsehood can be seen as contributing something 
philosophically negative). One of the guiding idea of this study is going to be that at least for 
some philosophical objects, and at least according to some significant philosophers in history, 
partial truth, in the way I construe it, can be seen to contribute something philosophically 
negative, not simply insufficient or not positive enough.26 
 
Before going any further, it’s important to be aware of a potential confusion that threatens 
looming in many of our discussions from now on. The confusion consists in running together 
claims about philosophical theories with claims about beliefs about philosophical theories; in 
other words, in confusing claims of the type “theory θ is true (or false)” with claims of the type: 
“according to philosopher Φ, theory θ is true (or false).” In the first case, we are making a claim 
about a theory; in the second case, we are making a claim about what a philosopher believes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Of course, there is a sense in which partial truth, no matter how it is construed, contributes something negative, in 
so far as it’s incomplete (and, hence, for a number of reasons, potentially misleading). But I will argue in Chapter 5 
that partial truth, in the way I want to construe this notion, can be seen to contribute something negative in a stronger 
sense. 
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about a theory (a claim which, in turn, may be true (or false) itself). This distinction is obvious 
enough but, as we will see, it has a strong tendency to get blurred for various reasons that would 
merit spelling out, whereby effort is needed to keep it in mind.27  The chief thesis of this study 
concerns philosophers’ beliefs about theories, not theories. That is, in this study I will defend the 
thesis that according to such and such philosopher, such and such philosophical theory is 
partially true rather than false. Whether the theory is in fact partially true rather than false is a 
different question (and whose answer, strictly speaking, doesn’t affect my chief thesis). This 
study is thus meant to be a contribution to the question how philosophers relate to (other 
philosophers’) theories, not to philosophical theories themselves; in particular, this study is 
meant to offer an explanation (so to say, itself a theory) of why at least in some instances 
philosophers (rationally) reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically 
interesting truth. 
 
In order to motivate the idea that falsehood is the chief thing philosophers should worry about 
when evaluating philosophical theories, we should briefly discuss the different grounds on which 
philosophers typically reject philosophical theories (I take it for granted that, overwhelmingly, 
philosophers tend to reject, much more than to accept, at least wholesale, philosophical theories 
by other philosophers28). The idea I want to preliminarily defend here (more on this in Chapter 5) 
is that, whereas philosophers can of course worry about many things with respect to 
philosophical theories, falsehood (broadly construed) plausibly takes the lead as the primary one, 
whereby to (rationally) reject theories acknowledged not to be false comes out as something 
puzzling.29 
 
Philosophers can worry about many things, but of course we are interested here in what they 
worry about as philosophers. The very nature of philosophy, however, makes it hard to pinpoint 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 One of the reasons why the distinction between theories and beliefs about theories tends to get blurred is that, 
when discussing beliefs about theories, we need in many instances to discuss specifics about the theories that are the 
objects of belief, whereby we’re likely to switch from talk about beliefs about theories to talk about theories, even 
though we’re still concerned with the former (we will see this happening quite often in Chapters 2, 3, and 4). 
28 This is an obvious fact that, however, hasn’t been taken seriously enough as a jump-start for a philosophical 
reflection on the nature of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise. The question metaphilosophers should be asking 
themselves here would be something along the lines of: what sort of theoretical enterprise is that one that doesn’t 
allow for acceptance (certainly not general, let alone universal) of their theories? 
29 In Chapter 5 I will specify that “to reject” here is meant to be reject in a robust, as opposed to neutral, sense. 
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what characterizes it as a discipline and thereby establish legitimate grounds of worry. It’s 
plausible to hold, however, that philosophers are in the business of providing theories, and that a 
theory is a set of interrelated claims (assertions) which are supposed to be true of an object.30 
Accordingly, it’s plausible to hold, or so I shall argue in Chapter 5, that theories are (rationally) 
evaluated, i.e., accepted or rejected, ultimately in terms of truth and falsehood (broadly 
construed).31 (And in particular, of course, when a theory is (rationally) accepted, it’s on the 
grounds of its truth, and when a theory is (rationally) rejected, it’s on the grounds of its 
falsehood).32 
 
Of course, the immediate objection will be that philosophical theories need not be accepted or 
rejected only in terms of truth and falsehood, or even in terms of truth and falsehood at all. 
Theoretical desiderata such as consistency, probability, information content, empirical content, 
empirical success, explanatory and predictive power, problem-solving capacity, simplicity, and 
accuracy, can (and do) play an important role in evaluating (and eventually accepting) theories.33 
Conversely, theoretical inadequacies such as inconsistency, improbability, lack of information 
content, empirical content, empirical success, explanatory and predictive power, problem-solving 
capacity, simplicity, and accuracy can (and do) play a role in rejecting theories. What I want to 
contend, however, is that a theory being inadequate on all these grounds (in other words, 
anything other than falsehood) shouldn’t be put on the same level as being inadequate on the 
grounds of falsehood. In the latter case, I want to suggest, “to reject” a philosophical theory as 
being inadequate has a stronger sense than in the former. 
 
This can be preliminarily shown with the help of an everyday example. If someone wants to 
know about e.g. Barack Obama’s political views, the claim that Barack Obama is an American 
politician may not do her a big service; for her purposes, then, this claim is inadequate. However, 
in so far as the claim is not false (it is, in fact, true), it’s implausible to hold that the claim is 
making a negative contribution to her knowledge of Barack Obama or his political views. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I am aware that this is a very naïve view of what a philosophical theory is, at least as I formulate it here; but I 
think more sophisticated views can be accommodated without making a substantial difference to my present point. 
31 Neither “theory” nor “truth” need to involve robust philosophical commitments; more on this in Chapter 5. 
32 Philosophers need not use the word “false” to reject a theory on grounds of its falsehood. Sometimes philosophers 
use other words, most notably “mistaken” or “wrong.” 
33 Niiniluoto 2007:182-195, in Kuipers (ed.) 2007. These desiderata apply to scientific theories, but preliminarily I 
am going to assume that they could apply to philosophical theories too. 
 19	  
Consider now the claim that Barack Obama is a Republican. This claim can be said to be 
inadequate too, but it’s plausible to hold that it is inadequate in a stronger sense than the 
previous one (strictly speaking, “inadequate” falls short of characterizing what’s wrong with this 
second claim). This claim doesn’t simply fail to do a service to someone who wants to know 
about Barack Obama’s political views; it does her a disservice, in so far as it leads her to 
entertain a false belief. This example, which I think can be extended to philosophical claims and 
theories (of course, with adjustments to account for the difference in abstraction and 
complexity), suggests that claims, i.e., assertions, can of course be seen as having a variety of 
inadequacies, but that falsehood probably takes the lead as the primary one.  
 
In Chapter 5 I will have more to say about grounds other than falsehood to reject philosophical 
theories. I will essentially argue that, under a generous but plausible understanding of “truth” and 
“falsehood,” philosophical theories ultimately are (rationally) accepted or rejected in terms of 
truth and falsehood.34 Accordingly, I assume from now on that, when a philosopher rejects a 
theory about an object x,35 it’s natural is to take this philosopher to believe that this theory is 
false of x.36 The chief insight of this study is that, at least in some cases, it’s better to construe 
rejection of previous philosophical theories by subsequent philosophers in terms of partial truth 
rather than falsehood. I will talk extensively about the benefits, both interpretative and 
philosophical, of this insight; preliminarily, I want to give two quick reasons.  
 
First, in many instances, to claim that philosopher Φ rejects theory θ on the grounds of falsehood 
(i.e., on the grounds that philosopher Φ believes that theory θ is false) doesn’t do justice to the 
fact that philosopher Φ credits theory θ with containing philosophically interesting truth. This 
circumstance suggests that philosopher Φ doesn’t take theory θ to be false simpliciter (in the way 
in which, for instance, someone might take a description of the Statue of Liberty that goes: “It’s 
a man wearing jeans and a T-shirt holding a baseball bat in his right hand,” and so on, to be false 
simpliciter). Rather, it suggests that philosopher Φ takes theory θ to combine significant 
falsehood with significant truth. But then, again, falsehood and truth arguably aren’t combined in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 However truth and falsehood are philosophically construed. I will argue in Chapter 5 that this is a subsequent, 
separate question. 
35 “Object” broadly construed. 
36 As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 5, “false” can be construed here in various ways, not necessarily as lack 
of correspondence with an independently existing object. 
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an accidental way, in the way in which a description of the Statue of Liberty might go: “It’s a 
woman (true) wearing a T-shirt (false),” and so on. The combination of truth and falsity is more 
complex and difficult to capture, and my notion of partial truth wants to make progress in this 
direction.37  
 
Second, if it were the case that the philosophers proposing a theory as alternative to the one they 
reject saw themselves as swapping falsehood for truth (in the same way in which, for instance, I 
might replace a description of the Statue of Liberty that goes: “It’s a man wearing jeans and a T-
shirt,” and so on, by one that goes: “It’s a woman wearing robes,” and so on), little justice would 
again be done to the fact that, in many instances, these philosophers see themselves as providing 
a more comprehensive theory. If, according to such and such philosophers, previous theories 
were false simpliciter, the new theories wouldn’t be more “comprehensive;” they’d simply be 
true as opposed to false. 
 
Before going any further, it’s important to stress that philosophically interesting truth is far from 
trivial, whereby it’s plausible to hold that philosophical theories that contain it can’t be false 
simpliciter. In the case of the Statue of Liberty, it’s relatively trivial that, if a description goes: 
“It’s a tablet evoking the law, on which the American date of independence is inscribed …” 
instead of: “It’s a man wearing jeans and a T-shirt, holding a baseball bat in his right hand …” 
“interesting” truth about the Statue of Liberty is being discovered.38 In the case of philosophy, 
however, things are very different, or so I shall argue: in many instances it requires hard 
philosophical work to simply get to “observe” the right philosophical object. As I suggested 
before, given that philosophical objects aren’t around us for us to observe, to say things that are 
true of them entails in many instances that philosophically interesting truth is being discovered.39 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 In Chapter 5 I’ll have more to say about the idea of combination of truth and falsehood. I will essentially argue 
that, given that the expression “combination of truth and falsehood” is far from univocal, it doesn’t do 
straightforwardly explanatory work on why some philosophers reject philosophical accounts that, they acknowledge, 
contain philosophically interesting truth. In particular, the expression “combination of truth and falsehood” doesn’t 
exclude, without further elucidation, the possibility of partial truth with no falsehood. 
38 The scare quotes suggest that in this case truth is interesting in a fairly mundane sense  
39 It won’t do to object that philosophical objects (at least many of them) are around for us to observe (for instance, 
material objects, knowledge claims, moral behavior, and so on): pure observation doesn’t disclose these objects in 
their philosophical outlook. 
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1.2.2 Objects: Philosophical Versus Ordinary 
 
My last point brings us to the difference between philosophical and ordinary objects. 
Philosophically interesting truth, I have suggested, is far from trivial largely because of the fact 
that, different from ordinary objects, it is far from trivial to get to observe the right philosophical 
object in the first place. How ordinary objects differ from philosophical ones is going to be an 
important question in the framework of this essay; but, more specifically, in so far as much of the 
motivation behind my choice of examples in the central chapters will depend on some 
assumptions about philosophical objects that, being far from uncontroversial, require some 
justification. This is why it is worthwhile to briefly discuss them here. These assumptions are 
basically two. First, I will assume that philosophical objects differ from ordinary ones not so 
much in virtue of possessing special properties making them philosophical than in virtue of the 
special approach we adopt towards them. Second, I will assume that, nonetheless, at least some 
philosophical objects do possess some special properties that make them philosophically 
interesting.40 In virtue of these properties, I will argue, partial truth about philosophical objects 
(the ones possessing these properties) can be seen to contribute something philosophically 
negative as opposed to insufficient or incomplete (in Chapter 5 I will elaborate on why). In other 
words (and this is my chief insight here), making the case that there is partial truth in philosophy 
in the way I want to construe this notion requires choosing as examples philosophical theories 
about philosophical objects possessing these properties.  
 
Let’s briefly discuss each of these two assumptions. The first one is that philosophical objects in 
general don’t differ from ordinary ones in virtue of possessing special properties making them 
philosophical, but in virtue of the special approach we adopt towards them. This can be seen 
straightforwardly when we consider that ordinary objects, like chairs, tables, trees, mountains, 
the Statue of Liberty, and so on, can easily become philosophical objects, as soon as we start 
asking special questions about them (Do chairs and tables exist? Are they physical entities? Are 
they made of matter? Do they have properties? Are they substances?, and so on).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 “Properties,” here and henceforth, broadly construed. 
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However, while philosophical objects in general are not philosophical in virtue of possessing 
some special properties that make them philosophical but in virtue of the special approach we 
adopt towards them, at least some philosophical objects do possess special properties that make 
them philosophically interesting. There are three properties I want to specifically concentrate on, 
and the insight I want to pursue is that objects possessing these three properties have a 
philosophically interesting connection to partial truth (in a way that I will spell out in Chapter 5). 
 
Reality, when looked at philosophically, can be seen as containing entities of a unique and 
elusive nature, to be distinguished from those far less mysterious entities about which we may 
lack a great deal of knowledge, but not a reasonably good idea of how to acquire, at least on final 
instance, this knowledge. Typically, but not always, these entities aren’t unique and elusive 
because we lack familiarity with them, but despite the fact that we are familiar (sometimes, very 
familiar) with them. These entities are unique and elusive in an essential, not in a factual sense.41  
 
Consider numbers, for example. We are all too familiar with numbers, and have no difficulty 
dealing with them in ordinary life, at least in so far as we are able to count things and make 
simple calculations; at a more advanced level, arithmetic and algebra provides us with a wealth 
of interesting truths about them. From a philosophical point of view, however, numbers have a 
unique and elusive nature. What are numbers? Do they exist independently from us? Are they 
human inventions? Are truths about them objective or subjective? These are all prima facie 
meaningful and legitimate questions, but answering them is a very difficult task. Successive 
attempts in the history of philosophy to answer them have been rejected and replaced by newer 
accounts, rejected in turn. Today, as much as two millennia ago, we stand quite at a loss to say 
what numbers exactly are, even if contemporary advances in logic and the philosophy of 
mathematics have made the handling of these questions much more precise. Along with 
numbers, we can think of things such as the mind, time, values, language, meaning, 
intentionality, just to name a few, as further examples of entities42 that, seen from a philosophical 
point of view, possess a unique and elusive nature. The first special property that some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Conversely, some entities are elusive in a factual, not essential sense. The Yeti or the Loch Ness Monster, for 
instance, are elusive creatures, because nobody has ever been able to offer incontestable evidence that they exist. 
However, neither the Yeti nor the Loch Ness Monster are elusive in an essential sense (that is, what sort of entities 
they are doesn’t raise particularly puzzling questions from a philosophical perspective). 
42 “Entity” broadly construed. 
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philosophical objects can be seen to have is uniqueness and elusiveness (I’ll treat them as if they 
were a single property, even though they are two, and of a different sort43).44 
 
In addition to (or independently from) being unique and elusive, some entities can be seen to be 
central in a philosophical understanding of reality. What I mean by this is that some entities are 
of such nature that there is a philosophically interesting route from a philosophical understanding 
of the nature of this entity to a philosophical understanding of the nature of the rest of entities 
(that is, ultimately, of reality) This doesn’t need to happen by virtue of the fact that the rest of 
entities are ontologically grounded on this entity; the idea is, rather, that they are 
epistemologically (or methodologically) grounded on it.45 
 
In Medieval philosophy, for instance, it was common to consider God to be an entity on which 
the rest of entities are grounded; this would be an example of ontological grounding, and it 
doesn’t need to involve the view that God is an entity which is central in a philosophical 
understanding of reality (although in Medieval philosophy that happened to be the case too). In 
Modern philosophy (roughly from Descartes to Hegel), on the other hand, it was common to 
consider the mind (understood in terms of consciousness)46 to be an entity understanding of 
which makes understanding of the rest of entities and of reality possible. I take this to be an 
example of an entity on which the rest of entities is epistemologically (or methodologically) 
grounded.47 This explains why in Modern philosophy, claims about the nature of reality are 
typically grounded on claims about the nature of the mind (specifically, of how the mind relates 
to reality).48 Crudely speaking, this is true of Descartes (the first Modern philosopher), Spinoza, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Uniqueness is an ontological category, whereas elusiveness is an epistemic one. On the other hand, an entity can 
be unique but not necessarily elusive, and the other way around. 
44 Perhaps uniqueness and elusiveness can be analyzed in terms of resistance to integration into a physical picture of 
the world (this seems to be what numbers, the mind, time, values, language, meaning, and intentionality have in 
common). 
45 “Epistemologically” broadly construed: understanding of the nature of this entity doesn’t need to involve 
knowledge of it. 
46 See Chapter 2, section 2. 1. 
47 This is the case if we assume a representationalist view in virtue of which our perception of things is mediated by 
our mental representations of things, whereby the mind is the entity through which we access the rest of entities. We 
will see, though, that the mind can also be seen to be an entity central for a philosophical understanding of reality 
even if we drop representationalist commitments (section Chapter 2, section 2.2 and 2.4.). 
48 The fact that for Modern philosophers the question how the mind relates to “reality” (i.e., the external world) is 
philosophically legitimate (and in fact central) straightforwardly shows that for them the mind isn’t a part of reality 
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Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hegel,49 among others. For all these philosophers, I 
hold, the mind (understood in terms of consciousness) was an entity which, in addition to being 
of a unique and elusive nature (in the sense sketched above), was central in a philosophical 
understanding of reality.50  
 
It seems fair to say that most philosophers agree that some entity or another possesses a unique 
and elusive nature in the sense sketched above. Not all philosophers, however, agree that these 
entities are, in addition, central in a philosophical understanding of reality. Generally speaking, 
there are few entities fulfilling the requirement of centrality, whereas there are many that fulfill 
the requirement of uniqueness and elusiveness. For instance, many philosophers agree that 
numbers are entities of a unique and elusive nature, but few believe that numbers play a central 
role in a philosophical understanding of reality in the sense sketched in my previous paragraph.51 
 
Finally, a third property that some philosophical objects can be seen to have concerns truth: even 
if it’s the case that their unique and elusive nature makes it a challenge for philosophy to capture, 
it can be the case that truth about it can be achieved, if only the right standpoint toward them is 
found and adopted. This property involves two ideas. First, it involves the anti-skeptical idea 
that, for all its uniqueness and elusiveness, we can get to know true things about the entity in 
question. (Sometimes this idea acquires a stronger form, namely that skepticism about this entity 
is confused or meaningless.) For instance, at least some philosophers believe that, for all their 
uniqueness and elusiveness, it’s possible to eventually understand the nature of numbers. 
Second, it involves the point that adopting the right standpoint toward this entity is 
philosophically crucial to adequately understand its nature. This goes hand in hand with the idea 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
itself; it’s the “entity” that lets reality appear in the first place. That’s what I mean to capture when I claim that in 
Modern philosophy the mind is central for a philosophical understanding of reality. 
49 Of course, in significantly different ways and defending widely diverging philosophical doctrines. 
50 Another example of an entity (or phenomenon) that can be seen to be central in a philosophical understanding of 
reality is language in the analytic tradition of philosophy (i.e., the one that starts with Frege, Russell, and 
Wittgenstein and continues with Carnap, Quine, Putnam, Davidson, and Kripke, to name a few of its foremost 
representatives). Of course, analytic philosophers don’t study language in order to find out what the nature of reality 
is. The philosophical route leading us from language to reality isn’t that simple. Rather (and, of course, crudely put), 
claims about reality (or of entities important for a philosophical picture of reality) are typically grounded on claims 
(or, rather, assumptions) about language and how it relates to reality. 
51 Perhaps only Pythagoras held such position. 
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that philosophical objects differ from ordinary ones in so far as it’s crucial to adopt the right 
standpoint toward them. 
 
Let’s recapitulate. Whereas philosophical objects don’t differ from ordinary ones by virtue of 
possessing special properties that make them philosophical, but rather by virtue of the special 
approach we adopt towards them, there are nonetheless some philosophical objects that can be 
seen as possessing special properties making them philosophically important: uniqueness and 
elusiveness, centrality in a philosophical understanding of reality, and cognizability, i.e., the 
potentiality to be known if only the right standpoint toward them is found and adopted. This sort 
of philosophical objects (assuming that there are such52) are important in the context of this 
essay, because partial truth about them (in the way I construe this notion) can be seen to 
contribute something philosophically negative, not merely insufficient or not positive enough. 
They are thus ideal candidates to construct my case that there is such a thing as partial truth in 
philosophy, and that this notion can play an explanatory role in accounting for the fact that 
(sometimes) philosophers reject past theories about x (reality, knowledge, morality, etc.) while 
acknowledging at the same time that the theories being rejected contain philosophically 
interesting truth. 
 
1.2.3 Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel. Consciousness, Human Being, the Absolute 
 
To conclude this first chapter, I proceed to introduce the three examples I will offer in this study 
as providing evidence that there can be partial truth in philosophy in the sense sketched so far (to 
be further elaborated on in my central chapters and in Chapter 5). I hasten to point out that, to 
some extent, the choice of examples is flexible, and different ones (that is, different 
philosophical objects, different philosophers, and different periods) might have been chosen. 
What is required for my examples to work is, I believe, three things: first, the objects to be 
discussed must be such that adopting or failing to adopt the right standpoint toward them must 
make a difference in whether we are observing the right object to start with (and that means that, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 We will see in short that at least according to three significant philosophers in the Continental tradition of 
philosophy, there are such philosophical objects (later on, my additional suggestion will be that the same is true of 
significant philosophers in the history of philosophy generally, indeed that philosophy as a theoretical discipline has 
a strong tendency to gravitate around those objects). 
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at its most general, the objects must be philosophical; more particularly, the objects must be 
special in the sense elicited in my last section: that is, they must be unique and elusive, central in 
a philosophical understanding of reality, and cognizable, in the sense that truth about them can 
be achieved, if the right standpoint toward them is found and adopted); second, it must be 
possible to adopt at least two different standpoints toward them, and one of these standpoints 
must be grounded on the other (that is, using the terminology I introduced before, one of these 
standpoints must be secondary with respect to the other, which is more basic); third, adopting a 
secondary standpoint toward the object in question can be seen to provide us with partial truth 
about that object, i.e., with beliefs (claims, theses) that are true of only a part of the object. The 
goal to be pursued is to argue that a philosopher can provide a theory which is true of only part 
of an object by dint of having adopted a secondary standpoint toward that object instead of a 
basic one. This circumstance can be used, in turn, to explain why subsequent philosophers have 
rejected past philosophical theories while acknowledging that they contain philosophically 
interesting truth: because they believe they are partially true in the way I construe this notion. 
 
I think it would be possible to show that the thesis that philosopher Φ argues that their 
predecessors have provided us with only partial truth about an object (for instance, reality, 
knowledge, morality, etc.) on account of having adopted a standpoint toward that object which is 
not so much wrong as secondary with respect to a more basic one, works for a high number of 
philosophers and philosophical objects, within different periods in the history of philosophy. If in 
this study I focus on the European (Continental) tradition of philosophy and on the specific 
philosophers I choose it’s largely for the reason that familiarity with this tradition and these 
philosophers allows me to construct my case with much greater detail than I would in the case of 
different philosophers belonging to other philosophical periods and traditions. 53  This 
circumstance shouldn’t mislead the reader, however, into believing that I intend my construction 
of the notion of partial truth to apply only to these cases. I take these cases to be exemplary, but 
still examples of a pattern that I take to extend to the history of philosophy and the philosophical 
praxis in general. Let’s then proceed to introduce the three examples. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Given the amount of detail with which I will cover these three figures, I expect to do justice to their intrinsic 
philosophical interest. If the reader isn’t convinced by my overall thesis, she can read this dissertation as three 
separate studies on each of these figures.  
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According to three significant philosophers in the European tradition of philosophy, J. P. Sartre, 
M. Heidegger, and G. W. F. Hegel, three entities 1) possess a unique and elusive nature which is 
a challenge for philosophy to capture and 2) play a central role in a philosophical understanding 
of reality; but 3) truth about them can be achieved if the right standpoint toward them is found 
and adopted. These entities are consciousness for Sartre, human being for Heidegger, and the 
Absolute for Hegel. At its most general, the thesis I will defend is that, according to Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, the best past philosophical theories of, respectively, consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute have been inadequate, but not exactly false; what is inadequate 
about them is that they provide us with only partial truth in the sense sketched above (to be 
further elaborated on in Chapter 5).  
 
1.2.3.1 Sartre on Consciousness 
 
According to Sartre, all previous philosophical theories about consciousness have been 
inadequate. At its most general, the thesis I will defend about Sartre (Chapter 2) is that, in the 
case of the best past philosophical theories, Sartre believes that they have been inadequate but 
not exactly false; what is inadequate about them is that they provide us only with partial truth 
about consciousness. The strategy I will use to defend this claim will be as follows. First, I will 
claim that the problem of the best past theories is best described by saying that, according to 
Sartre, they result from adopting an inadequate standpoint toward consciousness. Second, this 
standpoint is not inadequate in the sense that is wrong but in the sense that is secondary: a more 
basic standpoint takes precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place. Third, once we 
succeed to understand the nature of this more basic standpoint and adopt it, it turns out that what 
we are able to know about consciousness from the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as, 
rather, partial.  Thus, I will conclude (and this will be my chief thesis concerning Sartre), Sartre 
provides us with an example of what I see as being partial truth in philosophy in the sense I want 
to elicit in this study (in this case, about consciousness). 
 
1.2.3.2  Heidegger on Human Being 
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According to Heidegger, human being has a unique and elusive nature which is a challenge for 
philosophy to capture. Now according to Heidegger, previous philosophical accounts of human 
being have been inadequate. (Similar to Sartre, Heidegger is worried about the best accounts so 
far; here the task of finding paradigmatic examples is more difficult, as they spread through the 
whole history of philosophy; as I will explain in Chapter 3, I will choose the “philosophical 
tradition” to be Heidegger’s target.) At its most general, the thesis I will defend about Heidegger 
is that, under analysis, these accounts are according to Heidegger inadequate but not exactly 
false; what is inadequate about them is that they provide us only with partial truth about human 
being. To show this I will proceed as follows. First, I will claim that the problem of previous 
accounts is best described by saying that, according to Heidegger, they result from adopting an 
inadequate standpoint toward human being. Second, this standpoint is not inadequate in the 
sense that is wrong but in the sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint takes precedence 
over it and makes it possible in the first place. Third, once we succeed to understand the nature 
of this more basic standpoint and adopt it, it turns out that what we are able to know about 
human being from the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as, rather, partial. Thus, I will 
conclude (and this will be my chief thesis concerning Heidegger), Heidegger provides us with an 
example of what he sees as being partial truth in philosophy (in this case, about human being). 
 
1.2.3.3  Hegel on the Absolute 
 
According to Hegel, the Absolute54 plays a central role in a philosophical understanding of 
reality, but the Absolute has a unique and elusive nature which is a challenge for philosophy to 
capture. Now according to Hegel, previous philosophical accounts of the Absolute have been 
inadequate. At its most general, the thesis I want to defend concerning Hegel on the Absolute is 
that, under analysis, these accounts are according to Hegel inadequate but not exactly false; what 
is inadequate about them is that they provide us only with partial truth about the Absolute. To 
show this I will proceed as follows. First, I will claim that the problem of previous accounts is 
best described by saying that, according to Hegel, they result from adopting an inadequate 
standpoint toward the Absolute. Second, this standpoint is not inadequate in the sense that is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Hegel’s chief alternative term is “Spirit” (Geist in German); alternative terms used by Hegel include “Reason” 
(Vernunft), “God” (Gott), and “the True” (das Wahre). 
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wrong but in the sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint takes precedence over it and 
makes it possible in the first place. third, once we succeed to understand the nature of this more 
basic standpoint and adopt it, it turns out that what we are able to know about the Absolute from 
the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as, rather, partial. Thus, I will conclude (and this 
will be my chief thesis concerning Hegel), Hegel provides us with an example of what he sees as 
being partial truth in philosophy (in this case, about the Absolute). 
 
1.2.4 Summary 
 
To conclude this chapter, let me summarize my chief results so far. A look at the history of 
philosophy shows that philosophers have in many instances been anxious to fight accounts they 
take to be inadequate, but not exactly false. This circumstance raises philosophically interesting 
questions, among which the most obvious one is: what is inadequate with a philosophical 
account that is not false? The option to be explored in this study is partial truth, construed in as: 
truth of only part of an object.  
 
A description can be seen not to be false in so far as the right object is being described; but still 
inadequate in so far as only a part is being described. In this case, the description is partially true 
(true of only part of its object). In this study, I want to defend the thesis that something like that 
can be seen to happen in philosophy; or rather, more accurately, that some philosophers have 
seen this their predecessors as doing this. My strategy for defending this thesis is to help myself 
with three examples along similar lines. On the basis of two plausible assumptions about the 
nature of philosophical objects, I suggest attacking the notion of partial truth with a shift of 
focus, from objects to standpoints toward objects. A standpoint is a perspective, point of view, 
stance, etc. we adopt over an object, rather than an object itself. A standpoint toward an object is 
something more elusive and difficult to characterize than an object. A standpoint can become an 
object (for instance, we can discuss whether observing the Statue of Liberty from the back, rather 
than from the front, works better to figure out its height), but it’s best to think of a standpoint as 
something we adopt, not as something we observe; that is, as something we experience in the 
first person, not in the third one.  
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A standpoint can, as much as an object, be seen to have parts and wholes, but “part” and “whole” 
must be taken in a figurative, not in a literal sense. A standpoint can be seen to be “part” of 
another standpoint if the former is grounded on the latter. A standpoint is grounded on another if 
the latter takes precedence over the former and makes it phenomenologically (or 
epistemologically) possible to begin with, but not the other way round. For instance, what we can 
observe of the Statue of Liberty through binoculars is grounded on what we can observe of it 
through the naked eye but not the other way round; phenomenologically, how things look like 
through the naked eye takes precedence over how things looks like through the binocular. If 
that’s the case, I say that the former standpoint is secondary with respect to the latter, which is 
basic. The possibility to be explored in this study is whether, in the case of some objects and 
some standpoints, adopting a secondary standpoint toward an object might allow us to see only 
part of that object, whereas adopting a basic standpoint might allow us to see it in its entirety. If 
this possibility proves successful, we can provide a philosophically interesting reason of why in 
some instances philosophers have been able to observe only a “part” (an aspect) of an object: 
because they were adopting a secondary standpoint toward that object. This reason can in turn 
provide a philosophically interesting explanation of why subsequent philosophers have believed 
that past philosophers, because of the fact that they were observing only part of an object, but 
still the right object, have taken their theories to be partially true rather than false. 
 
Philosophical objects differ from ordinary objects less in virtue of possessing special properties 
that make them philosophical than in virtue of the special approach we adopt towards them. 
However, some philosophical objects do possess special properties that make them 
philosophically interesting. Three properties have an interesting connection to partial truth in 
philosophy. First, some philosophical objects have a unique and elusive nature which is a 
challenge for philosophy to capture (for instance, numbers or the mind); philosophical 
uniqueness and elusiveness doesn’t occur because we lack familiarity with an object, but despite 
the fact (sometimes because) we are familiar with that object. Second, some philosophical 
objects are central in a philosophical understanding of reality because not the rest of entities, but 
philosophical understanding of the rest of entities, are grounded on them. Philosophically 
speaking, these entities are our way of access to the rest of entities. An example of entities 
central in a philosophical understanding of reality is the mind in Modern philosophy and 
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language in Analytic philosophy. Finally, at least some entities which are unique, elusive, and 
central in a philosophical understanding of reality are (or can be seen to be) cognizable: truth 
about them can be achieved, as long as the right standpoint toward them is found and adopted. 
These three features have an interesting connection to partial truth because partial truth about 
philosophical objects possessing them can be philosophically negative as opposed to insufficient 
or not positive enough. 
 
According to three significant philosophers in the European tradition of philosophy, Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, three entities (different in each case) 1) have a unique and elusive nature 
which is a challenge for philosophy to capture; 2) play a central role in a philosophical 
understanding of reality; but 3) truth about them can be achieved if the right standpoint toward 
them is found and adopted. These entities are consciousness for Sartre, human being for 
Heidegger, and the Absolute for Hegel. In this study I will show that, according to Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, past philosophical theories of, respectively, consciousness, human being, 
and the Absolute, have been inadequate but not exactly false; what is inadequate about them is 
that they provide us only with partial truth about these objects. Central to my defense will be the 
idea that, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, previous philosophers have adopted a 
secondary standpoint toward consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, which has allowed 
them to see only a “part” (an aspect) of them. What results from this is partially true (not false) 
theories about consciousness, human being, and the Absolute. This truth is partial, not in the 
sense that is insufficient or incomplete, but in the sense that is misleading or negative. Drawing 
on these three examples I hope to show in Chapter 5 that the notion of partial truth, in the way I 
construct it, can be helpful to make sense of some instances of rejection of philosophical theories 
by philosophers who acknowledge those theories as containing philosophically interesting truth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SARTRE ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
According to Sartre, all past philosophical theories of consciousness have been inadequate in 
some way or another. At its most general, the thesis I want to defend in this chapter is that at 
least the best past theories are according to Sartre inadequate but not exactly false; what is 
inadequate about them is that they provide us with partial truth about consciousness (in the sense 
sketched in Chapter 1, to be elaborated on in Chapter 5). Crucial to my defense will be the notion 
of standpoint and the idea that, according to Sartre, there is a secondary and a basic standpoint 
that we can adopt over consciousness. In essence, I will argue that the following holds according 
to Sartre. First, what is problematic about the best past theories is best described by saying that 
they result from adopting an inadequate standpoint toward consciousness. Second, this 
standpoint is not inadequate in the sense that is wrong but in the sense that is secondary: a more 
basic standpoint takes precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place. Third, what we 
are able to know about consciousness from the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as 
partial. As I anticipated in Chapter 1, I will take this to be an example of partial truth in 
philosophy, and I will argue in Chapter 5 that the notion of partial truth, conveniently spelled out, 
can be a helpful notion to make sense of at least some instances of rejection of theories by 
philosophers who acknowledge those theories to contain philosophically interesting truth. These 
instances, I will suggest, constitute a significant pattern in the history of philosophy and 
philosophy praxis, and more attention should be paid to it. 
 
In order to defend these claims, I need first of all to delimit Sartre’s target, the theories I’ll 
contend he takes to be partially true. Given that, to Sartre’s eyes, his theory is essentially the first 
to get the nature of consciousness quite right, he considers all past philosophical theories of 
consciousness inadequate in some way or another. However, it would be a mistake to run all of 
these theories together, as Sartre credits some with having contributed philosophically interesting 
truth, whereas he ignores others for being inept or uninteresting. Two figures deserve Sartre’s 
credit for having contributed most to our philosophical understanding of consciousness, 
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Descartes and Husserl. 55  For all their philosophical merits, however, Sartre believes that 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness must be rejected. What we have here, I 
contend, is the sort of relation between a philosopher and his predecessors that is the goal of this 
study to elucidate: rejection of a theory that, it’s acknowledged, contains philosophically 
interesting truth. How do we square these two facts, rejection and acknowledgement of 
interesting truth? My answer is partial truth. Essentially, I will take Sartre to believe that 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories are not false in so far as in them the right object is being 
described;56 but that are still inadequate in so far as only a part57 of that object is being described. 
I will suggest that what we have here is a scenario analogous to the one of my very first example 
(Chapter 1): a description of the Statue of Liberty that goes: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet 
evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 
1776 …,” and so on, can be seen not to be false in so far as the right object is being described, 
but still inadequate in so far as only a part of that object is being described. (We still need to see 
why Sartre wants to reject these theories, instead of complete or supplement them; I’ll discuss 
this in Chapter 5). 
 
To make my case, I will focus on Sartre’s early work, in particular on The Transcendence of the 
Ego (TE).58 The reason why I draw on Sartre’s early work is simple: its overarching theme is 
consciousness, and its overarching goal is to come up with an adequate philosophical 
understanding of it, which includes as a task engaging critically with past philosophical theories 
of consciousness and showing their inadequacies. The reason why I draw on TE is that this work 
is Sartre’s first significant philosophical publication, which involves two things. First, being 
Sartre’s first publication, TE is the work by Sartre most obviously indebted to his predecessors 
(in this case, Descartes and Husserl), whereby what according to Sartre is philosophically 
valuable in them stands out more conspicuously than in later work. Second, being Sartre’s first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This simplifies things a bit, as there are more figures that might be candidates to deserving this credit (Bergson, 
Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, among others). However, they are a plausible choice, and my case for partial truth can 
be construed for both of them along roughly similar lines, which makes them methodologically more interesting 
than other choices. 
56 Which, per Chapter 1, section 1.2.1. (final paragraph), involves philosophically interesting truth. 
57 Or, in this case, an aspect or mode of it. 
58 Although I’ll be drawing on other works, especially from Sartre’s early period; these include: The Emotions: 
Outline of a Theory (E) (Sartre [1939] 1948), The Imaginary (I) (Sartre [1940] 2004b), and Being and 
Nothingness (BT) (Sartre [1943] 1992a). 
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articulation of his own theory, TE engages critically with Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories and 
shows their inadequacies quite conspicuously too.59 TE, in a nutshell, exemplarily showcases 
Sartre’s double stance towards Descartes and Husserl that is my goal in this chapter (and this 
study) to elucidate (i.e., rejection of a theory that, it’s acknowledged, contains philosophically 
interesting truth). 
 
Before proceeding to make my case, let me make two quick disclaimers.  
 
First, in view of its title (Transcendence of the Ego), TE seems to be an essay about the ego, i.e., 
about the self, not about consciousness. It’s plausible to assume that the self has a 
philosophically interesting connection to consciousness,60 whereby it’s plausible to expect of an 
interesting philosophical work on the self (as TE undoubtedly is) to say philosophically 
interesting things about consciousness. But it’s not clear that a philosophical work on the self 
should thereby be a work on consciousness. Given that I think this is the case of TE, I need to 
provide some justification for this view. Most of this justification will be given in the course of 
this chapter, in which I intend to show that Sartre’s views about the self derive from his views 
about consciousness, rather than the other way round.61 By now let me preliminarily point out 
that the self and consciousness, for Sartre as much as for Descartes and for Husserl, are tightly 
connected, whereby any philosophically interesting thesis by Sartre about one amounts to a 
philosophically interesting thesis about the other. (To be faithful to the letter of TE, I’ll be 
sometimes speaking of Sartre’s views about the self, although, as we will see, what I really mean 
with that on final analysis will be Sartre’s views about consciousness). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 A more elaborate treatment of Descartes and Husserl can be found at different places of BN. 
60 Although this assumption can be challenged: philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, for instance, might 
arguably reject it. 
61 I need this claim to my make my overall case in this chapter, for, remember, in this chapter I claim that, according 
to Sartre, Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness are partially true rather than false. More specifically, I 
need this claim to argue, in Chapter 5, that what Sartre criticizes in TE isn’t so much Descartes’ and Husserl’s views 
about the self as their views about consciousness. This claim, in turn, will allow me to argue that we can construe 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s thesis that there is a self in consciousness as being true for Sartre (even though in fact 
Sartre believes this thesis is false), while it still holds that, for Sartre, Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of 
consciousness should be rejected (Chapter 5, section 5.1.2.). The point I’ll be making is that Sartre would find 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness inadequate even if (counterfactually) Sartre believed all the 
theses contained in them (for instance, those about the self) were true.  
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Second, even though TE’s chief targets are Descartes and Husserl, Sartre targets more figures, 
although more peripherally. One is the philosopher Immanuel Kant, a figure I’ll say some things 
about, but whom I will largely leave aside in this chapter. Another is the French moralist 
François de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680), who according to Sartre is the foremost 
representative of what he calls the “French moralists.” It isn’t clear that Sartre’s allusions to Kant 
might suffice to defend a thesis analogous to the one I defend with regard to Descartes and 
Husserl.62 But we will see that this can be done with regard to La Rochefoucauld and the 
moralists, whereby I will devote a section to discuss Sartre’s views about their theory of 
consciousness too (section 2.3. below), and profit from this discussion to supplement my case 
about Descartes and Husserl with a third, additional, figure. 
 
2. 1 DESCARTES ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Given that this chapter concerns consciousness from a philosophical perspective it’d be good to 
start with a preliminary discussion of what is going to be meant by consciousness here. This task, 
however, wouldn’t be without some dangers, as per Chapter 1, philosophical objects aren’t 
around for us to observe, whereby it’s not clear what exactly a specific philosophical object is 
unless we somehow know that we’re adopting the right standpoint toward it. To start with a 
general definition of consciousness, in other words, wouldn’t guarantee that we have captured 
the right object to begin with. It seems therefore better to let the characterization of 
consciousness emerge from Sartre himself or, rather, from the past philosophers he takes to have 
contributed most to their philosophical understanding. 
 
The first philosopher Sartre credits with having contributed philosophically interesting truth 
about consciousness is Descartes. In this section I briefly spell out Descartes’ views on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Essentially, Sartre argues that Kant’s famous claim that “the I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations” (Critique of Pure Reason B131-132; Kant [1781/1787] 1998: 246) may well be true from a critical 
(epistemological) standpoint, but not necessarily from a factual (phenomenological) one. Kant is right, says Sartre in 
other words, that all consciousness of x may become the object of an “I think” (Sartre takes this to mean that I can 
always reflect on my consciousness of x and make a statement of the form “I am conscious of x”); but this doesn’t 
mean that all consciousness of x is the object of an “I think” (i.e., not all consciousness of x is of the form “I am 
conscious of x”). Here the notion of standpoint and issues of priority can be seen to engage a philosophically 
important debate: whereas Sartre and Husserl would hold that Kant’s epistemological (critical) standpoint is 
secondary with respect to a phenomenological (factual) one, Kant would hold that the opposite is true. 
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consciousness in a way that highlights the chief points on which later I will construct my case.63 
There are three points in Descartes’ theory of consciousness that must be emphasized in 
connection to Sartre: according to Descartes, (a) the mind must be understood in terms of 
consciousness; (b) consciousness is completely revealed in the cogito; and (c) the cogito occurs 
in reflection. Let’s briefly consider each of these points in turn. 
 
2. 1. 1 The Mind 
 
Descartes is the first philosopher to have taken the mind to be an entity that is philosophically 
special in the way I sketched in Chapter 1. This take by Descartes on the mind, which is shared 
by Sartre too, is going to help me in my overall case on partial truth, for I will be able to suggest 
that partial truth about what Descartes calls the mind (that turns out to be largely equivalent to 
what we today call consciousness64) can be seen to contribute something philosophically 
negative, as opposed to insufficient or incomplete. For Descartes, the mind is a unique and 
elusive sort of entity, not perhaps factually, but certainly philosophically.65 More importantly, for 
Descartes the mind is central in a philosophical understanding of reality: a philosophical 
understanding of reality is grounded on a philosophical understanding of the mind. What 
Descartes means here concerns a question of epistemological priority: we can be certain that we 
know reality only because we can be certain that we know our mind in the first place (and then 
there is a philosophically interesting route from knowledge about our own mind to knowledge 
about reality, via the idea and existence of God). Even more importantly, and here’s the first 
point that needs emphasizing in connection to Sartre, the mind must be understood in terms of 
consciousness.66 Contra the Aristotelian tradition, for which the mind is a principle of life and 
something to be studied as an object, that is, from a third person standpoint, Descartes takes the 
mind to be completely disclosed in our being conscious of it, and accordingly something to be 
studied from the standpoint of the subject, that is, from a first person standpoint. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 My goal in what follows isn’t historical or exegetical. I content myself with presenting a fairly standard picture of 
Descartes that does justice to, or at least doesn’t contradict, Sartre’s reading.  
64 Although, as we will see, with important differences. 
65 Descartes famously claims that factually the mind is better known (i.e., it is less elusive) than our body (cf. 
Second Meditation, subtitle: Descartes [1641] 1984: 16). 
66 There may be qualms about whether Descartes was really the first philosophers to have understood the mind in 
terms of consciousness. St. Augustine is a good candidate of (early) Medieval philosophy for having done so. 
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To get a first glimpse of what, according to Sartre, isn’t as adequate in Descartes’ theory of 
consciousness, it may help to remember that Descartes’ overall philosophical project is 
epistemological. As is well known, Descartes is interested in establishing absolute certainty in 
our knowledge.67 His preliminary strategy is to show that all of our beliefs are on principle 
always dubitable.68 As is also well known, Descartes believes that knowledge coming from 
experience (ultimately from the senses) can be on principle always deceptive (locally, since 
senses sometimes deceive us,69 and globally, since we might be dreaming70). and knowledge not 
coming from experience, that is, rational or a priori knowledge (for instance, arithmetic truths), 
isn’t better off: for all we know, an all-powerful evil demon might trick us into taking to be true a 
belief that is not (for instance, that two plus two equals four), each time that we come to have the 
belief in question.71 What results from this all-around skepticism isn’t that none of our beliefs is 
indubitable and that, therefore, there is no certainty whatsoever,72 but, again as is well-known, 
that at least one of our beliefs is indubitable: that I exist.73 This doesn’t mean that I exist as a 
body or a physical being (indeed, this is what we typically take ourselves to be), because, as 
Descartes has already established, an evil demon might trick me into thinking that I have (or am) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 “I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again 
right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.” 
(Descartes [1641] 1984: 12) 
68 “[I] am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about which a doubt may not 
properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-
out reasons. So in future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs just as carefully as I would from 
obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty.” (Loc. cit. 14-15) 
69 “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. 
But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who 
have deceived us even once.” (Loc. cit. 12) 
70 “As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being 
awake can be distinguished from being asleep. … Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars –that 
my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hand- are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not 
even have such hands or such a body at all.” (Loc. cit. 13) 
71 “I will suppose therefore that … some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his 
energies in order to deceive me.” (Loc. cit. 15) “[S]ince I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where 
they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or 
count the sides of a square, or in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable?” (Loc. cit .14) 
72 “I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of 
the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. 
So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.” (Loc. cit. 16) 
73 “[L]et him [i.e., a deceiver of supreme power and cunning] deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it 
about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I 
must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or 
conceived in my mind.” (Loc. cit. 17). 
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a body, whereas in fact I have (or am) not.74 Rather, what is indubitable is that I exist only in so 
far as I think.75 But then, again, “thinking” shouldn’t be understood here as a cognitive capacity 
that, say, computers can possess too. Rather, and this is the first crucial point that I take Sartre to 
give Descartes credit for, “thinking” means something like to be conscious of something. 
Otherwise, it wouldn’t make sense for Descartes to hold that thinking is the only phenomenon 
absolutely immune to skeptical doubt: if we understood “thinking” in its ordinary meaning, it is 
perfectly dubitable whether I think or not (an evil demon might delude me into making me 
believe my thought processes are rational and coherent, whereas they really are a chaotic mess 
with no thinking whatsoever). By contrast, understood as “being conscious,” it can easily be seen 
that not even the most powerful evil demon can make me doubt that, while I am conscious, I am 
conscious of whatever I am conscious of. 
 
A conscious state in virtue of which consciousness directs towards itself, allowing for the fact 
that consciousness can’t be mistaken that the conscious state of which it is conscious of is 
actually there, is called by Descartes cogito (in Latin, “I think”).  
 
2. 1. 2 The Cogito 
 
As is well known, Descartes took the cogito to be the only legitimate starting point in philosophy, 
the only absolutely indubitable certainty from which we can reconstruct our knowledge. Whether 
Descartes was right in considering the cogito the only legitimate starting point in philosophy or 
in understanding self-consciousness the terms he did, Descartes’ most important and well-known 
insight set the agenda for virtually the whole of Modern philosophy. Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hegel,76 no matter how staunchly opposed to Descartes, somehow 
share his assumption that access to our consciousness77 constitutes a starting point in philosophy, 
or at least a central fact that needs to be incorporated into a philosophical picture of reality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 “I am not that structure of limbs which is called a human body. I am not even some thin vapour which permeates 
the limbs –a wind, fire, air, breath, or whatever I depict in my imagination; for these are things which I have 
supposed to be nothing. Let this supposition stand.” (Loc. cit. 18) 
75 “Thinking? At least I have discovered it –thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist –that is certain. 
But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should 
totally cease to exist.” (Ibid.) 
76 These are the most important names in mainstream Modern Philosophy. Many others could be included. 
77 Of course, there are divergences over the ultimate nature of this “privilege.”  
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While this assumption was challenged in various ways by post-Hegelian (and anti-Cartesian) 
philosophers including, among others, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche,78 
Descartes’ chief insight was taken up anew and radicalized in Husserl’s phenomenology (this 
circumstance will become relevant when we proceed to consider Husserl in section 2.2.).  
 
2. 1. 3  Reflection  
 
There is room for interpretative controversy, but it’s plausible to hold that, according to 
Descartes, consciousness is best studied in reflection. The reason is simple: Descartes believes 
it’s in reflection that consciousness completely reveals to itself, because consciousness 
completely reveals to itself when it is conscious of itself, and consciousness is conscious of itself, 
precisely, in reflection. We will see later on that the crux of my thesis that, according to Sartre, 
Descartes’ theory of consciousness isn’t false but partially true is that Sartre believes that 
consciousness can be conscious of itself (and more fundamentally so) prior to reflection too. I 
will take this to mean that, according to Sartre, there is a standpoint toward consciousness that is 
more basic than reflection. Now it is open to scholarly debate whether Descartes fails to realize 
this circumstance or whether he realizes, but believes that absolute certainty wouldn’t be 
guaranteed in this case. What I think is less open to debate is, as we will see, that according to 
Sartre the following holds: (a) Descartes takes the cogito to be the basis of any philosophically 
interesting truth about consciousness; (b) Descartes’ cogito is secondary with respect to a more 
basic mode of self-consciousness.  
 
2. 2. HUSSERL ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The second philosopher Sartre credits with having contributed philosophically interesting truth 
about consciousness is Husserl. There are three claims by Husserl about consciousness that are 
going to be relevant in my case for partial truth in Sartre with respect to Husserl: (a) 
phenomenology, not psychology, provides us with philosophically interesting truth about 
consciousness; (b) consciousness must be understood in terms of intentionality; and (c) 
consciousness must be studied via reflection. Let’s discuss each of these three points in turn. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 And non-philosophers like, crucially, Freud. Again, many other philosophers could be included here. 
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2. 2. 1 Phenomenology  
 
Late Husserl called phenomenology a “neo-Cartesianism.”79 (We will see in a minute what 
phenomenology exactly is). This testifies to Husserl’s debt to Descartes. Husserl claimed to be 
following a Cartesian program, indeed to follow Descartes’ agenda in a way that was more 
sensitive to Descartes’ discovery of the cogito than he himself had been. For Husserl, as much as 
for Descartes, consciousness is completely revealed in its being conscious of itself, and 
consciousness of itself provides us with the only domain in which absolute evidence can be 
found. Philosophers, who, according to Husserl, are supposed to pursue knowledge in its highest 
degree of evidence, should devote themselves to exploring this domain. 
 
Probably the best way to understand what is so important for Sartre in Husserl’s views of 
consciousness is to contrast them with the view that Husserl attacked: that consciousness is best 
studied from a third-person standpoint, as something we can be conscious of, instead of what is 
conscious. This is the standpoint adopted by psychology, understood not as a branch of 
philosophy (rational psychology), but as a positive science on the model of physics and the rest 
of natural sciences. 
 
Husserl claimed that, for philosophical purposes, consciousness must be taken to be something 
quite different from what psychology took it to be. In the second half of the 19th century, 
psychology became a positive science by taking consciousness to be a part of nature, something 
to be described and explained in the same way in which a physicist describes and explains 
physical phenomena. While Husserl never denied that consciousness can be naturalized nor that 
psychology can become a science,80 he denied the value of psychology when it comes to 
elucidating a particular aspect of consciousness of crucial relevance for philosophy, namely, the 
difference between the objective correlates of our conscious states as opposed to the subjective 
acts in which we are conscious of these correlates. For the purposes of this chapter at least, 
Husserl is then best seen as updating Descartes’ move against the Aristotelian tradition, with its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Husserl CM: 1. 
80 In the sense of “positive science.” Husserl took phenomenology to be the real scientific psychology. But in the 
latter case “scientific” has for Husserl a more pregnant, grander sense than as applied to the empirical sciences. 
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emphasis on the third person standpoint toward consciousness, bringing about a shift of 
standpoint to the first person. 
 
Consider logical laws, for instance.81 If one is after a philosophical elucidation of the validity of 
logical laws, as Husserl was,82 one can be tempted to focus on the psychological processes in 
which logical laws are thought in order to explain that validity. This can be done via a “genetic” 
explication of how we psychologically get to acquire those laws or through a “static” description 
of how we psychologically represent them. In either case, the elucidation proceeds in 
psychological terms, and the goal is a derivation or, more strongly, a deduction of logical laws 
from psychological ones.83 Generally speaking, the attempt to account for, or, more strongly, 
derive, a phenomenon from psychological phenomena is called psychologism. Psychologism 
flourished in the second half of the 19th century, and Husserl’s phenomenology can be seen, at 
least in its origins, as a reaction against it.84  
 
Husserl’s point against psychologism85 was that accounting for the objective validity of logical 
laws in psychological terms involves a category mistake fallacy.86 A Kantian way to put 
Husserl’s point would be to say that logical laws lay claim to a universal, necessary validity that 
no conscious state, taken to occur in space and time, as psychology does, can explain.87 Now this 
Kantian way to put the point is a bit misleading, because it suggests that it’s universality and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This is what set Husserl’s phenomenology going (Logical Investigations [LI]: Husserl [1900/01] 1970). Later on, 
Husserl generalized the objects to be studied to everything consciousness can be conscious of (Ideas Pertaining to a 
Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy [Ideas]: Husserl [1913] 1982) and Cartesian 
Meditations [CM]: Husserl [1931] 1995). 
82 “Our great task is now to bring the Ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and 
definiteness.” (LI: 251) 
83 “The essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in psychology, in whose field those propositions belong –as far 
as their theoretical content is concerned –which give logic its characteristic pattern. Logic is related to psychology 
just as any branch of chemical technology is related to chemistry, as land-surveying is to geometry, etc.” (LI: 90) 
Needless to say, Husserl is here exposing the very idea he wants to attack. Significantly, Husserl’s first monograph 
“The laws of arithmetic,” endorsed psychologism, which was subsequently rejected by Husserl largely as a result of 
a devastating critique by Frege. 
84 We could say “successful reaction.” There is wide agreement that Husserl’s LI crucially helped to discredit the 
psychologist program, at least in the terms in which it was originally put. 
85 LI: Prolegomena to Pure Logic, passim. 
86 LI: 179. Sartre himself puts Husserl’s point thus: “If I seek the psychic facts which are at the basis of the 
arithmetic attitude of the man who counts and calculates, I shall never arrive at the reconstitution of the arithmetic 
essences of unity, number and operation.” (E: 10; my emphasis) 
87 “We are […] interested in what makes science science, which is certainly not its psychology, nor any real context 
into which acts of thought are fitted, but a certain objective or ideal interconnection which these acts a unitary 
objective relevance, and, in such unitary relevance, an ideal validity.” (LI: 225) 
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necessary validity what is irreducible to the conscious acts in which logical laws are thought, 
whereas Husserl’s point concerns the objective sense of logical laws, whether or not universally 
and necessarily valid. What Husserl suggested to avoid the category mistake fallacy was to 
develop a more refined understanding of the conscious acts in which logical laws are thought. 
This understanding is Cartesian in spirit, that is, conscious acts are to be studied in so far as we 
immediately observe them, but Husserl wants to avoid the pitfalls into which Descartes fell when 
trying to make a deductive use of his original discovery that the cogito is immune to skeptical 
doubts. According to Husserl, a rigorous distinction must be drawn between the conscious acts in 
which we grasp (for instance) logical laws and what these acts are conscious of. According to 
Husserl, grasping this distinction with the required radicalism is heavily impaired if one takes 
conscious acts to be spatio-temporal events occurring in the natural world, as psychologism did. 
If the latter is accepted, Husserl believes, there is no way to escape relativism and skepticism.88 
Husserl’s reason is simple: starting from facts you can only explain facts.89 Thus, a radical 
change of standpoint is needed to account for the heterogeneity of objective correlates and 
subjective conscious acts.90  
 
2. 2. 2  Intentionality 
 
We have just seen that, according to Husserl, psychologism fails to provide us with an adequate 
philosophical understanding of consciousness, because it fails to draw a distinction between 
conscious acts and what conscious acts are conscious of. This is just to say that, according to 
Husserl, what psychologism targets isn’t consciousness itself, but a psychological state (entity, 
event, etc.), something we are conscious of.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “Psychologism in all its subvarieties and individual elaborations is in fact the same as relativism, though not 
always recognized and expressely allowed to be such. […] Every doctrine is ipso facto relativistic, a case of specific 
relativism, if, with the empiricists, it treats the pure laws of logic as empirical, psychological laws.” (LI:145).  
89 “[M]ost serious consequences arise for the psychologistic logicians. “The first is that only vague rules could be 
based on vague theoretical foundations. If psychological laws lack exactness, the same must be true of the 
prescriptions of logic.[…] In the second place […] no natural laws can be known a priori, nor established by sheer 
insight. … Nothing, however, seems plainer than that the laws of ‘pure logic’ all have a priori validity.” (LI: 98-99) 
90 “Psychologism can only be radically overcome by a pure phenomenology, a science infinitely removed from 
psychology as the empirical science of the mental attributes and states of animal realities.” (LI: 253) 
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What we need, Husserl believed, is not just refining our psychological theories or developing 
better ones, but, rather, attempting a less theory-laden, at the limit theory-free description of 
consciousness as we observe it. Such description reveals one fundamental fact: conscious states 
are always about something.91 This is what Husserl, following his teacher Franz Brentano, 
expressed by saying that consciousness is intentional.92 The intentionality of consciousness isn’t 
supposed to be a contingent property that might be present in some cases, e.g., in veracious 
perception, but missing in others, e.g. in misperception. Rather, Husserl holds, consciousness is 
intentional through and through, in its very nature: even a misperception, for instance, is 
misperception of something. According to Husserl, the intentionality of consciousness is a 
principle without ontological commitments. By refusing to assimilate, for instance, an arithmetic 
truth to the conscious act in which this truth is known to be true, not only does Husserl refuse to 
assign an ontological status to arithmetic objects, but, moreover, he leaves this ontological status 
systematically undecided. The whole question about the ontological status of the correlates 
(contents) of consciousness is, quite simply, excluded from phenomenology. For Husserl, this 
ontological non-commitment isn’t an optional move that a phenomenologist might or might not 
choose to follow, but the only possible way to do phenomenology. This is why Husserl demands 
a “suspension” or “bracketing” of what he calls our “natural attitude,” in which ontological 
assumptions are always tacitly present.93 Husserl called this suspension “phenomenological 
reduction,”94 and the importance he placed on it cannot be overestimated: as long as the 
phenomenological reduction is not adequately understood, he thought, phenomenology will 
remain a descriptive psychology, and thus a positive science.  
 
2. 2. 3  Reflection  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 “Without exception, every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such.” (CM: 33). 
92 “Conscious process are also called intentional; but then the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this 
universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something.” (CM: 33) Of course, the 
principle of intentionality of consciousness does not exclude the fact that there are “elements” in consciousness that 
are not themselves intentional: “One easily sees […] that not every really inherent moment in the concrete unity of 
an intentive mental process [i.e., a conscious act] itself has the fundamental characteristic, intentionality, thus the 
property of being “consciousness of something.” That concerns, for example, all data of sensation which play so 
great a role in perceptual intuitions of physical things.” (Ideas: 75, Husserl’s emphasis) 
93 For example, in the natural attitude we take objects of perception to be “out there,” in the physical world, whereas 
we take objects of, e.g., imagination not to be “out there,” but, rather, say, in “our mind.” 
94 More technically, epokhé (from Greek εποχή, a suspension of judgment). 
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According to Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is a philosophical advance over Descartes 
(and at least the Sartre of the first pages of TE seems to agree). One of Descartes’ mistakes, 
Husserl suggests, is to have assumed that consciousness is a part of the “furniture of the world” 
(even if immaterial); that is, in Descartes’ terminology, that consciousness is a substance. 
Husserl avoids this mistake by realizing that, after the reduction, consciousness isn’t anything 
existing, not a substance, but a pure domain of sense. However, the same as Descartes, Husserl is 
committed to the view that reflection is the adequate standpoint to be adopted over consciousness. 
This point is important, and the basis on which I want to construct my case that, according to 
Sartre, there is a standpoint toward consciousness that is more basic than the one adopted by both 
Descartes and Husserl. 
 
Husserl’s distinction between a subjective conscious state and the objective correlate of that state 
was encapsulated in the Cartesian schema cogitatio-cogitatum. Whereas “cogito” translates the 
Latin “I think” (i.e., “I am conscious”), a cogitatio, from the Latin “thought,” refers to the act in 
which one’s thinking (i.e., being conscious) takes place. Cogitatum, finally, is the past participle 
of the verb “cogito,” thus “what-is-thought:” this is the term Husserl uses to refer to the objective 
correlate of the conscious state we happen to be observing, for instance a logical law (qua-being-
thought), a desk (qua being-perceived), a unicorn (qua-being-imagined), and so on.  
 
When Husserl generalized phenomenology to a systematic study of all conscious states and 
shifted his attention to the schema cogitatio-cogitatum, however, he thought it necessary to admit 
an additional subjective component of conscious states: the Ego or self.95 This doesn’t need to 
make of the self a “material” component of our conscious states.96 After the phenomenological 
reduction, the Ego doesn’t seem to be “materially” in consciousness.97  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 This is the move against which Sartre’s TE reacts. Significantly, Husserl himself had rejected in Logical 
Investigations the idea that the Ego belongs to consciousness: “The phenomenologically reduced ego is therefore 
nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity. […] 
(LI: 542) 
96 “In contradistinction [to any cogito], the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially necessary; 
and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in mental processes, it cannot in 
any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the mental processes themselves.” (Ideas: 132). 
97 “This much is clear from the very beginning: After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego 
anywhere in the flux of manifold mental process among others, nor as strictly a part of a mental process, arising and 
then disappearing with the mental process of which it is a part.” (Ideas:132) 
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What is Husserl’s rationale for admitting the existence of a self in consciousness?98 This question 
is important, as Husserl’s answer is crucial in Sartre’s rejection of Husserl’s theory of 
consciousness. A quick answer by Husserl is that we must do justice to the fact that we can 
observe the correlate of a conscious state in many different ways, while the conscious state 
remains “invariant.” For example, when perceiving a chair in my office I can shift my look from, 
say, the wall at the back to the chair by my desk, back and forth, at my will. This shift of look 
shouldn’t be taken in an empirical sense, but in a phenomenological (or, more controversially, in 
Kantian terms, a transcendental one). The point isn’t simply that, say, by a convenient 
adjustment of my optic nerves I am able to change the perspective over what I see, thus passing 
from perceiving the chair by my desk to the wall at the back, back and forth. The point is rather 
that the possibility of thus changing my look is internal to the perception itself, even if my optic 
nerves (or neurons firing, or what have you) stay “invariant.” Thus, Husserl seems to believe, a 
subjective pole “behind” this look must be admitted into phenomenology’s “ontology.”99 The 
possibility of consciousness to change the look at any point, not just in the same sort of 
conscious state, but from one sort to another,100 suggests in effect the existence of a subjective 
pole behind each conscious state. Seen from the opposite side, in addition, every correlate of a 
conscious state appearing in the background (for instance, the wall of my office behind my desk, 
when I perceive my desk in my office) can always become the explicit object of our look, thus 
passing from appearing in the background to appearing in the “foreground.” In this sense, our 
conscious life forms a unity, and the famous Kantian claim “‘I think’ must be capable of 
accompanying all my representations” holds good also for Husserl.101 Husserl’s calls the self a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 “If an intentive mental process is actional, that is, effected in the manner of the cogito, then in that process the 
subject is “directing” himself to the intentional Object. To the cogito itself there belongs, as immanent in it, a 
“regard-to” the Object which, on the other side, wells forth from the “Ego” which therefore can never be lacking.” 
(Ideas: 76) 
99 “[T]he Ego belongs to each coming and going mental process; its “regard” is directed “through” each actional 
cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with 
each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego, however, is something identical.” (Ideas:132) 
100 For instance, I can perceive my friend Sergio, but I can also imagine, remember, and so on, my friend Sergio, at 
my will. 
101 Although arguably in a different sense. “In every actional cogito the ego lives out its life in a special sense. But 
all mental processes in the background likewise belong to it; and it belongs to them. All of them, as belonging to the 
one stream of mental processes which is mine, must admit of becoming converted into actional cogitationes or 
incorporated into actional cogitationes as immanental constitutents. In Kant’s words, “The ‘I think’ must be capable 
of accompanying all my presentations.” (Ideas: 132-3). An intriguing Insertion in Copy A: “…whether also Kant’s 
sense I leave undecided…”  
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“transcendence within immanence.”102 The self, Husserl believes, cannot be “bracketed” or 
“suspended,” as the physical world can.103  
 
Husserl understood this self to be “transcendental.”104 If taken in a Kantian sense, this makes of 
the self-propelled look a constraint for conscious states to be conscious of something.105 Thus, 
Husserl’s transcendental move seems to endorse a new, up-to-date version of Descartes’ (and, 
with differences, Kant’s) insight that in every cogito there is a self as the subject of every 
cogitatio.106 This must commit Husserl to the view that in every act of perception there is a self 
perceiving, in every act of imagination there is a self imagining, in every hating there is a self 
hating, and so on.  
 
2. 3 THE PSYCHOLOGISTS 
 
We have just seen how, on the basis of their respective theories of consciousness, both Descartes 
and Husserl hold the thesis that there is a self in consciousness. We will see in short that Sartre 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 “If we retain a pure Ego as a residuum after our phenomenological exclusion of the world and of the empirical 
subjectivity included in it (and an essentially different pure Ego for each stream of mental processes), then there is 
presented in the case of that Ego a transcendency of a peculiar type –one which is not constituted- a transcendency 
within immanency.” (Ideas:133) 
103 “[I]f I effect the phenomenological epokhe, then, as in the case of the whole world in the natural positing, there 
“I, the human being” undergoes exclusion; what remains behind is the pure act-process with its own essence. 
However, I also see that the apprehension of that process as human mental process, apart from the positing of 
existence, brings in a variety of things which need not of necessity be there and that, on the other hand, no excluding 
can annul the form of cogito and cancel out the “pure” subject of the act: the “being directed to,” the “being busied 
with,” the “taking a position toward,” the “undergoing,” the “suffering from” necessarily includes in its essence this: 
that it is precisely a ray “emanating from the Ego” or, in a reverse direction of the ray, “toward the Ego” –and this 
Ego is the pure Ego; no reduction can do anything to it.” (Ideas:190-1). 
104 “Concerning our terminology we may add the following. Important motives, grounded in the epistemological 
problematic, justify our designating “pure” consciousness […] as transcendental consciousness […] (Ideas: 66). 
The customary view that Husserl’s phenomenology became with Ideas an updated Kantian idealism can find support 
in claims like these: “[…] [T]here is […] such a thing as the field of a pure consciousness, indeed, […] there is such 
a thing which is not a component part of Nature, and is so far from being that, that Nature is possible only as 
intentional unity motivated in transcendentally pure consciousness by immanental connections.” (Ideas:115); “The 
existence of Nature cannot be the condition for the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a 
correlate of consciousness: Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness.” (Ideas: 
116).  
105 “Among the universal essential peculiarities pertaining to the transcendentally purified realm of mental processes 
[Erlebnisse] the first place is due to the relationship of each mental process to the “pure” Ego. Each “cogito,” each 
act in a distinctive sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego, it “proceeds from out of the Ego,” it “lives” 
“actionally” in the act.” (Ideas:190) 
106 This Cartesian affinity, on the other hand, is strengthened by Husserl’s self-proclaimed “foundational” character 
of phenomenology. “In addition […] phenomenology, by virtue of its essence, must claim to be “first” philosophy 
and to offer the means for carrying out every possible critique of reason.” (Ideas:148) 
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wants to reject this thesis. However, Sartre believes that the presence of the self must be rejected 
against the claims of some psychologists too. Let’s see exactly why, as, similar to the case of 
Descartes and Husserl, what Sartre objects to the psychologists is having an inadequate theory of 
consciousness, based on having adopted an inadequate standpoint toward it. 
 
Generally speaking, Sartre divides the theories of consciousness he rejects in TE into two groups: 
the ones that defend a formal, and the ones that defend a material, presence of the self in 
consciousness. Examples of the former are Descartes and Husserl (and Kant). Examples of the 
latter are what Sartre calls “the French moralists” or “theorists of amour-propre,” like La 
Rochefoucauld, or “psychologists,” like presumably the Freudians. Similar to the case of 
Descartes and Husserl, my guiding insight is going to be that, according to Sartre, the French 
moralists and psychologists have an inadequate theory of the self because they have an 
inadequate theory of consciousness in the first place. 
 
Let’s start considering the opposition between formal and material presence of the self. What this 
opposition amounts to is not articulated by Sartre very precisely, but intuitively the distinction 
seems clear: whereas Kant and Husserl believe there is a self in consciousness as a unifying 
subject of our experiences, these psychologists and moralists take the self to belong to 
consciousness as the ultimate, self-satisfying motor of our conscious life. For the former, the self 
is in consciousness as an empty presence: we can never intuit it, but without it there wouldn’t be 
a unified consciousness in the first place. For the latter, the self is in consciousness, and its 
presence can be experienced, although only through cunning or insight. Sartre renders this 
distinction terminologically explicit by using “I” for the formal notion of the self, and “me” for 
the material one. (This distinction is not as important as it might seem, since Sartre’s “I” and “me” 
are two aspects of one single self). 
 
Significantly, these psychologists-moralists warn us, we do not need to be aware of our self at all. 
Most of the time, our self is “behind” our feelings, volitions, thoughts, etc, without being noticed. 
But being noticed or not, they claim, the self is always present in consciousness. Furthermore, 
the self is not “neutrally” present. Rather, the self “uses” consciousness as a means for an end, 
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which is the self’s satisfaction of its desires. Thus, and this seems to be what the theory in 
question amounts to, consciousness is selfish by nature .107  
 
This position has some plausibility to it: sometimes we can become aware of this selfishness 
ourselves. For example, while “altruistically” helping Paul and aiming, for all I know, at his 
good, I can suddenly realize that I am helping him so that I feel proud of myself, I stop suffering 
at his sight, I can take advantage of my help later on, etc.108 This may well tempt us to consider 
self-satisfaction to be always present in consciousness, either if we are conscious of this 
circumstance or not. On the other hand, and as these psychologists say, only rarely are we 
conscious of our search for self-satisfaction: most frequently, our own self does not appear to us, 
at least as an ever-desiring source of action. Moreover, Sartre suggests, these psychologists claim 
that this lack of consciousness is not due to our lack of attention or insight. Rather, our own self 
actively disguises itself in various and sophisticated forms. One has to grasp it in a cunning way. 
At the limit, and this seems to be Freud’s postulate, a direct access to it is impossible. Only 
through a long and patient interpretative work of what our consciousness does offer us can we 
gain some insight of it, and even so in a very tentative and hypothetical manner. 
 
2. 4. SARTRE ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
So far I have presented the views about consciousness by the two philosophers Sartre gives most 
philosophical credit, Descartes and Husserl (supplemented by the psychologist La 
Rochefoucauld). Remember however that the chief textual source I am drawing on to make my 
case is an essay about the self. Accordingly, a good way to thus discuss what, according to Sartre, 
is inadequate with Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness is to discuss what, 
according to Sartre, is inadequate with Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of the self. My chief 
claim in my next paragraphs will be that what Sartre finds inadequate about Descartes’ and 
Husserl’s theories of the self is not so much their theses about the self (in particular, that there is 
a self in consciousness) as their theories of consciousness underlying them. I will use this thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Both in a purely psychological sense and in a moral, pejorative one. That is why, somewhat oddly at first sight, 
Sartre lumps together “psychologists” and “moralists” here.  
108 No doubt, this is a favorite and recurrent motive in many of La Rochefoucauld’s maxims, encapsulated in the 
exemplary one “Our virtues are, most often, only vices in disguise” (La Rochefoucauld [1678] 2007: 3). 
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as a basis to claim that, according to Sartre, Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness 
aren’t so much false as partially true. 
 
2. 4.1 Existence of The Self 
 
2.4.1.1 Philosophical Self 
 
According to Sartre, Kant’s famous claim that “it must be possible for the “I think” to 
accompany all my representations”109 basically means that a self is a necessary condition for a 
unified consciousness. Without a self, we wouldn’t have a unified consciousness, but a 
succession of consciousnesses unrelated to one another. A self, something permanent that is 
conscious of the successive conscious states and that connects them with one another, must be in 
consciousness (even if, in fact, we don’t observe it). Kant’s claim that there is a self in 
consciousness thus holds according to Sartre de jure. Sartre asks whether Kant’s de jure claim, 
with which he agrees, applies de facto too.110  
 
According to Sartre, both Descartes and Husserl take the cogito as a proof that there is a self in 
consciousness: whenever consciousness directs towards itself, i.e., reflects, a self appears in 
consciousness. It thus might seem as if the self is present in consciousness generally, not just in 
the cogito: in the cogito a self is observed because there is a self in consciousness generally, 
whether being observed in reflection or not. This is the view that, according to Sartre, both 
Descartes and Husserl endorse. Now as far as the cogito (reflection) is concerned, Sartre agrees 
with Descartes and Husserl: every time I pass from, let’s say, perceiving my desk, to observing 
my perceiving my desk, a self appears in consciousness.111 However, Sartre contends, that there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Critique of Pure Reason B131 (Kant [1781/87] 1998: 246). 
110 “We have to agree with Kant when he says that ‘it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my 
representations’. But should be thereby conclude that an I inhabits de facto all our states of consciousness and really 
performs the supreme synthesis of our experience?” (TE:2). “[I]t must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all 
our representations, but does it accompany them in actual fact?” (TE:3). “ [W]e wish to resolve the problem of the 
de facto existence of the I in consciousness […]” (TE:4). 	  
111 “[I]t is undeniable that the Cogito is personal. In the ‘I think’ there is an I which thinks. […] [E]ach time that we 
grasp our thought, either by an immediate intuition, or by an intuition based on memory, we grasp an I which is the I 
of the thought that is being grasped and which, furthermore, gives itself as transcending this thought and all other 
possible thoughts.[…]This is the de facto guarantee of the de jure affirmation in Kant. It thus appears that there is 
not a single one of my consciousnesses that I do not grasp as endowed with an I.” (TE: 9-10) 
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is a self in consciousness is not true of all sorts of consciousness. Sartre gives two reasons to 
defend this view. 
 
First, Sartre points out that, although the cogito consists in the fact that, in it, consciousness 
directs towards itself (hence the privileged certainty of what is being observed112), the cogito, 
structurally considered, includes two consciousnesses, a reflecting and a reflected one, not just 
one.113 What goes on in the cogito, Sartre urges, is not that consciousness is observing itself, but, 
rather, that the reflecting consciousness is observing the reflected one. We need to be careful 
here with this seemingly dissolution of one consciousness into two. First, Sartre suggests, in the 
cogito there aren’t two different consciousness, one of them observing the other in the way in 
which, say, I observe my friend Sergio: consciousness is still one, as the distinction between a 
reflecting and a reflected consciousness is phenomenological or conceptual, not material or 
numerical. Second, the fact that reflection transforms an unreflective consciousness into a duplex 
of a reflected-on and a reflecting one doesn’t mean that the reflecting consciousness is 
unconscious: if this were so, the consciousness being reflected-on would itself lapse into the 
unconscious, not being an object for any consciousness anymore; the whole conscious structure 
would lapse into the unconscious. Rather, the reflecting consciousness is positionally conscious 
of the reflected consciousness, and non-positionally conscious of itself.114 But since it is non-
positionally conscious of itself, this reflecting consciousness is in turn unreflected. In short, 
Sartre concludes, although Descartes and Husserl are right in claiming that the self appears in the 
cogito, it appears only in the reflected consciousness, not in the reflecting one. In the latter, taken 
in isolation, there really is no self at all. 115  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In this he takes both Descartes and Husserl to be right “[T]he certainty of the Cogito is absolute since, as Husserl 
says, there is an indissoluble unity between the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness (so much so 
that the reflecting consciousness cannot exist without reflected consciousness).” (TE:10) 
113 “The fact remains that [in the Cogito] we are in the presence of a synthesis of two consciousnesses, one of which 
is conscious of another.” (TE:10) 
114 “Insofar as my reflecting consciousness is conscious of itself, it is a non-positional consciousness. It becomes 
positional only if directed at the reflected consciousness which, in itself, was not a positional consciousness of 
itself.” (TE:10) “In fact, all reflecting consciousness is in itself unreflected, and a new, third-order act is needed to 
posit it.”(TE:10-11) 
115 “[T]he reason why Descartes moved from the Cogito to the idea of thinking substance is that he believed that I 
and ‘think’ are on the same level. We saw just now that Husserl, albeit more subtly, can basically be charged with 
the same error.” (TE:14) 
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Second, Sartre appeals to what we experience in unreflective consciousness to argue that in it 
there is no self.116 This claim seems to rest on a dubious basis: how can we observe what we 
experience in unreflective consciousness? Being unreflective, our consciousness is conscious of 
something other than itself (for instance, my desk, Peter, a landscape, a mathematical theorem, 
and so on). In so far as I am conscious of my consciousness, I am non-positionally conscious. 
Now this non-positional character of self-consciousness prevents it, precisely, from being 
observed. If, on the other hand, I turn my look to my consciousness, I can well observe a self, but 
this is because a leap to reflection has occurred. In this case, unreflective consciousness has 
vanished and can’t be “observed” any more. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the object I was 
originally perceiving, for instance, my desk, has vanished too. I can well continue perceiving my 
desk, but my perceiving my desk has passed from being unreflected to being reflected-on. 
Although there is still perception, it is now reflected. Again, unreflected perception has vanished. 
So the question is: how can we observe our unreflective consciousness? 
 
Sartre’s solution is to observe unreflective consciousness in an indirect way: not through 
reflection, since once we do this unreflective consciousness disappears, but through memory.117 
According to Sartre, we can reconstitute the whole of a past, non-reflective consciousness 
through memory. Moreover, Sartre suggests, this doesn’t happen to be a contingent fact or a 
special skill we possess, but a fact dictated by systematic features of consciousness. As said 
before, every unreflective consciousness is, although non-positionally, conscious of itself. This 
seems phenomenologically correct: no matter how absorbed I was in some object e.g., one hour 
ago, and how little conscious I was “of myself,” the memory of my “contents” of consciousness 
remains, and can be intuited and described. Once we do so Sartre’s conclusion is clear: “[T]here 
is no I on the unreflected level.”118  
 
(Another possibility open to Sartre to grasp unreflective consciousness would be what he calls 
purified reflection. What exactly Sartre means by purified reflection is a very difficult 
interpretative problem, and unfortunately this is a topic I must leave aside here. According to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 “I will call such a consciousness ‘first order’ or ‘unreflective’ [irréfléchie] consciousness” (TE:8).	  
117 “[T]his operation, this non-reflective grasp of a consciousness by another consciousness, can obviously be 
performed only in and by memory […]” (TE:12) 
118 TE:13. 
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Sartre, purified reflection is a special sort of reflection, theoretically possible but extraordinarily 
unusual in human life, and what is distinctive about it is that, in it, consciousness both directs 
towards itself and limits itself to observing unreflective consciousness, without positing any self 
nor any psychical entity.)  
 
Sartre’s conclusion of these two phenomenological descriptions is that neither in unreflective 
consciousness nor at the unreflected level of reflective one (i.e., in reflecting consciousness) is 
there a self. The self only appears in reflected consciousness.119 This essentially says that, 
according to Sartre, the thesis that there is a self in consciousness isn’t false simpliciter, but 
rather partially true: it is true of a “part’ of consciousness, i.e., reflected consciousness. (Of 
course, “part” here, as suggested in Chapter 1, must be taken in a figurative sense; perhaps we 
should say true of an aspect or of a mode of consciousness. Different to a part, reflected 
consciousness happens once in a while, whereas a part would be continuously present). What we 
have here, I contend, is a picture that is quite analogous to my very first example in this study. A 
description of the Statue of Liberty that goes: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the 
law; on it is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776,” and 
so on, is not false in so far as the right object is being described (the Statue of Liberty); but it’s 
still inadequate in so far as it describes only a part of the object, not the object in its entirety. 
Analogously, I hold, Sartre believes that a description of consciousness that goes: “It’s a self 
appearing in an inadequate fashion, as the unity of our psychical states and actions,” and so on 
(see below) is not false in so far as the right object is being described (consciousness); but it’s 
still inadequate in so far as it describes only a part of the object (reflected consciousness), not the 
object in its entirety (consciousness simpliciter). This basically summarizes what is my chief 
thesis for the whole chapter.120 
 
The fact that there is a self in reflective consciousness but not in unreflective one, however, 
raises a problem for Sartre: where does the self come from? How do we account for the presence 
of the self in reflection, a point on which Sartre has agreed? Sartre’s suggestion is that the self 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Indeed, reflecting consciousness is unreflected, unless a third-order conscious act makes of this reflecting 
consciousness in its turn an object of reflection. See above. 
120 Much of the rest of the chapter is elaboration for purposes of giving a complete analysis of TE and do justice to 
its intrinsic philosophical interest. 
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does not simply happen to appear in reflection; rather, it is reflection itself that makes the self 
appear, that brings about the self.121 We should not think of the self as a permanent entity, of 
which we are not conscious in unreflective consciousness and of which we become conscious 
when we reflect. If that were the case, where would this self happen to be in unreflective 
consciousness? Rather, Sartre seems to be suggesting, the self is a “volatile” pseudo-entity that 
reflection produces as much as intuits (I am aware that the term “pseudo-entity” is awkward: all I 
mean is an entity whose existence is parasitic on a special mode of consciousness, whose 
occurrence is furthermore always optional). If so, we can’t say unqualifiedly that, for Sartre, 
there is or that there is not a self. Against the latter, Sartre states that the self appears and is 
intuitable.122 Moreover, neither TE as a whole nor its chief thesis would make sense if there were 
no self, if only because a wide array of claims about it are made.123 To this extent, Sartre is a 
realist about the self: there is such a thing as the self, as well as (true or false) facts of the matter 
about it. (It would be worth a separate discussion about what Sartre, later on,124 calls being-for-
others, the social self). Against the former, the claim that there is a self is not unqualifiedly true 
for Sartre. Only in reflective consciousness is there a self, and the self is as much constituted as 
contemplated by reflection.125 In unreflective consciousness the self does not only fail to appear: 
there simply is no self at all.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 “But might it not be precisely the reflective act that brings the me [the self] into being in reflected consciousness? 
… Husserl is the first to recognize that an unreflected thought undergoes a radical modification when it becomes 
reflected. But does this modification have to be limited to a loss of ‘naivete’? Might not the essential aspect of the 
change be the fact that the I appears?” (TE:11) 
122 “We should note, further, that the I does not appear to reflection as the reflected consciousness: it gives itself 
through reflected consciousness. To be sure, it is grasped by intuition and is the object of evidential certainty” 
(TE:15). Sartre’s additional claim is that this certainty is neither “apodictic” nor “adequate;” but that does not make 
our intuition of the self less evident and certain. 
123 That is why it is not accurate to read Sartre as arguing that the self is “an imaginary construct” (Howells 1988:2). 
Sartre’s self is not a construct, if that means something made up. The self is real and intuitable, although its mode of 
appearance is in effect of a very peculiar, “evanescent” nature. It is equally inaccurate to say that according to Sartre 
‘states’ such as love of hatred are “illusory unities imposed on the perpetual flux of consciousness in our desire to 
give ‘depth’ and ‘durability’ to our feelings.” (loc. cit). Again, states have nothing of “illusory” for Sartre, if that 
means “possessing deceptive appearance” or “non-existing:” states are perfectly real and intuitable, even when they 
appear inadequately and only in reflective consciousness. I bring out this criticism of Howells because it is 
representative of much in the secondary literature that, in my opinion, misreads Sartre on this score. If for Sartre the 
self were something illusory, he couldn’t conclude things like these: “The I is an existent. It has a type of concrete 
existence, doubtless different from that of mathematical truths, meanings, or spatio-temporal beings, but just as 
real.” (TE: 15-16) 
124 BT specifically. 
125 “[T]he Ego is an object apprehended but also constituted by reflective knowledge.” (TE:34, Sartre’s italics.) 
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Given that, as I established at the beginning of this chapter, Sartre sees a very tight connection 
between the self and consciousness, any thesis by him about the self involves or goes hand in 
hand with a thesis about consciousness (although, as we have just seen, not necessarily vice 
versa). There are in particular four theses that Sartre defends about the self and that are important 
to understand Sartre’s theory of consciousness, against Descartes’ and Husserl’s. They are the 
following:126 
 
1. The self is an object-like entity, not a consciousness-like one. It is just as objective and 
real as mathematical truths or spatio-temporal things, although it has a different kind of 
existence. Using philosophical jargon, the self is transcendent to consciousness, not 
immanent. It is an object for consciousness, not a subject in it.127 This basically says that 
the self is not consciousness itself or something consciousness-like, but something we are 
conscious of. (If we want to be sensitive to the social self and fundamental project, 
elements of selfhood that Sartre will introduce later on in his work,128 we could call the 
self in this more restricted sense psychic self). 
2. The self can be observed, just as much as mathematical truths and spatio-temporal 
entities129. Similar to spatio-temporal entities, the intuition of the self is not adequate, in 
one stroke and from a single point of view,130 but inadequate, by profiles and from 
different, potentially infinite points of view.131 (Different profiles of a spatio-temporal 
entity, for instance, a chair, are the different aspects of the chair I can observe from 
different angles; by contrast, different profiles of the self are the different reflected 
consciousnesses I can observe in reflection: for example, I can observe that I am 
perceiving a chair, that I am sad, that I remember my friend Peter, and so on.) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 TE: 15-16. 
127 “The I is an existent. It has a type of concrete existence, doubtless different from that of mathematical truths, 
meanings, or spatio-temporal beings, but just as real. It gives itself as transcendent.” (TE:15-6) 
128 Specifically in BN. 
129 “The I yields itself to a special kind of intuition which grasps it behind reflected consciousness, in a way that is 
always inadequate.” (TE:15-6) 
130 Like, for example, an image (an object of imagination). See I. 
131 Like, paradigmatically, an object of perception. Well understood, the self is not an object of perception. It is an 
object, or, rather, pseudo-object, of reflection. It belongs to the psychical, as opposed to the physical world. But the 
same as an object of perception, its mode of presence is always partial, incomplete. 
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3. The claim that there is a self is true only for reflective consciousness.132 The self does not 
appear in unreflected consciousness, but in, or rather, behind,133 reflected consciousness. 
(“Behind” here is of course somewhat metaphoric; the point is that we observe the self 
“through” a reflected consciousness, indirectly, not directly.) In unreflective 
consciousness there is no self at all.134 
4. The existence of the self must be, using Husserl’s terminology, bracketed or suspended. 
The cogito, “I think,” affirms more than what is undoubtedly given in intuition. Its truth, 
therefore, and contra Descartes, is not apodictic. The only absolutely certain given of the 
pseudo-cogito and therefore only genuinely apodictic truth is not “I am conscious of x” 
but “there is consciousness of x.”135  
 
The most important claim for my purposes is number 3. Sartre does agree with Descartes and 
Husserl that there is a self. However, Sartre suggests, there is a self only in reflective 
consciousness, not in unreflective consciousness (nor in purified reflective consciousness). It is 
true that Descartes and Husserl claim there is a self in consciousness, i.e., a subject of our 
conscious acts, whereas Sartre claims that there is a self for consciousness, i.e., an object of our 
conscious acts. This is a fundamental disagreement between Sartre, on the one hand, and 
Descartes and Husserl, on the other. If so, the claim that there is a self in consciousness must be 
false for Sartre (not partially true). Does this invalidate my thesis that, according to Sartre, 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories are partially true, rather than false? I believe not. There are two 
ways to accommodate this problem.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 “The I only ever appears on the occasion of a reflective act.” (TE:16) 
133 We shall see later that this qualification is important.  
134 “When I run after a tram, when I look at the time, when I become absorbed in the contemplation of a portrait, 
there is no I.” (TE:13) 
135 According to Husserl “That ego sum or sum cogitans must be pronounced apodictic … was already seen by 
Descartes.” (CM: 22). (Yet, according to Husserl, contrary to Descartes –according to Husserl!- “I exist, ego cogito, 
… no longer signifies “I, this man, exist.” (CM: 25). According to Sartre, by contrast, “The transcendent I must fall 
under the phenomenological reduction. The Cogito affirms too much. The sure and certain content of the pseudo-
‘cogito’ is not “I am conscious of this chair,” but “there is consciousness of this chair.” This content is sufficient to 
constitute and absolute field for the investigations of phenomenology.” (TE:16) The “pseudo-cogito” is the self-
consciousness of unreflective consciousness. The ‘pseudo’ part of the formula accounts for the fact that, being 
unreflective consciousness, this is not a Cartesian, reflective cogito. The ‘cogito’ accounts for the fact that 
unreflective consciousness, despite being non-positionally conscious of itself, is still conscious of itself.  
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First, it can be responded (as I do in Chapter 5) that even though Sartre does believe Descartes’ 
and Husserl’s thesis that there is a self in consciousness is false, it could counterfactually be 
construed to be true for Sartre without this circumstance altering the fact that Sartre sees 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness to be partially true rather than false (on 
account of the fact that they adopt a standpoint toward consciousness that is based on a more 
basic one). In other words, while there are at least some theses about consciousness that 
Descartes and Husserl defend that Sartre takes to be false (not partially true), these theses could 
counterfactually be construed to be true for Sartre while it still holds that Sartre takes Descartes’ 
and Husserl’s theories of consciousness to be partially true. 
 
Second, it can be responded that my model of partial truth, although correct, doesn’t totally work 
in practice, as one can always find theses in the theories rejected that are false according to the 
philosopher rejecting them, while it still holds that, for the most part, the philosophers takes the 
theories to be partially true rather than false. This is just another way to say that my model of 
partial truth (sketched in Chapter 1, especially section 1.1) works, so to speak, only “in ideal 
conditions,” but ideal conditions are never found in the history of philosophy and the 
philosophical praxis, as relations between philosophers and theories get “messy” for various 
reasons and factors that would merit further spelling out; if we were able to “abstract away” from 
this “messiness” we’d verify that my model works. (These two responses merit further 
development.) 
 
2.4.1.2 Psychological Self 
 
Let’s consider now Sartre’s strategy for rejecting the material presence of the self in 
consciousness, defended by La Rochefoucauld. I want to quickly cover this because I will argue 
at the end of this chapter that Sartre takes La Rochefoucauld’s theory of consciousness to be 
partially true in quite an analogous way than Descartes’ and Husserl’s, something that I believe 
will make my case even more solid. If Sartre has appealed to a description of consciousness to 
argue, against Descartes and Husserl, that there is no self in unreflected consciousness, this time 
the same strategy would be ineffective. La Rochefoucauld, like the Freudians, admits that the 
self does not appear in what Sartre calls unreflective consciousness. But Sartre takes La 
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Rouchefoucauld to claim that the self is there none the less. According to Sartre, La 
Rouchefoucauld’s insight, like that of the Freudians three centuries later, is that we are not 
conscious of our self because, precisely, the self “conceals” itself to more effectively fulfill its 
desires (our consciousness is in charge of repressing our desires most of the time).  
 
Sartre’s strategy this time is to charge these psychologists with failing to distinguish between 
unreflective and reflective consciousness, a charge that I will take to amount to failing to realize 
that consciousness can be unreflectively conscious of itself, and that this unreflective 
consciousness is, moreover, more basic than reflective consciousness.136 According to Sartre, 
this produces the following double error. First, they unnecessarily supplement unreflective 
consciousness with a reflective layer to account for the fact that unreflective consciousness is 
conscious of itself.137 Second, they claim that this reflective level is unconscious, to account for 
the fact that most of the times the self remains unknown to us.138 According to Sartre, the first 
mistake results from failing to see that unreflective consciousness does not need a reflective layer 
to be conscious of itself. As explained before, in being positionally conscious of an object, 
unreflective consciousness is by the same stroke non-positionally conscious of itself. In short, 
unreflected consciousness is autonomous and does not require reflection to be completed at all. 
Furthermore, at the unreflective level, desire is “centrifugal” and impersonal, i.e., not endowed 
with a self139. The second mistake, Sartre suggests, results from the confused view that 
consciousness can be unconscious at the same time, which Sartre simply dismisses as a 
contradictory or confused notion. 
 
Sartre’s conclusion of this brief psychological study parallels the previous one: there is no self in 
unreflective consciousness or “behind” it. The self only appears with a reflective act. According 
to Sartre, the me and the I are simply two sides of the self (the “passive” and the “active” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 “Now, the interest of this thesis [these psychologists’ thesis that “the me thus seeks to procure the object for itself 
so as to satisfy its desire,” TE:17] seems to me to reside in the way it brings out an error very frequently committed 
by psychologists –an error consisting in confusing the essential structure of reflective acts with that of unreflected 
acts.” (TE:17) 
137 “[E]ach time that the observed consciousnesses are given as unreflected, a reflective structure is superimposed on 
them [by these psychologists] – a structure that is thoughtlessly claimed to be unconscious.” (TE:18) 
138 See previous note, last phrase quoted. 
139 “At this [unreflected] level, desire is given to consciousness as centrifugal (it transcends itself, it is the thetic 
consciousness of ‘having-to-be’ and the non-thetic consciousness of itself) and impersonal (there is no me: I am 
faced with the pain of Peter in the same way I am faced with the color of this inkwell.” (TE:18) 
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respectively).140 Both of them are transcendent to consciousness. Below I will contend that 
underlying this conclusion by Sartre is his criticism of La Rochefoucauld’s theory of 
consciousness and I will provide textual evidence showing that Sartre rejects this theory as being 
inadequate but not exactly false. 
 
2. 4. 2 Appearance of the Self 
 
So far, Sartre has established that there is no self in unreflective consciousness, but that it 
appears only in reflected consciousness, and furthermore as an object for reflective 
consciousness, not as a subject in it.141 Now how does the self exactly appear? Do we intuit it 
adequately and apodictically, the same way we intuit reflected consciousness? Sartre has already 
claimed that the self does not appear in reflected consciousness and all at once, adequately, but 
through it and by “profiles,” inadequately. Besides appearing inadequately, the self does not 
appear apodictically. The difference between “adequate” and “apodictic” is important in this 
context. According to Husserl (and Sartre following him), an object is given adequately when 
our consciousness can encompass it in its entirety, without leaving out any aspect of it. For 
instance, to perceive a physical object (for instance, a chair) involves, by necessity, to leave 
aspects of it left unperceived (for instance, observing the front of the chair leaves the back part 
out). Thus, a physical object is given always inadequately to consciousness. By contrast, to be 
conscious of a mathematical truth or of a mental state (for instance, ¾+1/2=5/4 and a pain, 
respectively) can be grasped in its entirety in one single consciousness, and hence is given 
adequately. An object is given apodictically when, furthermore, its very existence is given 
adequately too; in other words, when it is phenomenologically (although perhaps not logically) 
self-refuting to doubt its existence. According to Husserl (following Descartes), only my being 
conscious of whatever I’m conscious of is apodictically given. Some adequately given objects 
aren’t necessarily apodictic; for instance, even if a single grasp of ¾ doesn’t leave anything out 
of it, it might still be the case that there’s no such a thing as ¾, or that a Cartesian evil demon 
tricks me into taking to be true things about ¾ that aren’t really true. Apodictic evidence is of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 “[The] Ego [the self], of which I and me are merely two faces, constitutes the ideal (noematic) and indirect unity 
of the infinite series of our reflected consciousnesses.” (TE:21) 
141 “[T]he I must not be sought in unreflected states of consciousness nor behind them. The me appears only with the 
reflective act, as the noematic correlative of a reflective intention.” (TE:20) 
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higher type than adequate one, indeed the highest possible type of evidence; after it, it comes 
adequate evidence, and lower than that inadequate evidence.    
 
Sartre’s insight about the self, then, against Husserl, is that the self is given neither apodictically 
nor adequately. According to Sartre, the self is neither reflected consciousness itself, nor one 
particular reflected consciousness, nor a real set of specific reflected consciousnesses. Instead, 
the self is the ideal unity of all our (potentially infinite; past, present and future) reflected 
consciousnesses. An infinite number of reflected consciousnesses would be necessary to have a 
total grasp of our self, but this total grasp is impossible. The reason is simple: the self is given 
through each of our reflected consciousnesses, much the same as a physical object is given 
through each of the different aspects different angles allow us to see of it. The same way we 
can’t observe the metaphysical totality of a physical object, but only the physical object from one 
angle, one aspect at a time, we can’t observe the metaphysical totality of psychical objects either 
(including the self). 
 
Sartre’s further claim is that the self does not directly unify our reflected consciousness, but 
rather the states, actions and qualities of reflected consciousness. It is states and actions which, 
in their turn, directly unify our reflected consciousnesses. Thus, the self unifies reflected 
consciousnesses only mediately, through states and actions. The self is the ideal unity of all my 
potentially infinite reflected consciousness in which Peter appears to me as being hateful. More 
accurately, Sartre suggests, hatred does directly appear to me in reflection, but only through what 
Husserl calls a “profile” (Abschattung).142 Hatred towards Peter, for instance, oversteps an 
individual consciousness of Peter appearing as hateful, in an analogous way in which my desk 
being wooden oversteps an individual consciousness of my desk appearing to me as being 
wooden.  
 
Different from states, actions are “chosen.” As opposed to the inert nature of states, actions are 
spontaneous. Whereas examples of states were hatred and love, Sartre’s examples of actions are 
doubting, reasoning, meditating and making a hypothesis. Again, the important issue here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The same way a physical object can never be given in its entirety (adequately), but only through a profile 
(inadequately). 
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regards less the accuracy of this psychological taxonomy than Sartre’s claim that all these 
conscious actions must be taken to be transcendences.143 The same as in the case of states, this 
means that, e.g., my doubting or reasoning are not directly present to my reflective consciousness. 
Rather, its mode of presence is indirect, and mediated by all my reflected doubting, reasoning, 
etc. consciousnesses. Thus, doubting, reasoning or perceiving are not themselves given at one 
stroke in reflected consciousness. They are ideal units of all my potentially infinite reflected 
consciousnesses of doubt, reasoning or meditation. Furthermore, and equally important, the 
mode of presence of actions is, again, inadequate. I do not intuit my doubting or reasoning all at 
once and in one stroke, but through time and by profiles.  
 
This last point by Sartre allows me to show how, once again, a thesis by Descartes about 
consciousness happens to be true for Sartre, but only of a part of consciousness. Remember that 
for Descartes at least one piece of knowledge is absolutely indubitable: the fact that I am 
conscious of having my beliefs, or of doubting. According to Sartre, this is true of unreflective 
doubt, the same as of what is apodictically given in unreflected consciousness. However, Sartre 
suggests, it is not true of reflective consciousness. A distinction must be drawn between 
Descartes’ methodical doubt, which is an action (that is, a psychical entity), and his spontaneous 
one, which is a consciousness.144 Whereas the latter can be held to be apodictically certain, the 
former is transcendent to consciousness, given inadequately and therefore of a doubtful nature. If 
so, “I doubt” is not, as Descartes thought, an apodictic truth, i.e., a truth it is meaningless to 
doubt (or the opposite of which is self-refuting). On the contrary, if Sartre is right that doubting 
is a transcendent object given always inadequately, the same as “I,” it is clear that the assertion 
“I doubt” is and will always remain doubtful, even when grounded on evident intuition. Still in 
other words, Descartes’ only apodictic beginning ought to have been “there is consciousness of 
doubting” instead of “I doubt” (or “there is consciousness of thinking” instead of “I think”). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 “[P]urely psychical actions, such as doubting, reasoning, meditating, making a hypothesis, must also be 
conceived of as transcendences [like “playing the piano,” “driving a car,” or “writing,” that is, actions “‘taken’ from 
the world of things”].” (TE: 26)	  
144 “[W]hen Descartes says, ‘I doubt therefore I am’, is he talking about the spontaneous doubt [i.e., unreflective 
doubt] that reflective consciousness grasps in its instantaneous character, or is he talking of nothing other than the 
enterprise of doubting [i.e., reflective doubt]? This ambiguity, as we have seen, can be the source of serious errors.” 
(TE, 27) 
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So far Sartre has stressed and elaborated on the radical difference of nature between states, 
actions qualities and the self, on the one hand,145 and consciousness, on the other. Sartre 
encapsulates this difference in the opposition between consciousness and the psychical.146 The 
psychical is the unity of states, actions and qualities; the self is its most all-encompassing 
synthetic unity. Consciousness is impersonal, intentional spontaneity, directed outwards by 
necessity, and conscious of itself, either non-positionally or positionally. The psychical, on the 
contrary, is a non-intentional pseudo-spontaneity, an object for consciousness, and never 
conscious of itself. In a nutshell, what according to Sartre is inadequate about Descartes’ and 
Husserl’s theories of consciousness is to have failed to capture consciousness at its most basic, 
and have captured instead consciousness as it appears from the reflective standpoint, which is 
secondary with respect to the unreflective one.  
 
Let’s see one example of a thesis by Husserl that Sartre takes to be false (or at least “highly 
debatable”147), but which might counterfactually be construed to be true without altering the fact 
that Sartre rejects Husserl’s theory of consciousness. It’s true that what Sartre is going to argue 
in what follows concerns Husserl’s views of the self but, as established in the introduction to this 
chapter, theses about the self, for Sartre as much as for Husserl, go hand in hand with theses 
about consciousness. 
 
Sartre warns us to be careful with the expression “synthetic totality of the psychical” as applying 
to the self. The danger here is to understand it in an analogous way to other “synthetic totalities” 
of a very different nature. One can think, for example, of a desk as being the “synthetic totality” 
of all the potentially infinite perceptions I can have of it. If so, the desk can be taken to be an 
object-pole, an X unifying all these possible perceptions. Sartre takes Husserl to defend this 
position. Against it, Sartre stresses the fact that what is logically prior here is the objective X. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Remember though that for Sartre the self is a different kind of transcendent unity than states and actions. 
146 “We have just learnt to distinguish between the ‘psychical’ and consciousness. The psychical is the transcendent 
object of the reflective consciousness; it is also the object of the science called psychology. The Ego appears to 
reflection as a transcendent object realizing the permanent synthesis of the psychical. The Ego is on the same side as 
the psychical.” (TE: 28, Sartre’s emphasis) “In an article in Recherches Philosophiques I attempted to show that the 
Ego does not belong to the domain of the for itself [i.e., consciousness]. I shall not repeat here. Let us note only the 
reason for the transcendence of the Ego: as a unifying pole of Erlebnisse the Ego is in-itself [TE’s 
“transcendences”], not for-itself.” (BN: 155-6)  
147 TE: 33 
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This means that although a desk can be taken to be a synthetic totality, this totality is in turn 
analyzable. Its “components” can be taken to be self-standing. I can consider my desk’s color 
apart from the desk itself, and the same goes for its shape, size, etc. The desk can be taken to be 
“behind” all its qualities as a unifying pole that might subsist even abstracting its qualities away, 
ideally speaking at least. On the contrary, e.g., a melody is an un-analyzable totality,148 as its 
parts cannot be isolated from the whole, even abstractedly: if I consider a particular note apart 
from the melody, this particular note becomes meaningless by itself.149 Sartre does not think it 
makes sense, in other words, to take the melody to stand “behind” its notes as a supporting, 
objective pole (in the same way a desk might be seen as standing “behind” its qualities). The 
unity of the melody exhausts itself in the fact that the notes cannot be considered in isolation 
without vanishing. They are non-self-standing components of the whole.150 Sartre invites us to 
think of the self in terms of (but not in exactly the same way as) the latter sort of “synthetic 
totality” rather than the former.151 The self, Sartre argues, does not neutrally “receive” successive 
states and actions without being affected, as an objective pole does. Each new state and action 
“alters” the self in a more substantial way than, e.g., a new color or shape alters my desk. 152  The 
self is, Sartre says, “compromised” by its states and actions.153 This already says that there exists 
a relation between the self and its states and actions that goes beyond being a purely “neutral” 
link between these two dimensions. I will try now to focus on what Sartre thinks the specific 
nature of this relation is. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 “It is useless, for instance, if we consider a melody, to suppose there is some X which acts as a support for the 
different notes. The unity stems in this case from the absolute indissolubility of elements which cannot be conceived 
of as separate, except by abstraction. The subject of the predicate will here be the concrete totality, and the predicate 
will be a quality abstractly separated from the totality and gaining its full meaning when it is linked back to the 
totality.” (TE:29-30) 
149 More accurately put, a note in isolation is meaningful (i.e., it has a determinate pitch and sound), but not qua 
‘part’ of a melody. 
150 A melody, then , at least compared to a desk, is a peculiar and elusive entity. Of course, not in the same sense as 
the mind, since, inter alia, a melody doesn’t play a central role in our philosophical understanding of reality. 
151 “I refuse to see in the Ego a sort of X pole acting as the support for psychical phenomena. […] The Ego is 
nothing other than the concrete totality of states and actions that it supports [like the melody is regarding the 
concrete totality of its notes, I.G.]. Doubtless it is transcendent to all states that it unifies, but not as an abstract X 
whose mission is merely to unify.” (TE: 30)	  
152 The word “alters” is not totally accurate, since one of the conditions of something being altered is its subsistence 
(logical, physical or metaphysical, little matters here) “behind” or “beneath” the alteration, which is not the case 
with the Sartrean self.  
153 TE: 30. 
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Part of an answer was already given when I considered states, actions and qualities. We saw that 
these correlates of a reflective act are not given all at once, adequately, in reflected 
consciousness, but, rather, inadequately, through it. This does not only mean that states and 
actions are ideal, transcendent unities of such and such reflected consciousness (roughly the way 
a desk is the ideal unit of all my perceptive consciousnesses of it). Moreover, we just saw, states 
and actions are given in reflective intuition as somehow “bringing about” reflected 
consciousnesses, and qualities are given as “bringing about” states and actions in its turn. 
Something similar is true of the self in relation to states and actions: the self somehow “produces” 
or “causes” them, either indirectly, trough qualities, or directly. But is the relation between the 
self and its states and actions exactly the same one as that one between the states and actions and 
reflected consciousnesses? 
 
Before anything else, there is a fundamental difference, Sartre believes, between these two types 
of relations. Whereas states and actions give a meaning to reflected consciousnesses, this is not 
the case with the self in relation to states and actions. To transcend my spontaneous, unreflective 
revulsion at the presence of hateful Peter towards reflective hatred of Peter is to positively 
qualify this particular reflected consciousness with a “new” outlook.154 We might say in Kantian 
terms (doing some violence to terminological accuracy), that the link between my unreflective 
revulsion at the presence of hateful Peter155 and my reflective hatred is a “synthetic” one, since 
we enrich the appearance of reflected revulsion with a meaning not contained in the appearance 
itself; the meaning-intention, e.g., “hatred” is, so to say, “informative.” That is why it makes 
sense to ask oneself whether, e.g., one really hates Peter after all, instead of, e.g., despising, 
detesting, disliking or disapproving of him. Differently so when we link the self to states and 
actions. In this case, Sartre argues, we add nothing to the latter: the transit from hating-Peter to 
my-hating-Peter (“I hate Peter”) is thus an “analytic” link (of course, not in the Kantian sense 
that the “I” is part of the concept of “hatred,” much less of “hating-Peter,” but in the very loose 
sense that with this link we are not giving any further positive content to the hatred itself). Does 
this mean that the self (or rather, its unification of states and actions) is “dispensable”? What 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 “When I unify my consciousness under the rubric ‘hatred’, I add to them a certain meaning, I qualify them.” (TE: 
32). 
155 Although my formulation begs the question. I should simply say “unreflective revulsion of Peter.” Whether Peter 
appears in fact as being hateful will depend on whether it is hatred rather than, e.g., anger, contempt, antipathy, 
envy, jealousy, etc. what I feel towards him. 
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does the self contribute when it unifies states and actions? “Materially” speaking, we should 
gather from Sartre’s account, precisely nothing.156 However, the self appears as effectively 
realizing the total synthesis of the psychical.157 And this makes sense: it is precisely as a total 
synthesis of the psychical (as opposed to the synthesis of such and such particular reflected 
consciousness) that the contribution of the self is simply “formal,”158 without specific contents. 
That is why the self is both always present and yet “meaning” nothing in material, positive 
terms.159 One might in fact compare, as Sartre does, this total unification of the self to the total, 
ideal, synthetic unification that the world plays in unreflective life.160 The comparison works as 
follows: just as the world stays at the background of worldly objects broadly conceived (i.e., 
correlates of unreflective consciousness, which include, but don’t need to be restricted to, 
physical objects), the self stays at the background of psychical objects (i. e., correlates of 
reflective consciousness). 
 
Sartre’s twofold negation is a bit surprising. If the relation between the self and its states and 
actions is neither that of production nor that of causation, what sort of relation is it? Sartre 
suggests that it is a mixture of both, and being a mixture of (free) production and (deterministic) 
causation, the self is an irrational notion. With this, we should not conclude that Sartre’s efforts 
to characterize in positive terms the self and its relation to states and actions have failed; Sartre 
suggests that it belongs to the inner nature of the self to appear to us as something profoundly 
irrational. Sartre uses terms like “poetic production,” “(ex nihilo) creation” and even “magical 
procession,” among others, to describe the relation between the self and its states and actions or, 
more simply put, between the self and consciousness. Sartre’s idea here is that the self appears to 
us as combining two mutually irreconcilable features: on the one hand, it appears to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 “[W]hen I incorporate my states into the concrete totality me, I add nothing to them.” (TE: 32). 
157 “The Ego appears to reflection as a transcendent object realizing the permanent synthesis of the psychical.” (TE: 
28). 
158 Of course, this “formal” character has little to do with the “formal” presence of the self in, not (“outside”) 
consciousness advocated, according to Sartre, by Kant and Husserl. Furthermore, it is not “formal” in the sense of 
“empty,” since the self is effectively intuitable. 
159 “I do not say to myself, ‘Perhaps I have an Ego’, in the way I can say to myself, ‘Perhaps I hate Peter’. I am not 
here seeking for a unifying meaning to my acts.” (TE: 32). 
160 With the difference, Sartre intriguingly points out, that, whereas the appearance of the self in reflective life is 
permanent, the appearance of the world in unreflective life is exceptional: “The Ego is to psychical objects what the 
World is to things. However, the appearance of the World in the background of things is quite rare; special 
circumstances are required (well described by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit) for the world to ‘unveil’ itself. The Ego, 
on the contrary, always appears on the horizon of states.” (TE:30-31).  
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spontaneous freedom, the absolute origin of all of our conscious states; on the other hand, it 
appears to be inert passivity, an object like a table or a mathematical truth, but of a psychical 
character. These two features account for the fact that the self appears to us as possessing a quite 
irrational nature. 
 
2. 5 STANDPOINT: UNREFLECTIVE VERSUS REFLECTIVE 
 
So far I have presented Descartes’ and Husserl’s (supplemented by La Rochefoucauld’s) theories 
of consciousness and the self, as well as Sartre’s chief criticisms as they stand in TE, the chief 
source I’m drawing on. What I want to show now is two things. First, I want to show that, 
whereas Sartre’s explicit discussion in TE concerns the self, what is really at stake for Sartre is 
consciousness; Sartre’s views about the self derive from his views about consciousness, rather 
than the other way round. Second, I want to show that, according to Sartre, what is problematic 
about Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories about consciousness is best described by saying that they 
result from adopting an inadequate standpoint toward consciousness. This standpoint is not 
inadequate in the sense that is wrong but in the sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint 
takes precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place. What we are able to know about 
consciousness from the secondary standpoint isn’t false but, rather, partial.  
 
2. 5. 1 The Reflective Standpoint 
 
Let’s start with Husserl, as he is the chief target of TE. Given that Sartre puts Husserl and 
Descartes in the same bag, what holds of Husserl is going to hold, mutatis mutandis, for 
Descartes too.  
 
I have explained above (section 2.2.3), but it’s important to stress once again, that Husserl is 
committed to the view that consciousness is best studied in reflection. In the Cartesian 
Meditations, his most mature exposition of phenomenology, he says:  
 
Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for example, the house and not the perceiving. Only in reflection do we 
“direct” ourselves to the perceiving itself and to its perceptual directedness to the house. (CM: 33)  
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It is true that Husserl distinguishes natural reflection (the one that psychology uses) and 
phenomenological reflection, but this distinction draws on the concept of phenomenological 
reduction (in which existential commitment are suspended), without affecting the fact that, in 
reflection, consciousness is positionally directed towards itself:  
 
The proper task of reflection … is not to repeat the original process [the subjective process present in consciousness 
in the natural attitude] but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it. (CM: 33)  
 
According to Husserl, reflection is the standpoint that must be adopted over consciousness for 
philosophical purposes:  
 
Precisely thereby an experiential knowing (which is at first descriptive) becomes possible, that experiential knowing 
to which we owe all conceivable cognizance and cognition of our intentional living [i.e., consciousness]. This 
continues to hold, then, for transcendental-phenomenological reflection. (CM: 34)  
 
I conclude, then, that for Husserl consciousness is best studied in reflection, a conclusion that I 
rephrase, in the terms I introduced in Chapter 1 by saying that Husserl is committed to the idea 
that consciousness, as a philosophical object, is best observed from the reflective standpoint. 
 
2. 5. 2 The Unreflective Standpoint 
 
Sartre’s basic criticism against Husserl, I contend now, is that, unbeknownst to him, there is a 
standpoint toward consciousness that is more basic than the reflective one. As a result of failing 
to adopt this more basic standpoint, I take Sartre to believe that what Husserl can observe of 
consciousness is a “part” of it. Thus, I will conclude, Husserl’s theory of consciousness is 
according to Sartre partially true rather than false (in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be 
further developed in Chapter 5). 
 
Sartre’s point against Husserl, let me clarify in the first place, can’t be the bare fact that 
consciousness can be conscious of itself prior to reflection, because it’s highly unlikely that 
Husserl wasn’t aware of this fact. What is at stake is, rather, whether consciousness of itself (in 
or prior to reflection) amounts to a standpoint toward consciousness taken as a philosophical 
object. This can be best seen through Sartre’s criticism of the idea of a self in consciousness, 
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drawing on Husserl’s notion of intentionality. In essence, I take Sartre to rely on the notion of 
intentionality to debunk Husserl’s idea that consciousness is best studied from a reflective 
standpoint.161 Since the defining feature of consciousness is to be conscious of something, Sartre 
argues, the correlate of our conscious states, not our conscious states themselves, or a self behind 
them, plays the unifying role.162 What is more, Sartre adds, consciousness’s intentionality 
renders a unified self possible, rather than the other way round.163 According to Sartre, by being 
conscious of an object, not of ourselves, we are, at the same time and by the same stroke, (non-
positionally) conscious of ourselves, through being conscious of the object.164 
 
This claim needs a little bit of unpacking. Suppose you’re watching a movie at a theatre and a 
friend sitting next to you asks you to make a complete inventory of what you are conscious of 
when you are watching that movie (not when you reflect on your watching it). You might start 
with fairly conspicuous things, such as, say, the blue eyes of the female lead role, her partner, the 
landscape at the background, and then proceed to more peripheral things, like the soundtrack of 
the movie, the smell of the theater, some whispers among the spectators, memories brought 
about by the movie, emotions felt, judgments entertained, and so on. Suppose that the inventory 
is eventually complete. Sartre would protest that, strictly speaking, you still need to add one 
more thing, which is consciousness being conscious of itself while all of this happens, on pain of 
everything you have just enumerated collapsing into the unconscious and disappearing. Thus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 “[T]he phenomenological conception of consciousness renders the unifying and individualizing role of the I 
completely useless. […] The transcendental I thus has no raison d’être.” (TE:7) These two simple claims 
encapsulate almost the whole of TE. For Sartre’s criticisms of Husserl on the intentionality of consciousness, see BN 
later on: “All consciousness is consciousness of something. This definition of consciousness […] means that 
consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being. […] Husserl defines consciousness precisely 
as a transcendence. […] This is his essential discovery. But from the moment that he makes of the noema an unreal, 
a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to his principle. “Consciousness is 
consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is that 
consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself.” (BN: 23) “…what Husserl calls intentionality… [H]e 
misunderstood its essential character.” (BN: 23) “[C]onsciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and 
transphenomenal being” (BN: 23-4) “To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must 
produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when 
consciousness reveals it.” (BN: 24) 
162 “It is usually believed that the existence of a transcendental I [like Kant’s] is justified by the need for 
consciousness to have unity and individuality. […] But it is certainly the case that phenomenology does not need to 
resort to this unifying and individualizing I. Rather, consciousness is defined by intentionality. Through 
intentionality it transcends itself, it unifies itself by going outside itself.” (TE:6) 
163 “It is, on the contrary, consciousness that renders the unity and personality of my I possible” (TE:7) 
164 “[T]he type of existence that consciousness has is that it is conscious of itself. And it becomes conscious of itself 
insofar as it is consciousness of a transcendent object.” (TE:7, Sartre’s emphasis).	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Sartre is saying that whenever consciousness is conscious of something, it is simultaneously 
conscious of itself (while being conscious of something else).  
 
Taken at face value, Sartre’s claim that consciousness is conscious of itself whenever it’s 
conscious of an object may sound somewhat unintuitive at first sight: when I am conscious of an 
object, for instance of my desk, my consciousness is apparently conscious only of my desk, not 
of its own being conscious of the desk.165 But this prima facie implausibility results from 
assuming that only in reflection consciousness can be conscious of itself. Sartre sees here a 
fundamental mistake; and he believes that it is philosophy, rather than common sense, that is 
responsible for this “reflective illusion.” There is no question, of course, that in reflection 
consciousness is conscious of itself. The mistake is, according to Sartre, to see in reflection the 
only or the basic way in which this can happen.  
 
Against the view that reflection is the only way in which consciousness can be conscious of itself, 
Sartre replies that unreflective consciousness is conscious of itself too: by being conscious of an 
object, say, my desk, consciousness is simultaneously conscious of itself as being conscious of 
the object, my desk. It is true that, in this case, consciousness does not explicitly observe itself, 
but does so implicitly, in other words, consciousness is what Sartre calls non-positionally 
conscious of itself: it does not take itself as the object of consciousness. But it is not less 
conscious of itself for that.166  
 
Against the view that reflection is the basic way in which consciousness is conscious of itself, 
Sartre responds that the unreflective consciousness that takes precedence over the reflective one 
on account of its autonomy: whereas an unreflective consciousness does not need a reflective one 
to be conscious of itself, a reflective consciousness does need a reflected consciousness to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Of course I can be observing my desk and still have a dim consciousness of my own consciousness. To see the 
point Sartre is going to make, let the reader imagine a situation in which I am fully absorbed in the observation of 
something (a painting, a home-run, a face, etc.), absolutely “oblivious” of myself. 
166 “[A] consciousness has no need of a reflecting consciousness in order to be conscious of itself. It merely does not 
posit itself to itself as its own object.” (TE:11) 
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reflective.167  This holds phenomenologically and ontologically. Phenomenologically, Sartre 
argues that 
 
[R]eflective life [i.e., consciousness] generally presupposes spontaneous [i.e., unreflective] life. (TE: 20) 
 
Ontologically, Sartre’s claim is that 
 
The unreflected has an ontological priority over the reflected, since it does not need to be reflected in order to exist, 
and reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-order consciousness. (TE: 19) 
 
 
This insight by Sartre that there unreflective consciousness of itself is more basic than reflective 
consciousness of itself is a fundamental tenet of his whole philosophy. In BT, Sartre claims 
 
[R]eflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not reflection which reveals the 
consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the 
reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. (BN: 13) 
 
We need to stop at this point, as Sartre has established the central idea on which I am 
constructing my case. What I take Sartre to have established is two things. First, Sartre has 
established that there are two fundamental standpoints we can adopt over consciousness, the 
reflective and the unreflective one.168 Second, Sartre has established that one of them is 
grounded on the other; in particular, the reflective standpoint is grounded on the unreflective one. 
Using the terminology I introduced in Chapter 1 (section 1.1.2.), the reflective standpoint is 
according to Sartre secondary with respect to the unreflective one, which is more basic. Recall 
from Chapter 1 (section 1.1. 2.) that a standpoint toward an object can be seen to be grounded on 
another standpoint if the latter takes precedence over the former and makes it 
phenomenologically (or epistemologically) possible in the first place. If that’s the case, we said, 
the former can be seen to be phenomenologically (or epistemologically) “included” in, and 
thereby be a “part” of, the latter. (Using alternative terminological choices, we can say that the 
former standpoint phenomenologically (or epistemologically) “supervenes” on the latter.)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 “[H]ow can we accept that the reflected comes first with relation to the unreflected? We can doubtless conceive a 
consciousness appearing immediately as reflected, in certain cases. But even then, the unreflected has an ontological 
priority over the reflected in order to exist, and reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-order 
consciousness.” (TE:19) 
168 Of course, these two standpoints don’t exhaust all the possible standpoints we can adopt over consciousness. 
They are the two fundamental ones concerning Sartre’s rejection of Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories. 
 70	  
 
This is precisely, I contend, what Sartre is suggesting about the two standpoints we can take over 
consciousness. According to Sartre, unreflective consciousness is a standpoint we can adopt over 
consciousness. 169  Unreflective consciousness is (non-positionally) conscious of itself and, 
therefore, somehow it “observes” itself (this is a bit misleading since to “observe” involves 
positional consciousness of whatever we are observing); consciousness reveals to itself 
unreflectively, and completely so. According to Sartre, on the other hand, reflective 
consciousness is of course a standpoint we can adopt over consciousness (this time “to adopt” is 
more properly used). More importantly, Sartre takes reflective consciousness to be grounded on, 
i.e., to be secondary with respect to, unreflective consciousness: without unreflective 
consciousness there wouldn’t be reflective consciousness to start with; the converse, however, 
doesn’t hold.170 
 
2. 6. PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
We can conclude now showing that Sartre believes both that Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of 
consciousness contain philosophically interesting truth. This shows that, whatever their 
theoretical inadequacies, they can’t be spelled out in terms of falsehood simpliciter. Rather, as 
I’ve just shown, it’s more accurate to spell them out in terms of adopting a secondary standpoint 
toward consciousness.  
 
2 .6 .1 Descartes 
 
It’s easy to show that Sartre credits Descartes with having contributed philosophically interesting 
truth about consciousness. This gives us reasons to believe that, whatever the philosophical 
inadequacies Sartre sees in Descartes’ theory of consciousness, they can’t be spelled out in terms 
of falsehood simpliciter. In other words, it can’t be the case that, for Sartre, Descartes’ theory of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 This is a bit misleading, since “to adopt” suggests positional consciousness of whatever object we adopt a 
standpoint towards. 
170 In BN Sartre says: “I believe that I have demonstrated that the first condition of all reflection is a pre-reflective 
cogito.” (BN: 121) 
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consciousness is false, even if for Sartre there are theses by Descartes about consciousness that 
are false (for instance, that there is a self in consciousness).  
 
First off, Sartre credits Descartes with having discovered that reflection provides us with a 
domain of absolute certainty: 
 
It is necessary to repeat here what has been known since Descartes: a reflective consciousness delivers us absolutely 
certain data. (I: 4) 
 
Second, Sartre credits Descartes with having discovered that, whatever consciousness may be, it 
can’t be itself part of the world. This doesn’t necessarily mean that Sartre agrees with Descartes 
that consciousness is “immaterial;” but Sartre acknowledges that Descartes’ theory of 
consciousness contains philosophically interesting truth:  
 
What first appears evident is that human reality can detach itself from the world … only if by nature it has the 
possibility of self-detachment. This was seen by Descartes … . (BN: 60) 
 
2. 6. 2 Husserl 
 
The same as Descartes, it’s easy to show that Sartre credits Husserl with having contributed 
philosophically interesting truth about consciousness. This gives us reasons to believe that, 
whatever the philosophical inadequacies Sartre sees in Husserl’s theory of consciousness, they 
can’t be spelled out in terms of falsehood simpliciter. In other words, it can’t be the case that, for 
Sartre, Husserl’s theory of consciousness is false, even if for Sartre there are theses by Husserl 
about consciousness that are false (for instance, that there is a self in consciousness). 
 
The most obvious way to show that Sartre’s credits Husserl with having contributed 
philosophically interesting truth about consciousness is Sartre’s endorsement of phenomenology 
as a philosophical method. According to Sartre, phenomenology’s chief object of description is, 
of course, consciousness,171 and this object is grasped by intuition. 172 “Intuition” doesn’t refer to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 “Phenomenology is a [scientific, and not a ‘critical’] study of consciousness.” (TE:4) 
172 “Its [phenomenology’s] essential way of proceeding is via intuition.” (TE:4) 
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an “ineffable” and mysterious way of apprehending things,173 as opposed to a language-
embedded, conceptual, or argumentative one, but to the way in which things are immediately 
present to us in self-observation, without intermediaries.174 
 
As said before, once we use the phenomenological intuition we don’t identify the correlates of 
our conscious states with truly existing entities. When I perceive my desk, for instance, or even 
when I misperceive a desk, I take the desk to be “right there,” existing in the world. Sartre knows 
that a phenomenological reduction is necessary to suspend the ontological commitments of our 
natural attitude, in which this taking for granted is always present. The phenomenological 
reduction allows us to observe consciousness as something that Sartre, quite idiosyncratically, 
identifies with Kant’s transcendental consciousness. 175  However, even after the reduction, 
Husserl’s consciousness is, for Sartre, unlike Kant’s, consciousness as we do observe it, not as it 
ought to be if what we observe is to count as experience (in Kant’s sense).176 What is important 
is that Sartre acknowledges Husserl’s theory of consciousness contains philosophically 
interesting truth: 
 
I can go along with Husserl in each of the admirable descriptions in which he shows transcendental consciousness 
constituting the world by imprisoning itself in empirical consciousness. (TE: 4) 
 
I take this to mean that as far as description is concerned, Sartre credits Husserl with describing 
the right object, even if from a standpoint that I take Sartre to believe is secondary with respect 
to a more basic one. This description of consciousness by Husserl includes distinguishing 
different types of evidence: 
 
Husserl has rendered philosophy a signal service by distinguishing between different kinds of certainty. (TE: 15) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 At a deeper level of philosophical problematization, it might. See for instance, Derrida [1967] 1973. 
174 “Intuition, according to Husserl, puts us in the presence of the thing.” (TE:4) 
175 “Husserl takes up Kant’s transcendental consciousness and grasps it by means of the epoché.” (TE:4). Of course, 
it’s questionable that what Husserl grasps by means of the epoché is, as Sartre wants, Kant’s transcendental 
consciousness. “For Kant and for Husserl, the I is a formal structure of consciousness” (TE:16).  
176 “It [Husserl’s] is a real consciousness, accessible to each and every one of us, once we have performed the 
‘reduction’.” (TE:4) 
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The second way to show that Sartre’s credits Husserl with having contributed philosophically 
interesting truth about consciousness is Sartre’s endorsement of Husserl’s notion of intentionality. 
In TE, Sartre says 
 
[C]onsciousness is defined by intentionality. (TE:6) 
 
And in BN, Sartre repeats that 
 
All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness 
that is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no “content” (BN : 11) 
 
Husserl defines consciousness … as a transcendence. In truth he does. This is what he posits. This is his essential 
discovery. (BN:23) 
 
2 .6. 3 La Rochefoucauld 
 
Finally, Sartre credits La Rochefoucauld with having contributed philosophically interesting 
truth about consciousness, which gives us reasons to believe that, whatever the philosophical 
inadequacies he sees in La Rochefoucauld’s theory of consciousness, they can’t be spelled out in 
terms of falsehood simpliciter. This case is interesting, as, although Sartre’s interest in La 
Rochefoucauld is more peripheral than his interest in Descartes and Husserl, the textual evidence 
he offers for the thesis I want to make in this chapter is more explicit. 
 
Sartre is quite clear that the theory of consciousness proposed by the French moralists is 
inadequate and must be rejected: 
 
[W]e must, before we go any further, rid ourselves of a purely psychological theory that affirms, for psychological 
reasons, the material presence of the me in all our consciousnesses. This is the theory of amour-propre put forward 
by the French moralists. (TE: 17) 
 
As we have seen, the central thesis of the French moralists, of which Sartre takes La 
Rochefoucauld to be their foremost representative, is that he self is materially present in all of 
our conscious acts (a self of which we may or may not be conscious). Given that Sartre wants to 
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deny this thesis, it’s tempting to hold that, according to Sartre, La Rochefoucauld’s thesis is false 
simpliciter.177 Textual support is easy to find. Sartre does say that 
 
The interest of this [La Rochefoucauld’s] thesis seems to me to reside in the way it brings out an error very 
frequently committed by psychologists —an error consisting in confusing the essential structure of reflective acts 
with that of unreflected acts. (TE: 17, my emphasis) 
 
And, more explicitly, that 
 
La Rochefoucauld’s psychology … is not true. (TE: 20, Sartre’s emphasis) 
 
However, to leave things at that wouldn’t do justice to the fact that Sartre acknowledges La 
Rochefoucauld’s theory to contain philosophically interesting truth.178 First, Sartre admits that 
La Rochefoucauld’s theory captures an important fact of our conscious life, namely that 
conscious states are “mine” and at least sometimes willed as mine, not for their own sake: 
 
I feel pity for Peter and I come to his aid. For my consciousness, one thing alone exists at that moment: Peter-
having-to-be-aided. … But if my state is suddenly transformed into a reflected state, then I am watching myself 
acting. … [As La Rochefoucauld (rightly) says, I.G.] It is no longer Peter who attracts me, it is my helpful 
consciousness that appears to me as having to be perpetuated. Even if I merely think that I must pursue my action 
because ‘it is good’, the good qualifies my behavior, my pity, etc. (TE: 20) 
 
La Rochefoucauld’s point that conscious states can be lived and willed as “mine” is for Sartre 
insightful and, more importantly, true. 
 
Second, Sartre believes that, in addition to being true, the fact observed by La Rochefoucauld is 
philosophically interesting, i.e. non-obviously true. This holds for Sartre both factually and 
philosophically. Factually, sometimes our conscious acts don’t appear to be “mine.” As Sartre 
suggests in the quote, in a situation in which all I’m conscious of is Peter-having-to-be-aided, my 
conscious acts are Peter-centered. There appearing no self in consciousness, my conscious acts 
don’t appear to be “mine” in any way. Philosophically, the existence of a self might be denied, in 
which case no conscious act would be “mine:” all of them would be selfless. In either case, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 In an analogous way in which someone might claim that the Statue of Liberty represents a man wearing jeans and 
a T-shirt, holding a baseball bat in his right hand and a newspaper in his left one (pg. 1). 
178 Or, in this case, psychologically interesting truth. 
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claim that at least some conscious acts are “mine” is, if true, philosophically (or psychologically) 
interesting. 
 
On the one hand, then, Sartre believes that “we must rid ourselves” of La Rochefoucauld’s 
theory; the theory involves “an error” and, on the whole, “is not true.” On the other hand, Sartre 
acknowledges that La Rochefoucauld’s theory contains interesting truth. How do we square 
these two facts? My answer is partial truth: according to Sartre, La Rochefoucauld’s theory is 
true of only a “part” of our conscious life, i.e., reflective consciousness (not of consciousness 
simpliciter).179 It can be easily shown that Sartre doesn’t take La Rochefoucauld’s theory to be 
false, as, once its limits are acknowledged, the theory has (limited) legitimacy. Sartre does say 
that  
  
La Rochefoucauld’s psychology has found its rightful place. (TE: 20) 
 
 
And, more explicitly, Sartre argues that 
 
 
La Rochefoucauld’s psychology is true only for the particular feelings that take their origin from reflective life.” (TE: 
20, my emphasis) 
 
 
I take this quote by Sartre to showcase the overall thesis I have defended in this chapter, not only 
concerning La Rochefoucuald, but concerning Descartes and Husserl, even if textual support for 
the last two figures isn’t as telling.  
 
2. 7 SUMMARY 
 
To conclude, let me summarize the chief results of this chapter. According to Sartre, the best past 
theories of consciousness are inadequate but not exactly false; rather, they are partially true (in 
the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be elaborated on in Chapter 5). According to Sartre, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Following the analogy of my first example in this study (pg. 1), we don’t have to say that a description that goes 
“It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of 
Independence, July 4, 1776,” is false about the Statue of Liberty (which, to some extent, is a correct claim to make); 
it’s more accurate to say that the description is true of a part of it. 
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furthermore, the chief inadequacy of past philosophers has been to adopt a standpoint toward 
consciousness that is grounded on a more basic one, which takes precedence over it and makes it 
possible in the first place. The two philosophers I’ve taken Sartre to believe have contributed 
most to a philosophical understanding of consciousness are Descartes and Husserl; additionally, 
I’ve considered Kant and the French Moralists (in particular La Rochefoucauld).  
 
Sartre credits Descartes with having discovered philosophically interesting truth about 
consciousness, on three accounts. First, Descartes is the first philosopher to understand the mind 
in terms of consciousness. Second, Descartes holds that consciousness is completely revealed in 
the cogito. Finally, Descartes holds that the cogito occurs in reflection, when consciousness is 
directed towards itself. Sartre credits Husserl’s theory of consciousness with containing 
philosophically interesting truth on three accounts too. First, Husserl holds that phenomenology, 
not psychology, is the proper way to study consciousness. Second, Husserl holds that 
consciousness must be understood in terms of intentionality. Third, Husserl is committed to the 
idea that consciousness must be studied via reflection. 
 
Both Descartes and Husserl defend the thesis that there is a self in consciousness. Sartre believes 
this thesis is false in one sense, partially true in another. The thesis that there is a self in 
consciousness is for Sartre partially true in the sense that it doesn’t hold of consciousness 
simpliciter, but only of reflective consciousness: Sartre agrees that in reflection there is a self, 
but he argues that in unreflective consciousness there is no self at all. The thesis that there is a 
self in consciousness is for Sartre false in the sense that the self is not in consciousness as a 
subject of our conscious acts, as Descartes and Husserl argue, but for consciousness, as an object 
of our consciousness acts; the self, in other words, isn’t what is conscious, but something we are 
conscious of.  
 
Underlying Sartre’s criticisms of Descartes and Husserl about the self there is a critique to 
Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness. Essentially, Sartre believes that Descartes’ 
and Husserl’s theories of consciousness target the right object. What according to Sartre is 
inadequate with Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories isn’t so much that they include claims that are 
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false of consciousness (although this happens to be the case for Sartre too) but, rather, that their 
claims are true of only a part (i.e., mode) of consciousness, i.e., reflective consciousness.  
 
According to Sartre, reflective consciousness is what we are able to observe of consciousness 
when we adopt a reflective standpoint toward it. According to Sartre, Descartes and Husserl are 
right that, when we observe our own consciousness from a reflective standpoint, (a) we are given 
a domain of absolute certainty and (b) a self appears. What Sartre objects to Descartes and 
Husserl is that there is a standpoint toward our own consciousness that is more basic than the 
reflective one, and moreover makes the reflective standpoint possible in the first place. This 
standpoint is the unreflective one. According to Sartre, consciousness does not need to reflect, 
i.e., direct towards itself, to be conscious of itself. By being conscious of an object (and an object 
alone) consciousness is at the same time and by the same token conscious of itself as being 
conscious of that object. It is true that, in this case, consciousness is non-positionally conscious 
of itself, i.e., it doesn’t take itself as an object; but it’s none the less conscious of itself for that. 
According to Sartre, reflective consciousness of itself is grounded on, and therefore it’s 
secondary with respect to, unreflective consciousness of itself, both phenomenologically and 
ontologically. Phenomenologically, unreflective consciousness is more basic because 
unreflective consciousness is conscious of itself too. Ontologically, unreflective consciousness is 
more basic because it doesn’t need reflective consciousness to exist. Both phenomenologically 
and ontologically, reflective consciousness “supervenes” on unreflective consciousness.  
 
Descartes and Husserl are committed to the view that consciousness is best approached to from a 
reflective standpoint, and Sartre argues that a reflective standpoint toward consciousness is 
grounded on, and thus secondary with respect to, an unreflective standpoint. Given that Sartre 
acknowledges that Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories of consciousness contain philosophically 
interesting truth, the idea that what Sartre finds inadequate in Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories 
of consciousness is to have been based on a standpoint that is secondary with respect to a more 
basic one explains better Sartre’s acknowledgement of interesting truth than the idea that what 
Sartre finds inadequate in those theories is that they are false simpliciter of consciousness. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HEIDEGGER ON HUMAN BEING 
 
According to Heidegger, human being180 plays a central role in a philosophical understanding of 
reality, but human being has a unique and elusive nature that is a challenge for philosophy to 
capture. Now Heidegger believes that the best past accounts of human being have been 
inadequate. At its most general, the thesis I want to defend in this chapter is that, under analysis, 
these accounts are, according to Heidegger, inadequate but not exactly false; what is inadequate 
about them is that they provide us with only partial truth about human being (in the sense 
sketched in Chapter 1, to be elaborated on in Chapter 5). 
 
To defend my thesis I will proceed as follows. First, I will claim that the problem of the best past 
accounts of human being is best described by saying that, according to Heidegger, they result 
from adopting an inadequate standpoint toward human being. Second, I will claim that, 
according to Heidegger, this standpoint is not inadequate in the sense that is wrong, but in the 
sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint takes precedence over it and makes it possible in 
the first place. Third, according Heidegger, once we succeed to understand the nature of this 
more basic standpoint and place ourselves in it, it turns out that what we are able to know about 
human being from the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as, rather, partial. Thus, I will 
conclude, Heidegger provides us with an example of what I see as partial truth in philosophy (in 
what, again, I take to be a philosophically interesting sense to be further discussed in my last 
chapter). 
 
To explain Heidegger’s conception of human being and its centrality in a philosophical 
understanding of reality, a significant amount of expository work is needed. This is not an easy 
task, on account of the intrinsic difficulty of Heidegger’s thinking, the level of abstraction at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 The noun “human being,” which I prefer to Heidegger’s Dasein (more on this below), will involve some odd 
grammatical consequences. First, I handle it as non-countable (because, as we will see, Heidegger’s focus is more on 
being human than on human beings). Second, I handle it as neutral to avoid sex biases, wherefore I will use “its” as 
its possessive, instead of “his” or “her.” 
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which he works, and the unusually ambitious task he sets himself.181 The locus classicus of 
Heidegger on human being is his treatise Being and Time (BT from now on), the chief text I will 
draw on.182 Similar to the case of Sartre, this early work is characterized by its indebtedness to 
Husserl’s phenomenology, as well as by a radical departure from it. However, Heidegger 
engages, to a much larger extent than Sartre, with a variety of figures central in the Western 
tradition of philosophy, including Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, 
Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Scheler, and Husserl. To some extent, any of these figures 
might be used to make my case, in so far as all of them have, according to Heidegger, something 
to contribute to our understanding of human being; but all of them, in some way or another, 
provide us according to Heidegger with inadequate accounts (that, under analysis, I shall claim, 
prove to be partially true rather than false).  
 
It’s easy to see that, given the many targets Heidegger has in mind, the territory to be covered is 
much larger than in the case of Sartre. This means that, in order to make my task manageable, I 
need to make more drastic methodological decisions. The two most important are, first, what 
aspect(s) of human being and, second, what past accounts to choose to make my case. As we will 
see in a minute, these two questions go hand in hand: the best past accounts of human being so 
far derive their philosophical significance from illuminating specific aspects of human being, not 
its nature in general,183 so to focus on one of those aspects involves to focus on a specific best 
past account, and vice versa.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 This might lead us to consider Heidegger’s whole philosophical trajectory to better situate the position of 
Heidegger that I study in this chapter. How to divide this trajectory is a matter of scholarly debate, which I will skip 
here for being largely tangential for my purposes. 
182 I will supplement BT with related texts from Heidegger’s published lessons of the same period (around 1927), 
especially Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (Grundprobleme) (Heidegger [1927] 1975) and Logik: Die 
Frage nach der Wahrheit (Logik) (Heidegger [1925/26] 1976). Despite being Heidegger’s undisputed magnum opus, 
on the other hand, BT doesn’t adequately represent, even partially, Heidegger’s whole philosophy. BT is an early 
work against which Heidegger reacted quite soon. But BT is the recurrent starting point for an understanding of 
Heidegger’s later philosophy. Also, it must be taken into account that BT remains an incomplete work. Out of three 
Divisions that Heidegger had originally planned, only the first one and two thirds of the second were published. In 
BT’s seventh edition (1953), Heidegger announced that the remainder of the plan could not be written without 
radically reworking what was already published, thus renouncing to complete the original plan, indeed the plan itself 
and the entire philosophical program behind it.  
183 As we will see, the idea of a special philosophical discipline trying to grasp the nature of human being (man) in 
general, i.e., a philosophical anthropology, is, contrary to appearances, relatively recent. 
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What I’ll do in this chapter is therefore focus on one aspect of human being that Heidegger takes 
to be of central importance, not on human being in general. Or rather, I will focus on human 
being in general by drawing on this particular aspect. For a number of reasons I’ll go over in 
section 4.3. below, I will focus on human being’s relation to the world. It’s Heidegger on past 
philosophical accounts of how human being relates to the world that I will examine in this 
chapter (or rather, as I will explain, the accounts of human being and world implicit in those 
accounts). But which past philosophical accounts should I specifically focus on? Given the 
impossibility of examining all the targets Heidegger has in mind in the framework of this chapter, 
what I’ll do is use the blanket term “philosophical tradition” to characterize Heidegger’s overall 
target. This decision has, of course, some costs, but also some advantages. The costs are its 
obvious lack of specificity and, even worse, the danger of falsifying the views of individual 
philosophers by bringing them down to a common denominator that perhaps doesn’t represent 
the views of any of them. The advantage is its convenience and its generality, which allows us to 
target at the same time various important past philosophical accounts at the same time. What I 
find decisive about this methodological choice is its textual support: Heidegger himself uses the 
expression “philosophical tradition” and is quite clear, at various points in BT, that this is the 
target of his criticisms (whether he is in fact right or wrong in so doing doesn’t really affect my 
thesis in this chapter, which concerns Heidegger on past philosophical theories184). 
 
After this brief methodological discussion, let me rehearse the thesis I want to defend in this 
chapter. According to Heidegger, the philosophical tradition has offered an inadequate account 
of human being’s relation to the world. Underlying this account is a view of both human being 
and world that is inadequate. Under analysis, this view is according to Heidegger not false but 
partially true (in a philosophically interesting sense to be further discussed in my last chapter). 
 
3.1 BEING 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Remember the distinction drawn in Chapter 1, section 1.2.1., between theories and philosophers’ beliefs about 
theories. 
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In a philosophical discussion about human being one would expect to start right away with the 
question: what is human being? 185  and then examine the most important answers the 
philosophical tradition has provided, as well as the most relevant shortcomings that those 
answers can be seen as having. However, following Heidegger, this is precisely what I won’t be 
doing here. It is indeed one of Heidegger’s chief insights in BT that the question: What is human 
being? is philosophically important only to the extent that we turn the question around and, 
whatever human being may ultimately be, what we really ask ourselves is: what does it mean to 
be for human being in the first place? (Using Heidegger’s jargon: what is human being’s type of 
Being?).186 Now this question, in turn, is according to Heidegger important only to the extent that 
its answer provides us with a philosophically interesting route to an answer to the further 
question: what does it mean to be for entities in general?187 According to Heidegger, therefore, 
the question: what is human being? is, taken by itself, of limited philosophical interest: only 
taking for granted what it means to be for human being can mislead philosophers into thinking 
that a self-standing interesting answer can be given to it. This circumstance gives us a simple 
clue of how, according to Heidegger, there can be a philosophically inadequate account of 
human being whose inadequacy, however, doesn’t exactly consist in its being false and that, 
furthermore, can be construed in terms of partial truth (I’ll come back repeatedly to this idea.) 
  
I will explain in short why Heidegger believes the question what it means to be for entities in 
general is philosophically important. By now, I want to stress that Heidegger believes this 
question is so important that he coins a special name for it: the question about Being.188 It is 
because the question about Being is so tightly connected with the question: What is human being 
(i.e., what is means for human being to be?)189 that we need to get clear about a few basic things 
about it, so we can later understand how this connection exactly works. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 That is, what is man? Following Heidegger, I take “human being” and “man” to pick out the same entity, but I 
don’t use the term “man” to avoid sexist language. 
186 From now onward, “type of Being” of an entity (or sort of entities) is short for: “what it means to be” for that 
entity (or sort of entities). 
187 Or, rather, what it means for entities to be in general. That is, Heidegger’s stress is on what to be means in 
general (at the highest level of abstraction), not what it means to be for entities in general. 
188 In German, Seinsfrage.  
189 From now onwards, unless otherwise specified, “what is human being?” is short for “what does it mean ‘to be’ 
for human being?” 
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3.1.1 The Question About Being 
 
According to Heidegger, the philosophical tradition once raised the question about Being and 
gave some first tentative answers (especially, Heidegger contends, Parmenides, Plato and 
Aristotle). I will suggest later that Heidegger therefore believes the tradition had the right object 
of philosophy in view (i.e., entities qua entities), which gives us reasons to reject falsehood 
simpliciter as what according to Heidegger is philosophically inadequate about the tradition (see 
section 4.1.3.). However, Heidegger complains, the question about Being has since been 
forgotten or ignored; but it needs to be asked, for reasons I’ll go over in a minute.  
 
I have already established that the question about Being is short for the question: what does it 
mean for entities in general to be? But this question is problematic as it stands, as it’s unclear 
what it’s being asked in the first place and, therefore, what a good answer should look like. 
Perhaps we can help ourselves with alternative formulations of the same question. These include: 
what makes entities be entities?, on the basis of what are entities entities?, in virtue of what are 
entities entities?, and so on.190 Prima facie, what is problematic about these questions is their 
generality. It makes sense to ask what makes, e.g., a chair be a chair, a mountain be a mountain, 
a number be a number, a person be a person, and so on; but it doesn’t make as much sense to ask 
what makes entities be entities. Let’s get things backwards and try to make progress by 
considering Heidegger’s preliminary answer and elaborating on it. According to Heidegger, what 
makes entities be entities is (what he calls) Being. But what is Being? 
 
Negatively put, Heidegger contends, Being is not itself an entity.191 (If we were to look for a one-
sentence summary of Heidegger’s entire philosophy, this statement would be a good candidate). 
But what is an entity? An entity, Heidegger tells us, is whatever is something or other.192 
Evidently, Heidegger is shooting for the highest level of generality here: anything we can 
meaningfully talk about is something or other, as even e.g. “nothing” is something or other, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 According to Heidegger, the question about Being asks about what “determines entities as entities, that on the 
basis of which entities are already understood.” (BT: 25-6) 
191 “The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity … [O]ur first philosophical step consists in not … ‘telling a story’ –
that is to say, in not defining entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if Being had the 
character of some possible entity.” (BT: 26)  
192 “Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any 
way, is being [“seiendes,” that is, “entity”]; what we are is being, and so is how we are.” (BT: 26)  
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“nothing” as opposed to “something.” More prosaically, examples of entities include a tree, a 
city, a mountain, a country, a person, a pain, a number, a centaur, God, and so on; but also a fact 
(e.g., that hammers are useful), a property (e.g., red, big, round, etc.), an event (e.g., a hammer 
falling.), and so on. As can be supposed from this list, Heidegger does not equate “is” with 
“exists:” some of these entities, like numbers and God, might not exist, and some, like unicorns, 
do not exist. And yet, Heidegger holds, all of these things are entities, i.e., they are, in some way 
or another. What is crucial for something to qualify as entity in Heidegger’s sense is that it be 
something as opposed to something else —whatever it may be at all.  
 
Heidegger’s rationale for refusing to equate “to be” and “to exist” is the level of generality of his 
inquiry: existing entities are a species of the more comprehensive genus entity simpliciter. Given 
that Heidegger’s question is what it means for an entity in general to be, Heidegger isn’t 
particularly interested in the question what entities exist.193 Thus, Heidegger isn’t doing ontology 
(as as usually understood).194 Also, Heidegger is not interested in what the ultimate nature of 
reality is; thus, Heidegger is not doing metaphysics either. So what does Heidegger take himself 
as doing? In a nutshell, it’s phenomenology. But to understand what Heidegger means by 
“phenomenology,” and why he believes phenomenology is the right approach to the question 
about Being, we need to pause for a while and contrast phenomenology to ontology and 
metaphysics. 195 
 
A description of sorts of entities discriminates entities according to what they are. Prima facie, 
there are different sorts of entities and, for a variety of reasons, it matters to philosophy to get 
clear about these differences. For example, mental entities, (such as pains, perceptions, beliefs, 
and so on) are prima facie quite different from physical entities (such as chairs, mountains, brain 
states, and so on); timeless entities (such as numbers or Platonic ideas) are quite different from 
temporal entities (such as living beings or historical events); and so on. A descriptive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 “[In describing the world] the first step is to enumerate the things that are ‘in’ the world: houses, trees, people, 
mountains, stars …  This, however, is obviously a pre-phenomenological ‘business’ which cannot be at all relevant 
phenomenologically. Such a description is always confined to entities. It is ontical. But what we are seeking is 
Being.” (BT: 91) 
194 In the way this term is used in the analytic tradition. This is ironic because Heidegger characterizes what he’s 
doing as “ontology” (more precisely, “fundamental ontology”). 
195 According to Heidegger, the question about Being “must be treated phenomenologically.” (BT: 50) Still stronger: 
“Only as phenomenology is ontology possible.” (BT: 60) 
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metaphysics tries to establish an accurate “catalogue” of the different sorts of entities in general. 
Ontology tries to establish the sorts of entities that exist.196 For example, what prima facie are 
mental entities (such as pains and beliefs) might turn out to be physical entities (such as neurons 
and brain states) and, conversely, what prima facie are physical entities (such as chairs and trees) 
might turn out to be mental entities (such as perceptions of chairs and trees), and so on. 
Metaphysics, finally, tries to establish the sorts of entities that ultimately exist: for instance, even 
though mental entities might turn out to be physical entities, physical entities, in turn, might turn 
out to be, on final analysis, some other sort of thing.  
 
Remember that Heidegger wants to find out what it means for entities to be in general. But 
Heidegger suggests that neither ontology nor metaphysics (in the way I just characterized them) 
can offer an adequate answer. The reason is quite simple: both of them, according to Heidegger, 
presuppose a chief meaning of “to be” in the very first place: to exist, to be real. Of course, 
different ontologies and metaphysics disagree, not only about what entities do in fact exist, but 
perhaps also about what “to exist” means in the first place. Precisely this disagreement, however, 
makes it plain that they agree on the supremacy of “to exist” as to what it means for entities “to 
be.” It won’t do to argue that ontologists and metaphysicians are of course aware that, for many 
entities, “to be” must mean something different than “to exist,” for instance possible and fictional 
entities; Heidegger’s response is simple: entities for which to be must mean something different 
than to exist (for instance possible and fictional entities) are understood negatively (privatively) 
in relation to existing ones, whereby the presupposition that to be means “to exist” is still 
operative.  Heidegger’s question about Being is presumably more radical, as this presupposition 
is skirted. But this radicality prevents Heidegger from making use of this presupposition to look 
for the meaning of Being. What Heidegger urges philosophers to do is to describe how entities 
appear (to us).197 Describing how entities appear (to us) is the only rigorous way of doing 
philosophy, Heidegger suggests, because entities appearing (to us) is a more basic layer of study 
than existing entities: even non-existing entities, for instance Santa Claus, appear (to us) in some 
way or another. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Of course, it might be objected to ontology characterized in this way. W. v. O. Quine, for example, one of the 
driving forces behind the revival of ontology in the analytic tradition, does not ask what sort of objects do in fact 
exist?, but what sort of objects do given beliefs or theories take to exist? 
197 In the remainder of the chapter, I shall be bracketing “to us” after to appear, suggesting, as Heidegger wants, that 
entities can’t appear other than to “us.”  
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There are two objections one might raise to Heidegger at this point. First, some entities (for 
instance, a unicorn) don’t exist; therefore they can’t appear (to us). Such entities, therefore, will 
fall outside the scope of the philosopher, and so he will be prevented from answering the 
question about the Being of entities in general. Heidegger’s likely response would be the 
following. The question: How do entities appear (to us)? is precisely the point at issue, so the 
answer is as yet unsettled. If so, the objection is question-begging; for it presupposes that only 
existing entities e.g. Obama, Chicago, or a horse, as opposed to e.g. Santa Claus, Wonderland, 
and a unicorn, can appear (to us). But this is not true: as just indicated, non-existing entities do 
appear (to us) (even if they have a peculiar mode of appearance). 
 
The second objection is the following: how entities appear (to us) can’t be the proper subject of 
philosophy, because how entities appear (to us) is something subjective, but philosophy studies 
(or ought to study) how entities objectively are. Heidegger’s likely response would be the 
following. The claim that how entities appear (to us) is something subjective presupposes a 
contrast between subjective and objective. Thus, this objection is a variation of the first one. 
Accordingly, an analogous response applies: the question: what is the type of Being of entities in 
the way they appear (to us)? is precisely the point at issue; it is as yet philosophically unsettled. 
The difference is that now it is the type of Being of the entity to which things appear (namely, 
“us”) that is philosophically unsettled. 
 
Heidegger’s most important claim until now has been that Being is itself not an entity.198 What, 
then, is Being? This question can’t be answered at this point yet; it takes the whole of BT to offer 
an answer.199 Given that I have established that Heidegger discriminates entities according to 
how they appear (to us), we can tentatively characterize Being, in an alternative way, as what 
makes entities qua entities appear (to us). In the next section I will draw on this characterization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Least of all is “Being of entities something behind entities, which does not appear (to us) in any way.” (BT: 60) 
199 Or rather, it takes the whole of BT to adequately raise the question! The closest Heidegger comes to give a 
preliminary characterization “Being” is this: “Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of 
entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being 
lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure 
and simple.” (BT: 62)	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to argue that, according to Heidegger, there are two different standpoints we can adopt over 
entities in general (this claim will be instrumental for the case I want to make in this chapter). 
 
Finally, why should philosophers be bothering about Being at all?200 I have already responded 
that Heidegger believes we have a received understanding of Being, namely “to exist,” “to be 
real.” But this understanding, at any rate as far as Heidegger is concerned, isn’t philosophically 
clear; it seems therefore a worth philosophical effort to get clear about it.201 What Heidegger 
wants to add now to this insight is the further idea that this received understanding of Being isn’t 
the exclusive possession of philosophers; rather, it belongs to human being in general, and 
moreover by necessity, due to the very nature of human being (I will come back to this in section 
4. 2. 1).202 In short, the requirement of asking the question about Being isn’t dictated by 
theoretical concerns that some human beings might have (philosophers, in this case) but others 
not; it is dictated by pretheoretical concerns inherent to the nature of human being itself.203  
 
 
3.1.2 Standpoint: Pre-Theoretical versus Theoretical 
 
So far I’ve talked much about Being and entities, but I still haven’t discussed the notion of 
standpoint. Remember, my overall goal in this study is to show that the relation between part and 
whole accounting for the fact that we can have partial truth can hold, in philosophy, not for 
objects, but for standpoints toward objects; in which case this relation becomes one between a 
secondary and a basic standpoint: the secondary standpoint provides us then with partial truth 
(not falsehood) about an object (1. 1. 2 and 1.1.3.  in Chapter 1). In this chapter, I want to show 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Heidegger does of course believe philosophers should bother about Being. To start with, the question of Being 
“can [and according to Heidegger must] be made visible as a very special one” (BT: 24). Moreover: “Does [the 
question about Being] simply remain –or is it at all- a mere matter for soaring speculation about the most general of 
generalities, or is it, rather, of all questions, both the most basic and the most concrete?” (BT: 29). Heidegger’s 
italics suggest that to his eyes the answer is affirmative. Finally, and most clearly, “[w]ith the question of the 
meaning of Being, our investigation comes up against the fundamental question of philosophy.” (BT: 50) 
201 “What we seek when we inquire into Being is not something entirely unfamiliar, even if at first we cannot grasp 
it at all.” (BT: 25) This received understanding of Being shows itself at its most conspicuous when raising the 
question “What is Being?” itself, for in raising it we ask precisely what Being is. “We do not know what ‘Being’ 
means. But even if we ask, ‘What is “Being”?’, we keep within an understanding of the ‘is’, though we are unable to 
fix conceptually what that ‘is’ signifies.” (BT: 25). 
202 “This guiding activity of taking a look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which we 
always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein [human being] itself.” (BT: ?) 
203 “The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in 
darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again.” (BT: 23) 
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how according to Heidegger the philosophical tradition has adopted a secondary (not wrong) 
standpoint toward human being, thus providing us with partial truth (not falsehood) about human 
being. To defend this claim I need to show that Heidegger believes there are two standpoints we 
can take over human being (one secondary and one basic). What I do in this section is the 
preliminary task of showing that Heidegger believes there are two standpoints we can take over 
entities in general.  
 
Remember, Heidegger starts from the premise that it’s not philosophically clear what it means to 
be for entities in general. The philosophical tradition has made do with a received, default 
understanding of what to be means: “to exist,” “to be real;” but whether this is what it means to 
be for entities in general is, Heidegger urges, up for grabs. What we need to do instead, 
Heidegger has suggested, is describe how entities appear (to us), without assuming any received, 
default understanding. But entities, Heidegger wants to contend now, appear (to us) in two 
fundamentally different ways, and moreover mutually irreducible between them. First, 
Heidegger claims, entities can appear (to us) as objects; second, entities can appear (to us) as 
tools. What I want to claim is that, according to Heidegger, there is a standpoint toward entities 
corresponding to each of these two ways. But first of all, what exactly are these two modes of 
appearance? 
 
Suppose I step into my office ready to spend an afternoon working there; I pull a chair and sit at 
my desk, in front of my computer. When doing this, I didn’t stare at the things I see in my office, 
reflect, and decide that the object “down there” is suitable to sit in, and the object “over here” 
suitable to work at. On the contrary, I acted in a spontaneous, non-reflective way;204 only 
exceptionally does someone “stare” at a chair so as to, after “reflection,” “decide” to sit on it, and 
so on. Given this spontaneity and non-reflectivity, is it the case that the office, chair, and desk 
don’t appear (to us)? Evidently not: even if I wasn’t really paying attention to the office, the 
chair, and the desk, they still appear (to me). Heidegger’s contention now is that the bare fact 
that I pull a chair and sit on it means that I take this entity as something, namely as, precisely, a 
chair. But in doing so, Heidegger urges, the chair doesn’t appear (to me) as an object; rather, it 
appears (to me) as tool to be practically dealt with. (The term “tool” is broader here than in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Which obviously doesn’t mean “unreflective” in the sense of “rash.” 
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usual sense: what is important to qualify for “tool” in Heidegger’s sense is that I take something 
to be dealt-with (not observed) as this or that; whether the entity is “objectively” a tool, for 
instance a hammer, is a side issue; remember we’re talking about how entities appear (to us), not 
what they objectively are). A trait of entities appearing (to me) as tools is that they slip our 
attention; their presence, so to say, recedes into the background; yet their presence is nonetheless 
quite conspicuous, even if “peripheral.” In the example above, for instance, my attention was 
focused (say) on my tasks: the book-to-be-read, the report-to-be-written, and so on. In some way, 
I wasn’t really “aware” that I was pulling a chair. But the chair wasn’t something hidden or 
mysterious; it was perfectly visible.  
 
My contention now is that Heidegger believes there is a standpoint toward entities corresponding 
to the way entities appear (to us) as tools. My argument is simple: a standpoint, per Chapter 1, 
must discriminate between objects: whatever a standpoint exactly is, and of whatever type, 
objects must be observed from it as being something or other; according to Heidegger, however, 
entities appearing (to us) as tools appear (to us) as being something or other (for instance, my 
pulling the chair to sit on involves that the entity in question appears (to me) as chair and not, 
say, as a hammer). Therefore, according to Heidegger, there is a standpoint toward entities from 
which entities appear (to us) as tools, and furthermore, as something as opposed to something 
else. This standpoint I call pretheoretical. 
   
In contrast to tools, entities can appear (to us) as objects. Suppose that, instead of stepping into 
my office to work at my desk, I do so to make an inventory of the furniture, which includes as a 
task elaborating a report of the physical state of each item. If I pull the chair with the goal, not to 
sit on it, but to observe its physical state (which involves to ascertain its objective properties —
blue, metallic, old, 80 centimeters tall, and so on), the way the chair appears (to me) is, if 
Heidegger is right, in a radically (and irreducibly) different sort of way than it is the case when 
the chair appears (to me) as I pull it to sit on it. (Remember Heidegger is doing phenomenology: 
Heidegger doesn’t claim that, if I observe the chair instead of sitting on it, the chair becomes a 
different sort of entity; what is different is how the chair appears (to us).) In the first place, 
Heidegger contends, the chair has now become my focus of attention, whereas before it slipped 
my attention. In the second place, the chair appears (to me) as standing out from the background; 
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even more, as being isolated (“cut off”) from its practical surrounding. This is why, Heidegger 
holds, the chair appears (to me) in such a way that I can relate towards the chair with an eye on 
how the chair, so to say, is “in itself” (“objectively”). This is the way, Heidegger, concludes, in 
which an entity appears (to us) as object, not as tool. What we have here, I hold, is according to 
Heidegger a distinctive standpoint we can take over entities, completely different from the 
previous standpoint and irreducible to it; I call this standpoint theoretical. 
 
The thesis by Heidegger that is really important for my purposes is now the following: the tool-
standpoint, not the object-standpoint, is the one allowing entities to appear (to us) in the first 
instance; what is more, entities appear (to us) as objects on the basis of them appearing (to us) as 
tools. In short, entities appearing (to us) as objects is a secondary way of appearing; the basic 
way is entities appearing (to us) as tools. Heidegger’s argument for this view rests on his 
phenomenological insight that entities always appear (to us) as something or other; but the “as” 
that is phenomenologically given to us in the first instance isn’t the “as” of theoretical 
observation; it is a pretheoretical “as” of practical engagement with the world. Heidegger 
doesn’t obviously deny that a theoretical standpoint toward entities can discover them as they are; 
what he contends is that this standpoint is able to do so on the basis of a pretheoretical revealing 
of entities that reveals them as something or other in its own right. This pretheoretical standpoint, 
Heidegger urges, makes the theoretical one possible to start with: only because entities 
pretheoretically appear (to us) as something or other can they subsequently appear (to us) with 
objective properties, i.e., theoretically appear (to us) as something or other. Only because an 
entity pretheoretically appears (to me) as, say, chair can it subsequently theoretically appear (to 
me) as, say, old, blue, and metallic, and so on. The theoretical standpoint, Heidegger concludes, 
does not reveal how entities are in a primary manner: this theoretical standpoint, far from being 
primary, is parasitic on a pretheoretical one, which makes the former possible.205 
 
Let me finish this presentation of these two different standpoints with a couple of remarks about 
the terms “theoretical” and “pretheoretical.” First of all, these are my terminological choices, not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 In Heidegger’s jargon, “To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate 
beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern.” (BT: 101)  
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Heidegger’s.206 While the terms aren’t totally satisfactory, alternative ones probably suffer from 
greater disadvantages. What is important to keep in mind is two things: first, while “theoretical” 
in Heidegger’s sense partially overlaps with “theoretical” in the usual sense, it doesn’t exactly 
coincide with it; its sense is significantly broader: we have already seen that to observe an entity 
from a theoretical standpoint in the usual sense (i.e., with a view to coming out with a theory 
about the entity) is a specific case of observing an entity from a theoretical standpoint in 
Heidegger’s sense. Second, the prefix “pre-“ in “pretheoretical” isn’t meant to suggest that this 
standpoint has a lower status; it simply suggests a standpoint which antecedes a theoretical one 
in the phenomenologically neutral sense I have just indicated. More importantly, the “pre-“ here 
doesn’t prejudice any teleology to the effect that a pretheoretical standpoint is bound to become 
theoretical as soon as we refine our cognitive instruments, whichever they are; a pretheoretical 
standpoint is for Heidegger autonomous and self-sufficient: whether it becomes theoretical or not 
is always purely optional. (This is another way to say that according to Heidegger, and using 
contemporary analytic terminology, the theoretical standpoint toward entities supervenes on the 
pretheoretical one.) 
 
So far I’ve shown that, according to Heidegger, there are two standpoints we can adopt over 
entities, the theoretical and the pretheoretical; the theoretical standpoint, moreover, is secondary, 
whereas the pretheoretical is basic. Remember though that I motivated this distinction by 
drawing on an example including an office, a chair, and a desk, that is, particular entities. 
Heidegger’s contention now is that there is both a pretheoretical and a theoretical standpoint 
toward entities in general (entities qua entities). At the bare minimum, we have a pretheoretical 
standpoint toward entities just by dealing with them in our everyday lives. From both a 
theoretical and a pre-theoretical standpoint, our received understanding of what Being is, 
according to Heidegger, isn’t so much mistaken or false as “vague” and “indeterminate.” 
Heidegger suggests that this vagueness and indeterminacy are not privative features, to be 
equated with a lack of distinctness that could be improved on with conceptual refinement. Rather, 
this vagueness and indeterminacy are positive, philosophically telling features of us, and as such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206  Heidegger himself uses other terms, including “pre-ontological” versus “ontological” and “pre-
phenomenological” versus “phenomenological.” 
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must be elicited and explained.207 On the other hand, our pre-theoretical understanding of the 
meaning of Being is, according to Heidegger, heavily conditioned by baggage whose origin is, in 
turn, a theoretical standpoint.208 
 
It is worth noting that, according to Heidegger, from a theoretical standpoint, the inadequacy in 
our received understanding of the meaning of Being accounts for the existence of spurious 
puzzles plaguing the philosophical tradition. What I take Heidegger to be suggesting here is that 
the philosophical tradition has adopted a theoretical standpoint toward entities (and I will argue 
in the next section that for Heidegger this involves partial truth, not falsehood, about entities). 
As we know, to adopt a theoretical standpoint toward entities doesn’t necessarily mean that the 
tradition has observed entities with a view to offer philosophical theories about them. Prior to 
that, it means that the tradition has privileged entities appearing (to us) as objects as the default 
way in which entities in general appear (to us). I will argue in a minute that, according to 
Heidegger, the philosophical tradition has thereby adopted an inadequate standpoint toward 
entities in general; this standpoint, however, isn’t inadequate in the sense that is wrong, but in the 
sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint, the pretheoretical, makes it possible in the first 
place. By overlooking the existence of this pretheoretical standpoint, the philosophical tradition 
hasn’t provided us with a false account of entities in general, but with a partially true one. 
 
The philosophical puzzles Heidegger alluded to above are spurious in the sense that their 
adequate response doesn’t consist in solving them but in, as Wittgenstein’s picture goes, 
dissolving them. To “dissolve” a philosophical puzzle is to show that what seems to be a 
legitimate question to which an answer ought to be given is, rather, an ill-raised, confused 
question, to which no interesting answer exists. These questions do not pose genuine 
philosophical problems but, rather, pseudo-problems.209 Heidegger’s examples of such questions 
include: can the existence of external reality be demonstrated? Is there truth? Can our knowledge 
of the truth be proved? Do other human beings exist?, and so on. Whereas Wittgenstein sees a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 “[The] very indefiniteness [of this understanding of Being] is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be 
clarified.” (BT: 25) 
208 “This vague average understanding of Being may be so infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about 
Being that these remain hidden as sources of the way in which it is prevalently understood.” (BT: 25) 
209 “[T]he ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein 
[human being] expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from leveling them off to that 
unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems.” (BT: 262,) 
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confused use of language in questions of this sort,210 the underlying flaw Heidegger sees is a 
deficient understanding by philosophers of what it means to be for the (putative) entities asked 
about (external reality, truth, knowledge, other human beings, respectively). According to 
Heidegger, only by raising the question about Being, that is, by asking what it means to be for 
entities in general, can the nature of these traditional questions be shown to depend on a prior 
(and flawed) understanding of something more basic, namely Being. 
 
3.1.3 Partial Truth: Being 
 
By now I’ve covered enough territory to make a first step into showing that, according to 
Heidegger, the philosophical tradition has provided us with an inadequate account of human 
being which, however, isn’t false but partially true. What I want to contend in this section is that, 
to begin with, the philosophical tradition has provided us with an inadequate account of the 
proper subject of philosophy. (We will see how this thesis carries over to human being and 
human being’s relation to the world; see sections 3.2.4. and 3.3.3 below). This account, however, 
isn’t false but partially true. I will argue that the problem of this account is best described by 
saying that, according to Heidegger, it results from having adopted an inadequate standpoint 
toward entities in general. This standpoint, according to Heidegger, isn’t inadequate in the sense 
that is wrong but, rather, in the sense that is secondary. 
 
First off, it should be clear by now that Heidegger finds something inadequate about the 
philosophical tradition generally speaking. I have already shown that, according to Heidegger, 
the central question of philosophy is the question about Being, which asks: what does it mean for 
entities to be in general? But the philosophical tradition, Heidegger complaints, hasn’t raised this 
question: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 “Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our 
language” (Tractatus 4.003; Wittgenstein [1922] 1961: 19); “All philosophy is a “critique of language”” (Tractatus 
4.0031; loc. cit.); “[P]hilosophical problems are misunderstandings which must be removed by clarification of the 
rules according to which we are inclined to use words.” (Philosophical Grammar, 32; Wittgenstein 1974: 68); 
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (Philosophical 
Investigations §109; Wittgenstein 1953: 47). 
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On the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma has been developed 
which not only the declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete 
neglect. (BT: 21) 
 
Hitherto our arguments for showing that the question [about Being] must be restated have been motivated in part by 
its venerable origin but chiefly by the lack of a definite answer and even by the absence of any satisfactory 
formulation of the question itself. (BT: 29) 
 
 
That according to Heidegger failure to raise the question about Being is philosophically 
inadequate doesn’t by now need demonstration. But, of course, failure to raise the question about 
Being is a quite different thing from making a false claim about Being. Therefore, a very 
preliminary result is this: according to Heidegger, the fact that the tradition hasn’t raised the 
question about Being is philosophically inadequate; but this inadequacy doesn’t consist in the 
falsehood of a claim (or an account). We need then to get a bit clearer about this inadequacy. 
 
What does failure to raise the question about Being exactly amount to? Once again, the question 
about Being asks what it means to be for entities in general, and Heidegger’s insight is that the 
answer is up for grabs: to be might mean different sorts of things for different sorts of entities. 
The failure to raise the question about Being is equivalent to assuming a default meaning of 
Being applying to entities in general. But this, Heidegger suggests, is precisely what the 
philosophical tradition has done. What this shows, I contend, is two things: first, the tradition has 
provided us with an inadequate account of the proper subject of philosophy; second, however, 
the tradition has had the right subject in view when providing us with this inadequate account. 
This is because, remember, “Being” is short for “what it means to be;” but what it means to be, 
according to Heidegger, can only be responded to with an eye on the maximum degree of 
generality, entities in general, as opposed to a specific sort of entities (for instance, physical as 
opposed to mental, or timeless as opposed to temporal). Therefore, the proper subject of 
philosophy, according to Heidegger, is entities in general. But even if we target entities in 
general, we still need to do so with the highest degree of generality in mind; for it would be 
possible to consider entities in general in so far as they are, say, physical or not physical, 
temporal or not temporal, and so on. There is the possibility, by contrast, to consider entities in 
general in so far as they are, precisely, entities; and this is the only (or at any rate the primary) 
way in which philosophers, according to Heidegger, should consider entities. According to 
Heidegger, I conclude, the proper subject of philosophy is entities qua entities.  
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It is easy to show, however, that Heidegger credits the tradition with having taken entities qua 
entities to be the proper subject of philosophy. If so, what we have here, I contend, is a situation 
which is analogous to the one I presented in the example at the beginning of Chapter 1. Let’s 
remember the example. Suppose I ask you to describe the Statue of Liberty and you answer 
something like: “It’s a tabula ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date 
of the American Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776,” and you proceed to describe this 
tablet with minute detail. As I established in Chapter 1, this description is inadequate, but not 
exactly false; what is wrong with it is that, instead of describing the Statue of Liberty, you are 
describing only one part.  
 
Something similar, I contend, is what Heidegger sees as happening in the case. According to 
Heidegger, the tradition has had in view the right object, entities qua entities. Given that it’d be 
possible to have in view what according to Heidegger is the wrong object, i.e., not entities in 
general but a specific sort of entities (for instance, physical, mental, timeless, temporal, and so 
on), the fact that the tradition targets the proper subject of philosophy involves important truth: it 
is not trivial that entities qua entities should be the proper subject of philosophy. This suggests 
that, according to Heidegger, whatever the inadequacies of the tradition about the proper subject 
of philosophy, it can’t consist in falsehood simpliciter. 
 
Still, Heidegger believes that the tradition has an inadequate view of the proper subject of 
philosophy. My contention is that this inadequacy consists in partial truth, and I base this claim 
on the idea that the inadequacy is best described by saying that, according to Heidegger, the 
tradition has adopted an inadequate standpoint toward entities qua entities. As I showed in my 
previous section, Heidegger believes there are two standpoints we can take over entities in 
general, the theoretical and the pretheoretical one. From a theoretical standpoint, entities appear 
(to us) as objects; from a pretheoretical standpoint, entities appear (to us) as tools. More 
importantly, Heidegger has shown that the theoretical standpoint is based on the pretheoretical 
one: only because entities appear (to us) as tools in the first instance can they subsequently 
appear (to us) as objects. According to Heidegger, the tradition has adopted a theoretical 
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standpoint toward entities.211 In so doing, and has overlooked the existence of a pretheoretical 
standpoint toward them: as a result, it has taken entities appearing (to us) as objects as the proper 
subject of philosophy. This is easily shown. According to Heidegger: 
 
Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also of ontological understanding, the interpretation 
of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world. Thereby the Being of 
what is proximally ready-to-hand [tool-like] gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things 
(res) which are present-at-hand. “Being” acquires the meaning of “Reality.” Substantiality becomes the basic 
characteristic of Being. (BT: 245) 
 
 
Now if I am right that, according to Heidegger, entities appear (to us) as objects based on their 
appearing (to us) as tools, the tradition has adopted a secondary (not wrong) standpoint toward 
entities; while the secondary standpoint targets the right object, i.e., entities qua entities, it only 
sees an aspect of it: entities appearing (to us) as objects, not as tools.  
 
The tradition, I conclude, has mistaken according to Heidegger the part for the whole, and that’s 
what is inadequate about its view of the proper subject of philosophy. Obviously, “part” and 
“whole” here don’t have a literal meaning, but a figurative one; and here, as I suggested in 
Chapter 1, is where the notion of standpoint fits in. What we have instead of a part versus the 
whole is a secondary versus a basic standpoint toward entities. If I adopt a secondary standpoint 
toward entities I see entities appearing (to me) as objects. According to Heidegger, this 
standpoint toward entities is inadequate because, prior to appearing (to us) as objects, entities 
appear (to us) as tools, and our goal is to describe how entities appear (to us) at their most 
general. Now this standpoint isn’t inadequate in the sense that is wrong, but in the sense that is 
secondary. It is not wrong because, even though entities appearing (to us) as objects doesn’t 
cover the full spectrum of philosophical investigation, still it’s an important part of this spectrum. 
This, I conclude, allows us to make sense of the fact that Heidegger both criticizes the tradition 
for providing an inadequate account of the subject of philosophy and credits it with discovering 
significant truth about it. The same idea will hold for Heidegger’s criticisms of the account 
provided by the philosophical tradition about human being. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 “[I]t has long been held that the way to grasp the Real is by that kind of knowing which is characterized by 
beholding [das anschauende Erkennen].” (BT: 246) 
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3.1.4 Summary 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, let me summarize what we have so far. Heidegger 
believes that the question: What is human being? is philosophically important, but only if it’s 
taken to ask: What does it mean to be for human being? This question itself is important only 
with a view to the broader question: What does it mean to be for entities in general? This is the 
question about Being. The question about Being is the central question of philosophy. “Being” is 
short for “what it means to be;” the Being of an entity is what it means to be for that entity. The 
question about Being needs to be asked, by virtue of the fact that we have a received 
understanding of Being: to exist (to be real); but this understanding is not philosophically clear. 
Whatever Being may “be,” it’s not itself an entity. Also, “to be” shouldn’t be equated with “to 
exist.” Heidegger isn’t doing ontology or metaphysics, but phenomenology. Ontology and 
metaphysics presuppose a default meaning of Being: to exist (to be real); but the point of 
Heidegger’s question about Being is to avoid this presupposition. The only way to do that is to 
describe how entities appear (to us): whether an entity appears (to us) is more basic than whether 
it exists or not: even non-existing entities appear (to us) in one way or another.  
 
Entities appear (to us) in two different, mutually irreducible ways: as objects and as tools. An 
example of an entity appearing (to me) as tool is a chair I pull to sit at my desk. An example of 
an entity appearing (to me) as object is a chair I stare at when making an inventory of the 
furniture of my office. When an entity appears (to us) as tool, it slips our attention, it, so to say, 
recedes into the background; but it does appear (to us) and, moreover, as something or other (my 
pulling the chair to sit lets the chair appear (to me) precisely as chair, and not as, say, table). This 
means that there is a standpoint from which entities appear (to us) as tools, the pretheoretical 
standpoint. When an entity appears (to us) as object, it becomes the focus of our attention; it, so 
to say, stands out from the background. Objective properties of entities appear (to us) only when 
the entity appears (to us) as object. An entity appearing (to us) as object also appears (to us) as 
something or other (for instance, as chair and not table, i.e., as an “objective” chair and not table). 
This means that there is a standpoint from which entities appear (to us) as objects, the theoretical 
standpoint. 
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According to Heidegger, entities appear (to us) as objects on the basis of entities appearing (to us) 
as tools. Only because an entity appears (to me) as chair-to-pull-at can it subsequently appear (to 
me) as a chair as object of perception. According to Heidegger, therefore, the theoretical 
standpoint is secondary, the pretheoretical basic. 
 
Heidegger believes that the philosophical tradition has an inadequate view of the proper subject 
of philosophy, but this view can’t be false simpliciter, because, according to Heidegger, the 
tradition targets the right subject: entities qua entities. What according to Heidegger is 
inadequate about the tradition on entities qua entities is best described by saying that it adopts an 
inadequate standpoint toward them, entities appearing (to us) as objects. According to Heidegger, 
this standpoint isn’t inadequate in the sense that is wrong, but in the sense that is secondary: a 
more basic standpoint, the pretheoretical one, takes precedence over it and makes it possible in 
the first place: entities appear (to us) as tools. While the tradition targets the right object, by 
virtue of the fact that it adopts a secondary standpoint toward it, it overlooks essential aspects of 
it. This doesn’t prevent the tradition from making true claims about this right object (for instance, 
that there are two chief modes of cognition by which we access entities, intuition and intellect). 
But overlooking essential aspect of it is philosophically inadequate.  
 
3. 2 HUMAN BEING  
 
In this section I show that, according to Heidegger, there is an entity which is unique in so far as 
it relates to entities qua entities, and this entity is, precisely, human being. This uniqueness 
singles out human being as the entity we should focus on when trying to answer the question 
about Being: answering the question what it means to be for human being provides us, according 
to Heidegger, with a methodologically sound and philosophically interesting route to answering 
the question what it means to be for entities in general. What it means to be for human being, 
however, is according to Heidegger something radically different from what it means to be for 
the rest of entities. By overlooking this fact, the tradition provides us with an account of human 
being that is inadequate. However, I will argue, this account can’t be for Heidegger false 
simpliciter, because Heidegger credits this account with having providing us with 
philosophically interesting truth about human being. I square these two aspects of the account of 
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human being provided by tradition, inadequacy and truth, by claiming that, according to 
Heidegger, this account is partially true (in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be further 
elaborated on in Chapter 5). 
 
3.2.1 Dasein 
 
We have already seen that one of the problems with the question: what is Being? is its generality. 
It makes sense to ask what it means to be for e.g. a chair, an elephant, a number, God, and so on, 
as it perhaps does for e.g. physical, non-physical, timeless, temporal, and so on, entities; but it 
doesn’t make as much sense for entities in general. It would be nice if there was one entity such 
that answering the question what it means to be for that entity provided us with a 
methodologically sound and philosophically interesting route to answering the question what it 
means to be for entities in general. Is there such an entity? Heidegger answers in the affirmative: 
it’s “we ourselves.” 
 
What is special about “we ourselves”? Remember, Heidegger’s big question is what to be means 
for entities in general. But precisely the extreme generality of the question prevents him from 
assuming a default meaning of “to be,” which is what the tradition has done: “to exist,” “to be 
real.” What we need to do is to describe how entities appear (to us), because appearing (to us) is 
more basic than existing or being real (or failing to exist or to be real). But entities appear to us, 
that is, to “we ourselves:” “we ourselves” are the ones (to whom) entities appear. On the other 
hand, “we ourselves” are of course human being. Heidegger then needs to show that human 
being is unique in so far as thinking about what to be means for human being provides us with a 
methodologically sound and philosophically interesting route to thinking about what to be means 
for entities in general.  
 
Heidegger shows this by making two claims. First, Heidegger claims that human being is an 
entity which is unique in so far as it relates to its own Being. Remember, “Being” is short for 
“what it means to be,” so what Heidegger is saying here is that human being is an entity which is 
unique in so far as it relates to its own “what it means to be.” This may sound a bit convoluted, 
but what Heidegger is saying here is, crudely, that what to be means for human being is an open 
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question, not for momentary lack of an answer, but intrinsically so, according to the type of 
Being of human being: only by being (crudely, “living”) does human being settle the question 
what it means to be for itself.212 How does this show though that thinking about what it means to 
be for human being provides us with a philosophically interesting route to thinking about what it 
means to be for entities in general? Heidegger’s idea is that human being or, rather, human 
being’s relating to its own Being, is responsible for the fact that there is such a thing as meaning 
of Being in general, i.e., what it means to be for entities in general. This idea ties with 
Heidegger’s second claim, which says that human being doesn’t relate to entities simpliciter, but 
to entities on the basis of a prior understanding of their Being, i.e., of what it means for them to 
be. Human being, Heidegger’s insight goes, does not relate to entities simpliciter, but to entities 
that already appear (to us) as something or other. Since the question “What is Being?” goes hand 
in hand with the question “What is the meaning of Being?,” an entity which possesses 
understanding of Being is unique in so far as there is such a thing as meaning of Being for this 
entity. Now for Heidegger there is Being only in so far as there is meaning of Being, because 
Being only appears (to us) in so far as we relate to entities, and we relate to entities only in so far 
as entities are meaningful (to us). This entity is unique in so far as this entity is revelatory of 
entities qua entities.213 Moreover, Heidegger suggests, only this entity is revelatory of entities 
qua entities. This means that there is a sense in which, by virtue of this entity, and it alone, there 
is such a thing as Being in general, a fact that explains why Heidegger takes human being to be a 
unique entity which is central in a philosophical understanding of reality. This fact doesn’t imply 
any “subjectification” or “anthropomorphication” of reality, because Heidegger doesn’t take “we 
ourselves” to be itself a part of reality but, so to say, the locus where reality qua reality appears. 
(This basically says that, according to Heidegger, human being is an entity which is central in a 
philosophically understanding of reality in the sense I sketched in Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.) 
 
Let’s quickly summarize Heidegger’s three reasons for singling out human being as the entity 
that is crucial to help answer the question about Being. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 “There is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and ... to some degree it does so explicitly. It 
is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it.” (BT: 32) 
213 Again in Heideggerian jargon, this entity is unique ontologically speaking. “The question of the meaning of 
Being becomes possible at all only if there is something like an understanding of Being. Understanding of Being 
belongs to the kind of Being which the entity called “Dasein” possesses.” (BT: 244) “Only as long as Dasein is (that 
is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being.” (BT: 255)    
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Dasein [human being] accordingly takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an 
ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence.  
 
 
First of all, Heidegger contends, human being is special in so far as it relates to its own Being in 
being what it is, whereas the rest of entities just “are” what they are simpliciter. In other words, 
as we will see below, human being’s Being is existence. 
 
The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself ‘ontological’, because existence is thus determinative 
for it.  
 
Second, Heidegger tells us that human being is special in so far as this relating to its own Being 
involves that this Being is “up in the air” while human being is (“lives,” “makes choices,” and so 
on). Human being, therefore, answers the question what it means to be for it in, so to say, 
“practical” terms: not by thinking about the question and providing answers to it, but by existing 
(crudely, “living”): 
 
But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses —as constitutive for its understanding of existence— an 
understanding of Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as 
providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies. Thus Dasein has turned out to be, 
more than any other entity, the one which must first be interrogated ontologically. (BT: 34) 
 
 
Finally, Heidegger contends, human being is special in so far as relating to its own Being 
involves relates to entities in general. For instance, in deciding to become a philosopher, I 
become a dedicated student of philosophy, and thereby relate myself to books-to-be-read, papers-
to-be-written, colleagues-to-discuss-philosophy-with, and so on. Heidegger’s insight here isn’t 
that I just happen to relate to specific entities, but to entities in general and thereby to entities qua 
entities: my relating to books-to-be-read, papers-to-be-written, and so on, involves ignoring, for 
instance, TV programs-to-be-watched, soccer-games-to-played, and so on; but ignoring these 
entities is still relating to them.  
 
Before going any further let me take care of an objection someone might have at this point: why 
go so anthropocentric and assume that human being is so special? Don’t entities other than 
human being relate to their own Being too? Don’t these entities then relate to entities qua entities? 
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Sentient beings, particularly animals, are the obvious candidates. As a response to this objection, 
two points must be made. First, although Heidegger certainly believes that human being is 
unique in the sense indicated, he never explicitly rules out that other entities might qualify as 
being unique in the same sense too. While many things point to the fact that Heidegger would 
probably deny it, he leaves the question open.214 Second, more crucially, what is important in 
Heidegger’s claim that human being relates to entities qua entities is the qualification qua entities. 
To relate to entities qua entities involves relating to entities which aren’t necessarily real, and 
only human being seems to be able to do that. For example, human being somehow relates to 
non-existent entities, such as Santa Claus: the fact that Santa Claus does not exist doesn’t 
collapse Santa Claus into nothing at all: Santa Claus is still Santa Claus and not, say, Merlin the 
Wizard. But sentient animals or plants don’t seem to relate to non-existent entities: even if they 
did, the entity in question (for instance Santa Claus) wouldn’t appear (to them) as non-existent. 
More perhaps to the point, human being has an understanding of the very concept of entity, 
something that sentient animals or plants arguably lack. Third, finally, to reveal entities qua 
entities is not to relate to entities simpliciter, but to relate to them in so far as one’s own Being is 
up for grabs: we relate to entities as a way of relating to our own Being. Given the terms in 
which Heidegger’s understands this “being up for grabs” of one’s own Being (see below), it is 
questionable that animals qualify for this sort of being. 
 
The two fundamental features Heidegger has highlighted result from the twofold nature of the 
phenomenon of Being which BT is trying to elicit and, with it, from the double formulation of 
the question about Being. Because there is no such a thing as Being other than through the 
“lenses” of the meaning of Being, Being goes hand in hand with meaning of Being and vice 
versa.215 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 For example: “Hier [i.e., in Hobbes’ suggestion that the reflection of a man on a mirror doesn’t appear to animals 
as being true/false, but as being similar/dissimilar to…] meldet sich … eine große Schwierigkeit, nämlich 
auszumachen, was den Tieren als Lebenwesen gegeben und wie ihnen das Gegebene enthüllt ist.” “Here a big 
difficulty makes its presence felt, namely to decide what is given to animals qua living beings, and how what is 
given is disclosed to them.” (Heidegger [1927] 1975: 270, my translation.) 
215 If Heidegger is right that there is an entity to which it is essential to possess an understanding of Being, it is 
essential to this entity to relate to entities qua entities; Dasein, Heidegger says, is ontically distinctive in that it is 
ontological (BT: 32). “All our efforts … serve the one aim of finding a possibility of answering the question of the 
meaning of Being in general. To work out this question, we need to delimit that very phenomenon in which 
something like Being becomes accessible –the phenomenon of the understanding of Being.” (BT: 424) 
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Before going any further let’s briefly discuss Heidegger’s terminological choice for “human 
being,” as this choice provides us with interesting clues about Heidegger’s view of human being. 
Heidegger doesn’t use the term “human being,” but the German neologism “Dasein.”216 This 
awkward choice (in German as much as in English217) is made with a number of things in mind. 
Remember that Heidegger wants to describe how entities appear (to us) with the goal to avoid 
presupposing a default meaning of to be; it is therefore important, Heidegger suggests, to do so 
while minimizing the risk of smuggling in undesired theoretical baggage. To describe how 
human being appears (to us) is in particular at odds with using traditional terminological choices 
to refer to this entity. Both the term “man” or “person,” for example, or philosophical terms like 
“subject,” “I,” or “consciousness,” theological ones like “spirit” or “soul,” scientific ones like 
“homo sapiens,” and so on, are theoretically loaded in some way or another. However, simply 
coining an arbitrary term to refer to this entity doesn’t seem to help either. Given the 
phenomenological nature of Heidegger’s investigation, it seems better a term that both refers to 
and describes the entity in question; this is what “Dasein” is meant to do. While “Dasein” refers 
to human being, “Dasein” also characterizes human being as that particular entity which 1) “is 
there” (Da-ist; da sein means “to be there” in German); 2) “exists” (Dasein means “existence” in 
German ). 
 
3. 2. 2 Existence 
 
Recall that I started this chapter with the question: What is human being? The philosophical 
tradition has provided a number of answers to this question; but all of them, according to 
Heidegger, are inadequate. Heidegger thus must have a better answer, but we need to keep in 
mind that for Heidegger the question: What is human being? is largely bogus: whatever human 
being may ultimately be, the philosophically interesting question for Heidegger is: What does it 
mean to be for human being in the first place? But why? What’s wrong with asking “what is 
human being?” in the standard way? This question makes reasonably good sense, as do a number 
of plausible answers one might give, for instance that human being is a rational animal, or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 “This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we 
shall denote by the term “Dasein.”” (BT: 27) “[T]his entity –man himself- … we denote by the term “Dasein.”” (BT: 
32)	  
217 Not that the word “Dasein” is awkward in German; it is a fairly common word generally meaning “existence.” 
What is awkward is to use it to refer to human being, as Heidegger does. 
 103	  
social animal, or God’s most perfect creature, or the only living species of the genus homos, and 
so on. There are two things that according to Heidegger are inadequate (but not necessarily 
wrong) with these sorts of answers, and for the question itself. First, there’s Heidegger’s familiar 
idea that in giving any of these answer we are presupposing a default meaning of to be for 
human being; Heidegger’s whole question, however, is whether for human being to be has this 
default meaning or not. Second, which comes down to the same point, none of these answers 
characterizes human being in the right way (which doesn’t mean that they are “false”), because 
human being doesn’t have any “what” that adequately characterizes it. Human being, Heidegger 
tells us, has no “essence.”  
 
According to Heidegger, rather, the “essence” of human being is its existence. 218  What 
Heidegger means here requires quite a bit of unpacking. First, Heidegger’s German word for 
“existence” that applies to human being is Existenz, not Dasein (this already suggests quasi-
technicality, given that Dasein is much more common in German than Existenz). Second, “to 
exist,” when applied to human being, does not mean, in fact it is sharply opposed to “to exist” in 
its usual sense. We say, for instance, that horses and New York, but not unicorns and 
Wonderland, exist. Heidegger would be ok with this. But remember, one of Heidegger’s central 
insights in BT is that to be for human being means a radically different thing than to be for the 
rest of entities; and he believes the term “existence” better captures what to be means for human 
being. For Heidegger, to exist is exclusively reserved to the type of Being of human being. To 
exist means for human being to relate to its own Being, that is, as we have just established, to 
relate to what it means to be for it.219 It follows that entities of a nature different from that of 
human being do not exist or have existence in Heidegger’s sense. (Again, Heidegger doesn’t 
explicitly rule out the possibility that entities different from human being might exist.) In order to 
avoid confusion, Heidegger uses the term “to be present-at-hand” (in German, vorhanden) to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 “The kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport 
itself somehow, we call “existence” [Existenz].” (BT: 32)’ “The ‘essence’ of this entity [Dasein] lies in its “to be” 
[Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being 
(existentia). … The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.” (BT: 67). Alternative formulations of the same insight: 
Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being (BT: 78). Dasein 
exists, as opposed to “is” (BT: 78). Dasein, in its very Being, has this Being as an issue.(BT:137); man’s ‘substance’ 
is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence (BT:153); the substance of man is existence (BT: 
255), and so on. 
219 “Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly towards that Being. In saying this, 
we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists.” (BT: 78) 
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mean “to exist” in its usual sense. A horse and New York, as opposed to a unicorn and 
Wonderland, do not exist, but “are present-at-hand,” in Heidegger’s parlance. “Existence” 
contrasts to “presence-at-hand” (in German, Vorhandenheit); a more traditional choice, endorsed 
by Heidegger, is “reality.” (Incidentally, this shows that for Heidegger “to exist” in its usual 
sense and “to be real” are roughly synonyms). 
 
On the other hand, Heidegger says, human being is characterized by the fact that, what it means 
to be for it, its Being, i.e., existence, is “in each case mine.”220 Heidegger’s insight here is that, 
when thinking about human being, we need to think in terms of a first-person perspective. 
Remember, the fundamental trait about human being is the fact that it relates to itself in being 
what it is, and that is something, that as far as “I” am concerned, only belongs to “me.” Any 
terminological or conceptual choice smuggling in assumptions to the effect that human relates to 
itself in an “indifferent” or “neutral” fashion falsifies what Heidegger thinks is essential to 
capture here. 
 
3. 2. 3 Pretheoretical versus Theoretical 
 
In section 3.1.2. I showed that, according to Heidegger, we can adopt two different standpoints 
toward entities in general, a theoretical and a pretheoretical one. Moreover, I argued, the former 
is based on the latter, so the former can be understood as being secondary, and the latter, basic. 
My contention now is that, given that human being is itself an entity, both claims should carry 
over human being for Heidegger too.  
 
It’s easy to show that this is indeed the case. What complicates matters a bit is that the standpoint 
toward human being which works as contrast pair with “theoretical” isn’t exactly the 
pretheoretical one. Or rather, it is the pretheoretical one, but this must be understood now in a 
different sense than before if we want to do justice to Heidegger’s insight that human being is an 
entity of a radically different sort of nature than the rest of entities. Remember, this difference 
consists in the fact that human being relates to its own Being in being what it is, whereas the rest 
of entities just “are” what they are. In other words, the rest of entities have an essence, whereas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 In German, jemeinig; it can be substantivized as Jemeinigkeit.	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human being has existence. Remember also that, according to Heidegger, relating to one’s own 
Being is something that one can do only on his own: only I relate to my own Being, you relate to 
your own Being, and so on. This means that for Heidegger the difference between other human 
beings appearing (to me) and I appearing (to myself), that is, between a third-person and a first-
person way of appearing, is philosophically important. From these two insights of Heidegger’s I 
draw the conclusion that cutting across the theoretical versus pretheoretical distinction in the 
standpoints toward entities in general there is a distinction between a first-person versus a third-
person standpoint toward human being. According to Heidegger, in other words, human being 
can appear (to us) in two quite different, mutually irreducible ways: as other people and as “I.” 
(If we take seriously Heidegger’s insight that we relate to existence only from a “first-person 
perspective,” I contend, these must be two different, mutually irreducible ways in which human 
being appear (to us).) But these two ways in which human being appears (to us) can themselves 
be divided, depending on whether we adopt a theoretical or a pretheoretical standpoint: other 
people can appear (to me) from both a pretheoretical and a theoretical standpoint; I, on the other 
hand, can appear (to myself) from both a pretheoretical and a theoretical standpoint.221 Let’s see 
how this distinctions work in more detail. 
 
According to Heidegger, from a theoretical standpoint human being appears (to us) as object. 
This isn’t surprising, because I’ve already established in section 3. 1. 2. that from a theoretical 
standpoint entities in general appear (to us) as objects, and that from a theoretical standpoint 
there isn’t a difference of Being between human being and the rest of entities: they way I appear 
(to myself) from a theoretical standpoint doesn’t differ, as far as Being is concerned, from the 
way other entities appear (to me) (I certainly appear (to myself) in a more “intimate” way but, if 
I adopt a theoretical standpoint toward myself, I appear (to myself) still as an object). It’s easy to 
show that, according to Heidegger, human being can and does sometimes appear (to us) as object; 
therefore, as I established, from a theoretical standpoint. This is true of “theoretical” in 
Heidegger’s broad sense (for instance, I can observe my office mate to find out whether he is 
nice, generous, shy, talkative, and so on). But it’s true of “theoretical” also in the narrower sense 
in which we observe human being to come up with theories about it. Heidegger is well aware 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 We need to be careful with this sharp distinction between a first-person and a third-person way of appearance: 
according to Heidegger, our everyday life is characterized by the fact that we live “impersonally” for the most part 
of the time, thus in such a way that first- and third- person standpoints are largely blurred.  
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that there are a variety of both sciences and areas of philosophy that study human being: 
anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophical 
anthropology, and so on; moreover, Heidegger admits, all these disciplines can and do provide us 
with theoretically interesting truth about human being:  
 
[T]here are many ways in which [human being] has been interpreted, and these are all at Dasein’s [human being’s] 
disposal. Dasein’s ways of behaviour, its capacities, powers, possibilities, and vicissitudes, have been studied with 
varying extent in philosophical psychology, in anthropology, ethics, and ‘political science’, in poetry, biography, 
and the writing of history, each in a different fashion. (BT: 37) 
 
 
Whether these disciplines, however, can provide us with philosophically interesting truth about 
human being is for Heidegger an open question. (I’ll come back to this in a minute).222 
 
Let’s consider now the pretheoretical standpoint we can adopt over human being. As I suggested, 
what we have here is two ways (not just one) in which human being can appear (to us), 
depending on whether it’s other human beings or “myself” who do so. I have already established 
that there is a radical, mutually irreducible difference between how other human beings appear 
(to me) and how I appear (to myself); but this shouldn’t distract us from the present point that, 
from a pretheoretical standpoint, both of them oppose themselves to human being appearing (to 
us) as object (a theoretical standpoint).  
 
First, from a pretheoretical standpoint other human beings appear (to me) in a way that 
Heidegger subsumes under the heading of (what he calls) “Being-with.” Admittedly, it’s a bit 
difficult to spell out what exactly Heidegger means by “Being-with,” but we can go a long way 
by drawing on our previous distinction between pretheoretical and theoretical standpoints toward 
entities in general. Heidegger’s idea here is that, in an analogous way in which things appear (to 
me) in the first instance as tools, i.e., as things to be practically dealt with (and only subsequently 
as objects, i.e., as things possessing objective properties such as metallic, 3 inches long, and of 1 
pound of weight), other people appear (to me) in the first instance as agents to practically 
interact with (and only subsequently as “human objects,” i.e., human being with objective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 It’d be easy to show Heidegger does distinguish philosophically and scientifically interesting truth, both generally 
and about human being in particular. Heidegger is furthermore committed to the view that philosophically 
interesting truth is more basic than scientifically interesting one. 
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properties, like for instance being blonde, handsome, intelligent, moody, a communist, and so 
on). Suppose, to look for an example, that I step into my office and find my office mates John, 
James, and Robert working there. Remember once again that Heidegger is doing phenomenology, 
because he believes that only from a phenomenological standpoint we are free of the 
presupposition that to be has a privileged default meaning: to exist, to be real. Heidegger’s 
contention is that, in the example, John, James, and Robert don’t appear (to me) as objects of 
perception (that, by way of an addition, happen to be human beings); rather, they appear (to me) 
as, say, the co-workers I say “Hello!” to, the friends I want to ask about playing soccer next 
weekend, and so on. The fact that John, James, and Robert are individuals with a number of 
objective features is indisputable, but those objective features don’t appear (to me) unless I 
change my standpoint toward my office mates, from agents to practically interact with to objects 
of perception. 
 
Second, from a pre-theoretical standpoint, I appear (to myself) as existing. This, too, requires 
quite a bit of spelling out, but at least Heidegger’s negative point is relatively clear: there is a 
way in which I appear (to myself) that does not consist in my observing myself. Observing 
oneself involves objectifying oneself, which in turn involves seeing oneself from a third-person 
standpoint. Heidegger’s idea here is that there is a genuinely first-person standpoint from which 
we appear (to ourselves). A comparison with the idea of Sartre’s unreflective consciousness 
might help here. Remember that in Chapter 2 Sartre showed that for consciousness to be 
conscious of itself, it doesn’t need to reflect, to take itself as an object. Rather, consciousness is 
non-positionally conscious of itself at the same time that it’s conscious of an object other than 
itself. Heidegger’s idea is similar, except that he doesn’t locate this pretheoretical standpoint in 
consciousness, but in human being’s practical engagement with the world. Moreover, 
Heidegger’s account of this pretheoretical standpoint is much more detailed, built on the idea 
that there is a temporal dimension to this pretheoretical standpoint. Being temporal, this 
pretheoretical standpoint is past-, present-, and future-oriented. An example in which we appear 
(to ourselves) from a pretheoretical standpoint is moods (this is the past-oriented dimension of 
the pretheoretical standpoint). According to Heidegger, we are never free of moods; if we master 
a mood, we do it by means of a counter-mood;223 more importantly, however, human being does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 BT: 175. 
 108	  
appear (to itself) by means of moods: moods, Heidegger tells us, aren’t inert states of mind 
sitting there in our consciousness; they are intentional by nature. When I feel sad or cheerful, I 
appear (to myself) as feeling sad or cheerful.224 Even more importantly, Heidegger argues that 
by mood, human being appears (to itself) prior to and beyond all cognition and volition.225 
Remember that a mood is just an example in which we appear (to ourselves) from a 
pretheoretical standpoint. Another example is possibilities (projects) (this is the future-oriented 
counterpart).   
 
3.2.4 Partial Truth: Human Being 
 
I have now enough expository material to show that, according to Heidegger, the philosophical 
tradition has provided us with an inadequate account of human being that, on analysis, proves 
not to be false, but rather partially true in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be further 
elaborated in Chapter 5. In my next section I will concentrate on human being’s relation to the 
world and show how my thesis applies to the tradition’s account of this relation too. 
 
The starting point of my case is, once again, Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with the philosophical 
tradition’s failure to raise the question about Being. This time, however, this dissatisfaction 
applies to the failure to raise the question, not about the Being of entities in general, but of 
human being. Here’s how Heidegger expresses his dissatisfaction: 
 
In the course of this history [the history of Greek ontology226] certain distinctive domains of Being have come into 
view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematics: the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, 
the “I,” reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their Being and its structure, in accordance 
with the thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected. (BT: 44) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 “In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its 
Being.” (BT: 173) 
225 BT: 175. 
226  It’d be easy to show that, according to Heidegger, the philosophical tradition, including contemporary 
philosophy, is essentially a two-millennia-long development of Greek ontology: “Greek ontology and its history … 
in their numerous filiations and distortions determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today.” (BT: 43) 
“In the Middle Ages this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body of doctrine.” (BT: 43) “[T]he [Greek] 
ontology that it has arisen has deteriorated to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident —merely 
material for reworking, as it was for Hegel.” (BT: 43); and so on. 
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The ego cogito of Descartes, subject, “I,” reason, spirit, person, and so on don’t seem to coincide 
with human being, but Heidegger takes them to do so nonetheless: it’s easy to show that for 
Heidegger all these are standard methodological choices of Modern philosophers to find out the 
nature of human being. In this passage, therefore, Heidegger is making two points: first, the 
tradition (in its Modern period) has failed to ask the question about the Being of human being; 
second, this is just as expected, given that the tradition has failed to ask the question about Being 
in general. But what is exactly inadequate about this failure?  
 
The chief inadequacy about the philosophical tradition, according to Heidegger, is that it 
replicates, from a theoretical standpoint, the chief inadequacy into which human being falls when 
it adopts a pretheoretical standpoint toward entities in general. Human being, Heidegger tells us 
over and over again, tends to understand its own Being in terms of the type of Being of those 
entities which, precisely, human being is not. Alternatively worded, according to Heidegger, 
human being tends to understand its own Being in terms of what he encounters most proximally, 
worldly things or more generally the world: 
 
The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is … such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do 
so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant —in 
terms of the ‘world’. In Dasein itself, and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way the world is 
understood is, as we shall show, reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted. 
(BT: 36-7) 
 
We will see in our next section that the ‘world’, with scare quotes, is Heidegger’s way to refer to 
the totality of entities that appear (to us) as objects. Heidegger is thus saying here that human 
being has a tendency to understand its own Being in terms of entities appearing (to us) as objects. 
This implies two inadequacies: first, other entities have a Being which is radically different from 
the Being of human being; second, other entities appear (to us) as objects, but that’s a secondary 
way in which entities appear (to us): the basic way in which entities appear (to us) is as tools. 
(I’ll elaborate on these two inadequacies in a minute). 
 
Heidegger expresses the same dissatisfaction about the tradition’s failure to ask about the Being 
of human being in a different, telling passage, in which he says: 
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The two sources which are relevant for the traditional anthropology —the Greek definition and the clue which 
theology has provided— indicate that over and above the attempt to determine the essence of ‘man’ as an entity, the 
question of his Being has remained forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as something obvious or ‘self-
evident’ in the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things. (BT: 75) 
 
Heidegger is saying two things here. First, the tradition sees the Being of human being as 
something obvious; in the absence of anything philosophically problematic about it, this Being 
hasn’t even become something to wonder about. Remember, by now we know that the Being of 
an entity is what it means for that entity to be; and that, according to Heidegger, what it means to 
be for human being isn’t settled at all, because, more generally, what it means to be for entities in 
general isn’t settled at all either. But this is what the tradition has done: it has taken for granted a 
default meaning of Being, namely “to exist,” “to be real,” to apply to human being. Second, the 
philosophical tradition has taken the Being of human being to be essentially the same as that of 
the rest of entities, i.e., presence-at-hand, “existence” in the usual sense. 
 
It is worth nothing that what Heidegger says of the tradition in the paragraph above holds also 
for specific figures in this tradition. One of these figures (about whom I shall say more in the 
next section), an exemplary instance according to Heidegger of how inadequate can 
philosophical theories of human being go, is Descartes. Heidegger tells us: 
 
The idea of Being as permanent presence-at-hand not only gives Descartes a motive for identifying entities within-
the-world with the world in general, and for providing so extreme a definition of their Being; it also keeps him from 
bringing Dasein’s ways of behaving into view in a manner which is ontologically appropriate. … [Descartes] takes 
the Being of ‘Dasein’ … in the very same way as he takes the Being of the res extensa —namely, as substance. (BT: 
131) 
 
The res extensa is how Descartes’ characterizes the Being of the world. “Substance,” in the way 
Heidegger understands the term, is roughly another name for presence-at-hand (at least, as far as 
what it means to be for it). Thus Heidegger is saying in this passage that, according to Descartes, 
the Being of Dasein is presence-at-hand.227 From what I’ve explained in my section 3.2.2. above, 
this is of course inadequate for Heidegger: presence-at-hand is what it means to be for entities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 “Descartes … says that cogitationes are present-at-hand, and that in these an ego is present-at-hand too.” (BT: 
254) Descartes’ ego doesn’t prima facie coincide with human being but, as I showed two pages back, Heidegger 
takes Descartes’ ego to be a methodological choice to study the nature of human being. Heidegger’s view seems to 
be historically accurate, given that Descartes takes human being to essentially be a res cogitans, and the res cogitans 
to essentially be (or at least consist of) an ego (we saw this in my chapter on Sartre; see Chapter 2, section 2.1.). 
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not of the type of Being of human being; whatever means to be for human being, Heidegger 
urges, it’s not presence-at-hand. 
 
All the evidence I’ve provided up to now simply shows that, according to Heidegger, there is 
something philosophically inadequate in the way the philosophical tradition has accounted for 
the nature of human being. That the accounts of human being provided by the tradition are 
inadequate for Heidegger scarcely needs demonstration. We already know, on the one hand, that 
Heidegger thinks the Being of human being is not obvious at all, because, more generally, the 
Being of entities in general is not obvious at all; the question about Being needs to be asked, and 
that includes, as a preliminary step, to ask the question about the Being of human being. We 
know, on the other hand, that according to Heidegger the Being of human being is not the same 
as that of the rest of entities: the latter’s Being is presence-at-hand, whereas the former’s is 
existence, and, as I explained in section 3.2.2., Heidegger is eager to contrast presence-at-hand 
with existence: 
 
[O]ur ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity [human being] as 
“existence” [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term 
“existentia;” ontologically, existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially 
inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s [human being’s] character. (BT: 67) 
 
The crucial question, that I proceed to consider now, is the following: does Heidegger believe 
that the accounts of human being offered by the tradition are false? On various grounds, I want to 
answer in the negative. Moreover, I will contend, Heidegger acknowledges that past 
philosophical accounts of human being contain philosophically interesting truth. To square these 
two facts, namely, that Heidegger believes these accounts are inadequate, but still admits that 
they contain philosophically interesting truth, I will suggest that according to Heidegger these 
accounts are partially true in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be further elaborated on in 
Chapter 5. 
 
First off, and replicating what I already argued when discussing Heidegger on the proper subject 
of philosophy, there is a relatively innocuous reason why Heidegger doesn’t believe the 
tradition’s account of human being is false: Heidegger doesn’t take the tradition to be offering 
any account to start with, if by “account” we understand a set of interconnected theses. It is true 
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that, according to Heidegger, the tradition is guilty of some serious inadequacies about human 
being; but this doesn’t necessarily involve making a claim about human being, whether true or 
false. More specifically, the tradition approaches human being (as a philosophical topic) in an 
inadequate way; but to approach x in an inadequate way isn’t of course the same as making a 
claim (true or false) about x. Suppose, to illustrate the point, that I address my landlord, whose 
name is Peter, by calling him John. Of course there is something inadequate in my calling him 
this way, but one can’t say that I am making any false claim about my landlord, for the simple 
reason that I’m not making any claim to start with: to call someone John isn’t the same as to 
claim that this person’s name is John. Something similar, I suggest, is going on here: the 
tradition approaches (i.e., “addresses”) human being in an inadequate way (of course, we still 
need to spell out what “to approach” means here)); but this isn’t the same as saying that the 
tradition is making a claim, whether true or false, about human being. 
 
Of course, this is a very preliminary point that can’t stop us very long. To call someone John is 
obviously a different thing than to claim that this person’s name is John; but to (sincerely) call 
someone John entails that one believes that this person’s name is John, and that involves a claim 
(or at least disposition to make a claim). Analogously, the tradition approaching human being as 
being x or y entails that the tradition believes that human being is x or y, and that involves a claim 
(or disposition to make a claim). If this is correct, we have to ask ourselves three things. First, 
according to Heidegger how does the tradition exactly approach human being? Second, 
according to Heidegger what is the belief implicit in the tradition’s so approaching human being? 
Third, according to Heidegger is this belief true or false? The two most important questions for 
my purposes are the second and the third: once we have identified a belief about human being 
held by the tradition, we’ll have a concrete basis to think whether according to Heidegger there is 
or there is not falsehood as opposed to partial truth. 
 
Let’s start by considering the first question. Admittedly, “to approach” is a vague term here, and 
so is the question “how does the tradition exactly approach human being”? We have already seen 
that Heidegger’s chief concern is that the tradition hasn’t raised the question about the Being of 
human being; but this is the same as assuming a default understanding of what to be means for 
human being. Finally, however, Heidegger’s overarching question about Being concerns entities 
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qua entities. This gives us a clue as to what “approach” means here: to take an entity to be this or 
that sort of entity. Our question then is: what sort of entity does the tradition take human being to 
be? Heidegger’s answer is quite clear: an entity like the rest of entities, a present-at-hand entity. 
This leads us to the second question. 
 
The second question is easily answered; in fact I’ve already answered two pages back: according 
to Heidegger, the implicit belief in the tradition’s assuming a default understanding of what to be 
means for human being is that human being is an entity like the rest of entities, i.e., an entity 
whose Being is presence-at-hand, not existence.228  
 
The third question is more difficult to answer. Remember, the question is whether according to 
Heidegger the tradition’s belief implicit in its assuming a default understanding of what to be 
means for human being, i.e., that human being is an entity whose Being is presence-at-hand, is 
true or false. The obvious candidate answer is clear: according to Heidegger, this belief is false. 
What I want to contend is that leaving things at that fails to do justice to the circumstance that 
Heidegger credits the tradition with, in so believing, having contributed philosophically 
interesting truth about human being. For this reason, I propose to construe Heidegger’s view of 
the belief under discussion as being partially true, rather than false. As I anticipated in Chapter 1, 
instrumental to my case is the insight that according to Heidegger the belief in question results 
from the tradition having adopted a secondary (not wrong) standpoint toward human being. 
 
I will not spend much time showing that Heidegger takes the tradition to believe that human 
being is an entity whose Being is presence-at-hand, and that Heidegger takes this belief to be 
false.229 What I want to show is that Heidegger credits the tradition with, in so believing, having 
providing us with philosophically interesting truth about human being. This significant truth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 See quote above: “The two sources which are relevant for the traditional anthropology —the Greek definition and 
the clue which theology has provided— indicate that over and above the attempt to determine the essence of ‘man’ 
as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as something 
obvious or ‘self-evident’ in the sense of the Being-present-at-hand of other created Things.” (BT: 75) 
229 [O]ur ontological task is to show that when we choose to designate the Being of this entity [human being] as 
“existence” [Existenz], this term does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the traditional term 
“existential;” ontologically, existential is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially 
inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s [human being’s] character. (BT: 67) 
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concerns two facts about human being to which Heidegger attaches great philosophical 
importance.  
 
The first fact is the following: while human being is an entity which is different from the rest of 
entities in so far as it exists in Heidegger’s sense, human being can be taken to be an entity 
similar to the rest of entities in so far as it exists in the usual sense too; the fact that human being 
exists in Heidegger’s sense doesn’t of course prevent it from existing in the usual sense too: 
otherwise we would be committed to the absurd idea that human being doesn’t exist in the usual 
sense. But this means, in Heidegger’s parlance: the fact that human being exists doesn’t prevent 
it from being present-at-hand too; or rather, as Heidegger qualifies, from being taken, in some 
circumstances, to be present-at-hand too. According to Heidegger, 
 
[e]ven entities which are not world-less —Dasein, for example— are present-at-hand ‘in’ the world, or, more 
exactly, can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand. (BT: 82) 
 
 
This passage clearly indicates that, for Heidegger, taking human being to be an entity present-at-
hand can’t be false simpliciter; not, at any rate, “with some right and within certain limits.” But 
taking human being to be an entity present-at-hand is precisely what, according to Heidegger, the 
philosophical tradition has done, as I’ve already shown. Therefore, the tradition’s view of human 
being can’t be false simpliciter according to Heidegger.  
 
Of course, someone will object, but this conclusion rests on a misunderstanding. Human being 
evidently exists in the usual sense; to deny it would be absurd, and this is what Heidegger is 
acknowledging in the quote above. But the fact that it exists in the usual sense is true of human 
being, not of its Being. Remember that Heidegger carefully distinguishes between an entity and 
the Being of an entity: an entity is something or other, for instance human being or a chair; the 
Being of an entity is what means to be for that entity, for instance what it means to be for human 
being or a chair. Clearly, what it means to be for x is not the same thing as x itself. From the fact 
that human is present-at-hand (i.e., exists in the usual sense) doesn’t follow that what it means to 
be for human being is presence-at-hand (i.e., “to exist” in the usual sense). The former, 
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Heidegger is telling us, may well be true, but the latter is certainly false.230 What Heidegger has 
taken the tradition to believe about the former is relatively beside the point: the philosophically 
important question, per section 3.1.1., is what it means to be for human being; in this respect, 
Heidegger is clear that he takes the tradition to believe the latter, and the latter according to 
Heidegger is false. 
 
My response to this objection is simple: Heidegger does distinguish between an entity and the 
Being of an entity, but the tradition, precisely, does not. Of course, this is according to 
Heidegger something inadequate on the part of the tradition; but I’ve already shown that failure 
to distinguish between an entity and the Being of an entity doesn’t involve making a false claim 
about an entity. More to the point, in the absence of this distinction, the belief held by the 
tradition that human being is an entity which is present-at-hand can be interpreted in two ways: 
(a) human being is an entity which is present-at-hand; (b) the Being of human being is presence-
at-hand, and it’s not clear to which Heidegger gives preference to. As I’ve already shown, 
Heidegger believes that (b) is false simpliciter; however, he believes that (a) is true, at least “with 
some right and within certain limits.”     
 
The second fact to which Heidegger attaches importance concerns the uniqueness of human 
being. According to Heidegger, human being is a unique entity. I take it as evident that this is a 
quite committed philosophical claim that not all philosophers will be happy to share. Those who 
do, and especially those who first defended it, must for Heidegger have contributed 
philosophically interesting truth. Now it’s easy to show that Heidegger takes the philosophical 
tradition to have defended that claim. Therefore, the philosophical tradition has according to 
Heidegger contributed philosophically interesting truth about human being. From this simple fact 
it follows that, whatever the inadequacies of the philosophical tradition on human being, they 
can’t be explained in terms of falsehood simpliciter.  
 
Remember that, per section 3.2.1., the uniqueness of human being for Heidegger comes down to 
its ontico-ontological priority over the rest of entities: human being is ontically unique in so far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 This could be shown with the following quote: “Dasein [human being] is essentially not a Being-present-at-
hand.” (BT: 138) 
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as it relates to its own Being in being what it is; and is ontologically unique in so far as, in so 
relating to its own Being, it relates to entities qua entities. In plainer terms, human being is 
unique in so far as it “makes up” its “essence” itself, instead of receiving a ready-made one; and 
in doing so, human being doesn’t relate to things simpliciter, but to things taken to be something 
or other. I don’t think it requires a lot of effort to show that this claim of Heidegger’s is quite 
philosophically committed. Many philosophers, both contemporary and traditional, and on a 
variety of grounds, refuse any sort of uniqueness to human being. For these philosophers it is 
then the case that human being is not a unique entity (in the sense indicated). From the fact that 
Heidegger’s claim is philosophically committed, I take it to be non-trivial. And from this fact I 
deduce that any philosophical view of human being in which it is included that claim in question 
provides us according to Heidegger with philosophically interesting truth. Now it’s possible to 
show that, according to Heidegger, the tradition has defended such a view. Heidegger tells us in 
the first place that 
 
Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority was seen quite early. (BT: 34)  
 
 
Remember that the claim that human being has an ontico-ontological priority is defended by 
Heidegger; as we have just seen, moreover, this claim is quite philosophically committed. 
Heidegger elaborates in detail on the same idea in the following passage: 
 
 
Aristotle says … “Man’s soul is, in a certain way, entities.” … Aristotle’s principle, which points back to the 
ontological thesis of Parmenides, is one which Thomas Aquinas has taken up in a characteristic discussion. … 
Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is … a transcendens. He does this by invoking an entity which, in 
accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to ‘come together with’ entities of any sort whatever. 
This distinctive entity … is the soul (anima). Here the priority of ‘Dasein’ [‘human being’] over all other entities 
emerges. (BT: 34, my emphasis)  
 
 
There can be no doubt that in this passage Heidegger is crediting the tradition with holding that 
human being has a priority over the rest of entities. He mentions three figures he takes to be quite 
central in the tradition, Parmenides, Aristotle and Aquinas, who seem to be saying something 
about the soul. (Of course, whatever the soul may exactly be, it doesn’t seem to exactly coincide 
with human being; but Heidegger clearly connects the two, and his last sentence suggests that he 
takes the soul to be a standard choice by Ancient and Medieval philosophy to pick out human 
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being under a different concept (this assimilation of “soul” to “human being” by Heidegger 
merits further discussion)). According to Heidegger, then, Parmenides, Aristotle, and Aquinas 
have realized that human being is an entity which is unique in so far as it lets entities qua entities 
appear. This shows that Heidegger credits the tradition (Parmenides, Aristotle, and Aquinas in 
this case) with having discovered philosophically interesting truth about human being. 
 
What we have as a preliminary result is that, first, Heidegger finds something significantly 
inadequate about the philosophical tradition while, on the other hand, he credits the tradition 
with having discovered philosophically interesting truth. How do we square these two facts? 
Once again, my answer is partial truth in the sense sketched in Chapter 1 (to be further 
elaborated on in Chapter 5). Remember that I understand partial truth as truth of part of an object, 
based on the fact that one is adopting a standpoint toward an object which is secondary (not 
wrong) with respect to a more basic one, which takes precedence over it and makes it possible in 
the first place. The problem with the tradition’s view of human being according to Heidegger, I 
contend, is best described by saying that, according to Heidegger, it results from having adopted 
an inadequate standpoint toward human being. Remember, I have already argued in section 3.1.2. 
that Heidegger believes there are two standpoints we can take over entities in general, a 
theoretical and a pretheoretical one; moreover, the theoretical one is according to Heidegger 
grounded on, that is, secondary with respect to, the pretheoretical. I have argued in section 3. 2. 
3., furthermore, that this distinction carries over to two standpoints we can take over human 
being too: there is both a pretheoretical and a theoretical standpoint. Moreover, the theoretical 
standpoint we can adopt over human being is based on the pretheoretical; the theoretical 
standpoint is secondary, the pretheoretical one is basic. What I contend now is that, according to 
Heidegger, the chief inadequacy of the philosophical tradition about human being is best 
described by saying that the tradition has adopted a theoretical standpoint toward human being, 
instead of a pretheoretical one. In doing so, what the tradition has been able to observe of human 
being isn’t an altogether wrong object (something that is not what human being is about), but the 
right object; still, it has been able to observe only a “part” (i.e., a mode, an aspect) of it. 
 
This is perhaps best shown in a negative way: according to Heidegger, the tradition has 
overlooked the pretheoretical standpoint toward human being. Remember that from a theoretical 
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standpoint human being appears (to us) as object; from a pretheoretical standpoint human being 
appears (to us) as Being-with (other people) or as existing (“me”). According to Heidegger, then, 
the tradition has overlooked the fact that human being appears (to me) as Being-with (other 
people) and as existing (I myself). Moreover, I showed that according to Heidegger the 
pretheoretical standpoint toward human being makes the theoretical one possible: only because I 
appear (to myself) as existing can I subsequently appear (to myself) as an object; only because 
other people appear (to me) as Being-with can they subsequently (and artificially) appear (to me) 
as objects. The theoretical standpoint toward human being, in other words, is according to 
Heidegger secondary with respect to the pretheoretical one. 
 
According to Heidegger, the tradition has had in view the right object, human being in so far as 
it relates to entities qua entities. Given that it’d be possible to have in view what according to 
Heidegger is the wrong object, i.e., human being simpliciter (i.e. human being, not as revelatory 
of entities qua entities, but as a further entity among entities) the fact that the tradition targets the 
right object involves philosophically interesting truth: it’s not trivial that human being in so far 
as it relates to entities qua entities is the right object to account for when thinking philosophically 
about human being. This suggests that, according to Heidegger, whatever the inadequacies of the 
tradition about the proper subject of philosophy, they can’t be accounted for in terms of 
falsehood simpliciter. By drawing on the distinction between a pretheoretical and a theoretical 
standpoint toward human being, it’s possible to make the case that the tradition has provided us 
with partial truth, not falsehood, over human being: by adopting a secondary standpoint toward 
human being, the tradition has only been able to observe a secondary aspect of it (presence-at-
hand), not its basic one (existence). 
 
3.2.5 Summary 
 
Before proceeding to the last part of the chapter, let me summarize this second part. According to 
Heidegger, there is an entity which is unique among the rest of entities, in so far as answering the 
question what it means to be for this entity provides us with a methodologically sound and 
philosophically interesting route to answering the question what it means to be for entities in 
general. This entity happens to be “we ourselves,” human being, which explains why, according 
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to Heidegger, human being plays a central role in a philosophical understanding of reality. The 
reason why answering what it means to be for “we ourselves” provides us with a route to 
answering what it means to be for entities in general is that, first, we are the ones to whom 
entities in general appear; second, “we” doesn’t pick us here as a further entity among entities 
but, rather, as the locus where there being such a thing as entities in general, i.e., entities qua 
entities takes place. Getting clear about what to be means for “we ourselves” in so far as we are 
this locus therefore provides us with a philosophically interesting route to getting clear about 
what it means to be for entities in general. From the fact that we are this locus, and not a further 
entity among the rest of entities, it doesn’t however follow that “we ourselves,” human being, is 
not itself an entity; it is, but a unique one: what we need to do is to get clear about its nature. 
 
First, human being is unique in so far as it, and it alone, is what it is by virtue of relating to its 
own Being, as opposed to the rest of entities, which are what they are simpliciter. Human being, 
in other words, has no “essence” but, rather, existence. Second, human being is unique in so far 
as it, and it alone, relates to entities qua entities: not entities in so far as they are, say, this chair 
or that table versus this desk or that computer, or in so far as they are physical versus non-
physical, timeless versus temporal, existing versus non-existing, and so on; but in so far as they 
just are something or other at all. Both features go hand in hand: human being relating to its own 
Being by way of relating to entities qua entities; and it relates to entities qua entities by way of 
relating to its own Being. Additionally, to exist for human being is something that each human 
being can only do on its own: only I relate to my own Being in being what I am, you relate to 
your own Being in being what you are, and so on. 
 
There are two standpoints one can adopt towards human being, a theoretical and a pretheoretical 
one. From a theoretical standpoint, human being appears (to us) as an object. In this case, it holds 
that human being has the type of Being of the rest of entities: thing-like as opposed to human-
like. From a pretheoretical standpoint, human being appears (to us) in two further different ways, 
depending on whether it’s other human being or I myself who do so. From a pretheoretical 
standpoint, other human being appear (to me) in the mode of Being-with: as practical agents to 
interact with, not as objects of perception. From a pretheoretical standpoint, I appear (to myself) 
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as existing: for instance, through moods I appear (to myself) as, say, sad, bored, or cheerful, 
prior to any way in which I might appear (to myself) by observing myself as an object. 
 
According to Heidegger, the philosophical tradition has provided us with an inadequate account 
of human being, but this account isn’t for Heidegger false simpliciter, for three reasons. First, 
preliminarily, the tradition hasn’t strictly speaking provided us with an account (true or false) of 
human being; according to Heidegger, the tradition has failed to ask the question about the Being 
of human being: but failing to ask about the Being of human being isn’t the same as making a 
claim (true or false) about this Being. Second, the belief implicit in the tradition’s philosophical 
approach to human being (i.e., an approach based on the failure to ask the question about its 
Being), i.e., that human being is an entity which is present-at-hand, can’t be false simpliciter for 
Heidegger, because Heidegger credits the tradition with having discovered significant truth about 
human being: first, human being exists in the usual sense, in addition to existing in Heidegger’s 
sense; second, more importantly, human being is an entity which is unique in so far as it reveals 
entities qua entities. 
 
The best way to square inadequacy with truth on the part of the tradition is to describe in terms 
of adopting an inadequate standpoint what according to Heidegger is inadequate about the 
tradition: according to Heidegger, the tradition has adopted an inadequate standpoint toward 
human being, the theoretical one. This standpoint isn’t inadequate in the sense that it’s wrong, 
but in the sense that it’s secondary: a more basic standpoint, the pretheoretical one, makes it 
possible in the first place.   
 
3.3 HUMAN BEING AND THE WORLD 
 
Recall that at the beginning of this chapter I claimed that, according to Heidegger, the best past 
accounts of human being derive their philosophical significance, not from accounting for the 
nature of human being in general, but from accounting for this nature focusing on a specific 
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aspect of human being.231 I have already given a clue of why Heidegger believes this is the case: 
in the first place, human being hasn’t a nature to begin with; if philosophers ask themselves 
about the “nature” of human being, it is only to the extent that getting clear about this “nature” 
provides us with a philosophically interesting route to getting clear about the “nature” of entities 
in general. This already shows that, according to Heidegger, philosophical accounts of human 
being can’t derive their philosophical significance from accounting for the “nature” of human 
being in the abstract. However, up to now I have been discussing human being in relation to 
entities in general and Being, without focusing on specific aspects of human being as an entity. 
Heidegger believes human being has some aspects which are philosophically important in so far 
as getting clear about those aspects provides us in turn with a philosophically interesting route to 
getting clear about what it means to be for human being. In this section, I conclude my case 
about Heidegger on the tradition and human being showing that, according to Heidegger, the 
tradition has provided with an inadequate account of one of these aspects, human being’s relation 
to the world; on inspection, I will claim, this account isn’t inadequate in the sense that it is false, 
but in the sense that it is partially true. The significance of this conclusion rests on our enabling 
us to provide an account of Heidegger’s relation to the tradition that does justice to the fact that 
he both criticizes it and credits it with discovering significant philosophical truth. 
 
3.3.1 World 
 
A cardinal feature of human being is according to Heidegger its relation to the world.232 We are 
constantly interacting with things as well as with other people, and sometimes we engage in 
theoretical activities that involve cognizing things and other people. If we go from particular 
things and people to all things and people, it seems there is a totality of things and people, and 
this totality, or so it seems, is the world. How does human being relate to the world? Heidegger’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 In my footnote 4 in this chapter I claimed that the idea of a special philosophical discipline dedicated to 
investigate the nature of human being in general, i.e., a philosophical anthropology, is, despite appearances, 
relatively recent.  
232 There is a philosophically interesting story by Heidegger that explains why a relation to the world is a cardinal 
feature of human being in the first place. Given the complexity of this story, I can’t go into details here, but it is 
crucially connected to Heidegger’s overall insight that time (or rather, what he calls temporality) is the ultimate 
background from which human being understands such a thing as Being in general (this is incidentally BT’s overall 
chief thesis). Now there are three dimensions to this basic temporality, past, present, and future, and human being’s 
relation to the world goes a long way into making sense of the present dimension. 
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chief contention is that we have a strong tendency, from a pretheoretical standpoint, to think of 
this relation in terms of a relation between two entities themselves in the world.  
 
This view, according to Heidegger, is philosophically inadequate: whatever the relation between 
human being and world is, it’s not a relation between two entities within the world (like, for 
instance, the water and the glass or the clothes and the cupboard). More importantly for my 
purposes, Heidegger argues that the philosophical tradition, despite sustained attempts at 
avoiding this inadequate view, has nonetheless failed to do so. On inspection, Heidegger 
suggests, the inadequacy of the tradition is to have replicated at a theoretical level the pre-
theoretical tendency we have when thinking of this relation. According to Heidegger, this 
circumstance has led key figures in the philosophical tradition (Descartes and Kant, in particular) 
to see a philosophically legitimate problem in the de facto relation between human being and 
world; more specifically: in whether there is a relation in the first place. The legitimate problem 
takes the form of questions such as: is there a world “out there”?, is there an external reality?, do 
we actually relate to a world? Heidegger makes quite clear that there is something inadequate, 
not simply about the answers the tradition has given to these questions, but before anything else 
about the questions themselves. Heidegger’s chief insight, the one I want to draw on to make my 
present case, is that questions like these make sense only if we presuppose a view of both human 
being and world which, he thinks, is inadequate. What I want to argue is that, according to 
Heidegger, these views are inadequate, not in the sense that are false, but in the sense that are 
partially true. Once again, I will base my case in the fact that Heidegger distinguishes between 
two standpoints we can adopt over the world, a secondary and a basic one.  
 
Let’s start with a very preliminary question: What is the world? Our spontaneous response is to 
look around, consider things like chairs, trees, buildings, cities, and so on, jump to things like 
planets, stars, galaxies, and so on, perhaps round out the picture with intangible things like moral 
values, numbers, maybe God, and conclude with the claim that the world is the totality of these 
things. Alternatively, we might think that the world is something, presumably thing-like too, 
wherein all these things are. In the first case we have a totality of things; in the second, a 
“container” of a totality of things. After my previous explanations in this chapter, it doesn’t 
require a lot of work to show that, according to Heidegger, either picture of the world is based on 
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a default understanding of what it means to be (in this case for the world), namely, to exist, to be 
real.  
 
Heidegger believes that this is indeed the way we tend to think of the world in our everyday life. 
Now philosophers, being presumably more insightful and conceptually sophisticated, should 
improve on our everyday stance and come up with a more refined (and true) picture of what the 
world is. Yet the philosophical tradition, Heidegger suggests, doesn’t essentially improve on our 
everyday stance, and tends to understand the world as a totality of things or as a “container” of 
this totality. Of course, this is not the impression we get if we read the accounts that different 
figures in the tradition offer of the world, for instance Descartes and Kant (I focus on Descartes 
and Kant following Heidegger, who devotes important and detailed discussions on these two 
figures about human being’s relation to the world): their accounts are based on a number of 
finely grained conceptual distinctions and insightful points, and we get the feeling that the world, 
for these authors, is something much more complex than a mere totality of things. But this, 
Heidegger suggests, is only appearance: behind the most refined accounts of the world we can 
find in the tradition, the default understanding of Being as to exist, to be real, is at work. How 
does Heidegger justify this suggestion? 
 
Remember once again that Heidegger is interested in the question what it means to be for entities 
in general, and all his diagnoses of what is right and wrong about the tradition is framed in terms 
of how right or wrong is the tradition in assuming a default meaning, for each respective entity or 
the aspect of an entity under discussion. I have already shown that Heidegger takes the tradition 
to have assumed a default understanding of what to be means in general, namely to exist, to be 
real (section 3.1.2.). Something similar, Heidegger believes, is going on in the case of the world: 
according to Heidegger, the tradition has assumed a default understanding of what to be means 
for the world, which is to exist, to be real too. (Remember once again that to assume that to be 
means to exist, to be real, is not the same as holding that the only way to be for an entity is to 
exist, to be real; it means that to exist, to be real, is the paradigm case of entity; what to be means 
for non-existent, non-real entities is then explained negatively in terms of what it means to be for 
existent, real ones). The way the tradition has framed this default understanding of the Being of 
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the world has resulted, according to Heidegger, in understanding the world in terms of presence-
at-hand, as what Heidegger calls Nature: 
 
A glance at previous ontology shows that … [o]ne tries … to Interpret the world in terms of the Being of those 
entities which are present-at-hand within-the-world … —namely, in terms of Nature. (BT: 93) 
 
According to Heidegger, there is something inadequate about thinking philosophically about the 
world by interpreting the world in terms of the Being of present-at-hand entities. But. according 
to Heidegger, what exactly is inadequate in this case? My contention is that, whatever this 
inadequacy exactly consists in, it can’t be explained in terms of falsehood simpliciter.  
 
A quick way to show how this holds is to show how Heidegger admits that the world can appear 
(to us) as Nature. Remember once again that Heidegger is doing phenomenology, not because he 
believes how entities appear (to us), as opposed to how things are “in themselves,” is a better 
methodological ground to look for philosophically interesting results; but because what the 
expression “how things are ‘in themselves’” means is philosophically up in the air until we get 
clear about what to be means in the first place, and the only way to avoid presupposing a default 
meaning is describe how entities appear (to us) (see section 3.1.1.). All the phenomenologist’s 
business in the case of the world is consequently to get clear about how the world exactly 
appears (to us); this will help us settle the question what to be means for the world. In this 
respect, Heidegger is quite clear that the world does or, more accurately, can in some situations 
appear (to us) as Nature, i.e., as something present-at-hand: 
 
If one understands Nature ontologico-categorially, one finds that Nature is a limiting case of the Being of possible 
entities within-the-world. Only in some definite mode of its own Being-in-the-world can Dasein [human being] 
discover entities as Nature. (BT: 94) 
 
Heidegger is making a negative point here: Nature is not the primary way in which the world 
appears (to us); but he concedes that the world can appear (to us) as Nature. Therefore, it can’t 
be false simpliciter to hold, as the tradition does, that the world appears (to us) as Nature.  
 
Still, once again, the tradition has an inadequate view of what the world is, and we need to find 
out what according to Heidegger is exactly inadequate with this view. My contention is that, 
according to Heidegger, what is inadequate with this view is best described by saying that it 
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presupposes an inadequate standpoint toward the world. This standpoint isn’t inadequate in the 
sense that is wrong, but in the sense that is secondary with respect to a more basic one.233 
Heidegger makes the negative point clearer in the following passage: 
 
Neither the ontical depiction of entities within-the-world nor the ontological Interpretation of their Being is such as 
to reach the phenomenon of the ‘world’. In both of these ways of access to ‘Objective Being’, the ‘world’ has 
already been ‘presupposed’, and indeed in various ways. (BT: 92) 
 
Remember that an ontical claim is for Heidegger a claim about an entity; whereas an ontological 
claim is a claim, account, description, etc. about the Being of an entity, i.e., about what it means 
to be for that entity. What Heidegger is thus saying in this passage is that to provide a 
philosophically adequate account of the world (both ontical and ontological) what we should not 
do is provide an account of entities within-the-world. But it’s easy to show that Heidegger 
identifies entities-within-the world with present-at-hand entities.234  Therefore, according to 
Heidegger, to provide a philosophically adequate account of the world what we should not do is 
provide an account of present-at-hand entities. Furthermore, Heidegger suggests in this passage, 
to provide an account of present-at-hand entities is inadequate because, in so doing, the ‘world’ 
has been “presupposed’. What I take this to mean is that, according to Heidegger, to provide an 
account of the world in terms of entities present-at-hand rests on a secondary, not wrong, 
standpoint toward the world. If so, however, the account can’t be false simpliciter at least in so 
far as, once again, the right (as opposed to the wrong) object is targeted. What we need to do 
now is show that, according to Heidegger, targeting the right object involves in this case having 
contributed philosophically interesting truth.  
 
3.3.2 Pretheoretical versus Theoretical 
 
Remember, per section 3.1.3., that according to Heidegger there are two mutually irreducible 
ways in which entities in general appear (to us), as objects and as tools; and that each of these 
two modes of appearing (to us) presupposes a standpoint, the theoretical and the pretheoretical 
one, respectively. In section 3.2.3. I claimed that this distinction between a theoretical and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 “[T]o Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially.” (BT: 33) 
234 “The derivative form ‘worldly’ will then apply terminologically to a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein 
[human being], never to a kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand ‘in’ the world. We shall designate these 
latter entities as “belonging to the world” or “within-the-world.” (BT: 93) 
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pretheoretical standpoint carries over for Heidegger to possible standpoints toward human being. 
My contention now is that this distinction carries over for Heidegger to possible standpoint we 
can adopt towards the world too. According to Heidegger, we can adopt two standpoints toward 
the world, a theoretical and a pretheoretical one. From a theoretical standpoint, the world appears 
(to us) as the totality of entities present-at-hand, as Nature. From a pre-theoretical standpoint, the 
world appears (to us) as the totality of entities ready-to-hand, as (what Heidegger calls) 
environment.  The world can appear (to us) as a an objective totality of entities like things like 
chairs, trees, building, cities, and so on; but it can appear (to us), Heidegger suggests, as the 
totality of entities appearing (to us) as something to practically deal with.235  
 
Heidegger’s next claim parallels the priority relation already seen in my previous sections: the 
theoretical standpoint toward the world is based on the pretheoretical one; the latter makes the 
former possible in the first place. Only because the world appears (to me) as a totality of tools to 
practically deal with can it subsequently appear (to me) as a totality of objects to observe in 
perception.  
 
Heidegger’s contention that there is more basic standpoint toward the world than the secondary 
one privileged by the philosophical tradition, involves a terminological change in derivatives and 
cognates of the term “world.” A worldly entity, in Heidegger’s jargon, is not an entity found in 
the world, like for instance a tree, a mountain, snow, a hammer, a chair, a city, and so on. Strictly 
speaking, Heidegger contends, only human being is a worldly entity, since only human being 
“has world,” i.e., is world-oriented. Heidegger introduces the adjectival term innerworldly to 
refer to entities found in the world: a tree, a mountain, snow, a hammer, a chair, a city, and so on, 
are in Heidegger’s jargon innerworldly, not worldly, entities. 
 
3.3.3 Human Being’s Relation to the World 
 
On the basis of my distinction between a pretheoretical and a theoretical standpoint we can adopt 
over the world, together with my previous point that we can adopt a pretheoretical as well as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 For example, the work-world of the craftsman (BT: 153) is more basic than the world taken as Nature, i.e. qua 
object of study of the physicist. 
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theoretical standpoint toward human being, we can now consider the relation between human 
being and world. Here we have a case in which the tradition, according to Heidegger, has 
provided us with an account that is false simpliciter (flat-out wrong, not partially true). On 
inspection, this account is according to Heidegger false simpliciter because underlying it is a 
view of both world and human being that is philosophically inadequate, but not exactly false. 
 
To start with, both Descartes and Kant agree that, in principle, the relation between human being 
and the world is philosophically problematic: there is a genuine philosophical problem about this 
relation. The philosophical problem, moreover, concerns the de facto relation of human being to 
the word: it is philosophically problematic, according to Descartes and Kant, whether there in 
fact is a relation between human being and the world in the first place: crudely, human being 
might conceivably lack a world (in contemporary terms, we might be brains in a vat). Of course, 
this is Descartes’ and Kant’s starting point. They quickly (or not so quickly) come to the 
conclusion that we do relate to a world, that human being does not lack a world. Descartes starts 
from the absolute certainty of the cogito, goes through a proof of God’s existence, and comes to 
the conclusion that, while we can be mistaken about individual facts about the world (for 
instance, that there is a chair in front of me), we can’t be mistaken about global facts about the 
world, i.e., that there is a world at all in the first place. Kant finds Descartes’ proof faulty and 
offers a different sort of proof in the “Refutation of Idealism” section of his Critique of Pure 
Reason,236 whereby he equally shows that human being does relate to the world. 
 
According to Heidegger, however, the chief flaw remains, and is common to both Descartes and 
Kant: while they “show” that human being relates to a world, they agree that human being might 
fail to do so: that is, precisely, why they demand (and offer) a philosophical proof that this 
relation does in fact exist. Now Heidegger is very clear that Descartes’ and Kant’s claim is false 
simpliciter (flat-out wrong, not simply partially true): according to Heidegger, human being 
cannot conceivably lack a world. Here we have an example of a philosophical account of the 
relation between human being and world (in this case, for illustrative purposes, Descartes and 
Kant) that includes what Heidegger takes to be falsehood simpliciter. My claim is that this 
account includes (presupposes) a view of both human being and world that is according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 B274-276; Kant 1998: 326-7. 
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Heidegger not really false, but partially true. I contend, then, that it is important to distinguish 
two things here: first, the object (in this case, both human being and world) that philosophers (in 
this case, Descartes and Kant) target when giving a philosophical account, and the theory about 
the object. The account may well be false, but justice must be made of the fact that the account 
targets the right philosophical object (which, per Chapter 1, section 1.2.2., involves the 
circumstance that interesting truth is being discovered). What I suggest to do justice to this fact is 
a strategy analogous to the one I used in the case of the proper subject of philosophy and of 
human being: accept that the account (or claims therein) are false by way of taking the part for 
the whole. 
 
3. 4 CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude, let me summarize my chief results in this chapter. According to Heidegger, the best 
past philosophical accounts of human being have been inadequate, but not exactly false; rather, 
they have been partially true (in a philosophically interesting sense to be further elucidated in my 
final chapter). 
 
Given the amount of past philosophers whom Heidegger targets in his criticisms, I’ve decided to 
make my case by drawing on the blanket term “the philosophical tradition” to cover, not all of 
them, but a position that, according to Heidegger, is common to all of them. Further, because 
past philosophical accounts of human being derive their significance from illuminating specific 
aspects of human being, not its nature in general, I’ve focused on one of those aspects, which 
Heidegger takes to be central: human being’s relation to the world. The account of the 
philosophical tradition of how human being relates to the world is based on a view of both 
human being and world which is inadequate but not exactly false (rather, partially true). 
 
According to Heidegger, the question: What is human being? is important in philosophy only to 
the extent that what is being asked is: What does it mean to be for human being? This question 
itself, however, is important only with a view to the broader question: What does it mean to be 
for entities in general? This question, which Heidegger calls the question about Being, needs to 
be asked: in so far as we deal with entities, we already have a sense of what it means to be for 
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entities; to explicitly make the question is thus to exploit a possibility which is already dictated 
by this sense. The question about Being can be rephrased as: what makes entities be entities in 
general?, and Heidegger’s preliminary answer is: Being. Whatever Being might be, it’s not itself 
an entity. The method to be used when answering this question is phenomenological: we need to 
describe how entities appear (to us) and classify them into different categories, according to how 
entities differ in what to be means for each sort.  
 
There are two chief ways in which entities appear (to us), entities qua objects and entities qua 
tools. Correlatively, there are two standpoints we can adopt towards entities in general, the 
theoretical and the pre-theoretical. To adopt a theoretical standpoint toward an entity doesn’t 
mean, in Heidegger’s sense, to observe an entity with a view to develop a theory about it. It 
simply means to observe the entity as an object. Examples include staring a hammer with a view 
to its objective properties. From a pre-theoretical standpoint, entities appear (to us) as “tools.” 
Examples include using a hammer to nail. According to Heidegger, the theoretical standpoint 
toward entities is secondary, the pre-theoretical one is basic: the latter makes the former possible.  
 
According to Heidegger, there is an entity which is unique, in so far as an understanding of 
Being belongs to its type of Being (i.e., to what it means to be for it). This singles out that entity 
as the one we should we starting with when answering the question about Being. This entity is 
“we ourselves.” Human being is unique as an entity, in so far as what it means to be for it 
involves dealing with entities qua entities, and moreover with a pre-theoretical understanding of 
their Being; furthermore, human being is unique as an entity in so far as what it means to be for 
it involves letting appear entities qua entities in the first place: human being (and it alone) is 
revelatory of entities qua entities. This is why human being, according to Heidegger, is so central 
in a philosophical understanding of reality in general: whatever reality may ultimately be, it is 
what it is in so far as it appears (to human being); furthermore, the question: what is reality? 
presupposes the question: what it means to be in general? But this question can only be answered 
by asking first: what it means to be for human being. Therefore, the question: what it means to be 
for human being is a necessary step into asking: what is reality? 
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The two chief characteristics of human being, which Heidegger calls Dasein, are its existence 
and its being “myself.” Existence involves that to be for human being, in radical contrast to the 
rest of entities, consists in relating to itself.  
 
The two standpoints we adopt towards entities in general apply towards human being too. From a 
theoretical standpoint, human being appears (to us) as object. From a pre-theoretical standpoint, 
other human beings appears (to us) as Being-with and ready-to-hand. From a pre-theoretical 
standpoint, I appear (to myself) as existence. The philosophical tradition (at least the figures 
Heidegger considers worth criticizing) has taken human being to be an entity which is indeed 
unique in so far as it’s different from the rest of entities, and in that respect its account of human 
being includes significant truth; it follows then that, according to Heidegger, it can’t be false 
simpliciter. However, by failing to account for this uniqueness in the correct way: by appeal to 
the fact that to be for human being means a radically different thing than from the rest of entities 
(a failure that connects with the failure to ask in the very first place what it means to be for 
entities in general, i.e., the question about Being), the philosophical tradition has a flawed 
understanding of human being.  
 
A cardinal feature of human being is its relation to the world. The philosophical tradition takes 
the world to be the totality of entities. According to Heidegger, this view of the world is 
inadequate but not exactly false; what is inadequate about it is that it’s secondary with respect to 
a more basic one: the world as background of our dealing with (not observing) entities. The 
world as background of our dealing with entities appears (to us) when we stand on a pre-
theoretical, not theoretical, standpoint toward entities. On the basis of this standpoint, we can 
observe entities (i.e., adopt a theoretical standpoint toward them), consider them as a totality, and 
thus have the world appear (to us) in a secondary sense. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HEGEL ON THE ABSOLUTE 
 
“We are perhaps too much inclined to regard idealism, especially German idealism, as a pure play of abstractions. 
The great problem of ‘idealism’, however, is the problem of reality: fundamentally, idealism is the doctrine that the 
distinction between the ideal and the real is itself entirely ideal.” (Paul Ricoeur)237 
 
 
According to Hegel, the Absolute238 plays a central role in a philosophical understanding of 
reality, but the Absolute has a unique and elusive nature, which is a challenge for philosophy to 
capture. Now Hegel believes that the best past theories of the Absolute have been inadequate. At 
its most general, the thesis I want to defend in this chapter is that, under analysis, these theories 
are, according to Hegel, inadequate but not exactly false; what is inadequate about them is that 
they provide us with only partial truth about the Absolute (in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to 
be elaborated on in Chapter 5). To defend my thesis I will proceed as follows. First, I will claim 
that the problem with the best past theories of the Absolute is best described by saying that, 
according to Hegel, they result from adopting an inadequate standpoint toward the Absolute. 
Second, I will claim that, according to Hegel, this standpoint is not inadequate in the sense that is 
wrong, but in the sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint takes precedence over it and 
makes it possible in the first place. Third, according to Hegel, what we are able to know about 
the Absolute from the secondary standpoint isn’t so much false as, rather, partial.  
 
To make my case, I will draw on two early prefaces by Hegel: the Preface to The Difference 
between the Systems of Fichte and Schelling (Preface-Difference) (1801) and the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (Preface-PhS) (1807).239 The significance of both Preface-Difference 
and Preface-PhS rests on the circumstance that prefaces are Hegel’s standard choice to discuss 
the goals, method and scope of philosophy in its most general fashion.240 This allows for a 
number of important self-contained claims that are difficult to find in the rest of Hegel’s corpus. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Ricoeur 1998, in Rée and Chamberlain 1998: 17. 
238 Alternative names used by Hegel include Spirit (Geist), God, Reason (or the Rational), and the True (das Wahre). 
239 Hegel Preface-Difference (Hegel 1977a) and Preface-PhS (Hegel 1977b), respectively. 	  
240 Although this can be taken to be common to other philosophers, Hegel’s prefaces can be seen, as R. Schacht 
does, as “a class in themselves;” for “of virtually no other philosopher can it be said that, if his introductory material 
[i.e., prefaces] alone remained available to us, we would be still in a position both to understand the essentials of his 
philosophy and to apprehend his greatness.” (Schacht 1975: 41) 
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Preface-PhS is in this respect particularly significant; in it, Hegel most sharply differentiates his 
own views from those of other contemporary philosophers. In so doing, Hegel advances his most 
important insights in an unusually bold and thus helpful way (even if Hegel’s philosophical 
statements remain legendarily obscure and thus in need of interpretation). Last but not least, 
these two prefaces, especially Preface-PhS, can be read as two condensed programs for Hegel’s 
whole philosophy,241 familiarity with which is going to be necessary to follow my case. 
 
Before starting to make my case, let me make two preliminary methodological remarks. First, 
while the term “Absolute” is relatively traditional in philosophy, Hegel’s own notion of the 
Absolute is so idiosyncratic that one may wonder whether philosophers before him really had in 
mind the same object, even if they used the same term. If that’s the case, someone might protest, 
it is misguided to talk about philosophers before Hegel as proposing theories of the Absolute in 
Hegel’s sense, which is what I intend to do in this chapter. My response to this worry draws on 
the distinction between theories and beliefs about theories that I raised in Chapter 1 (section 
1.2.1.). I admit that it is open to debate whether philosophers before Hegel defended theories and 
theses about the Absolute in Hegel’s sense (most likely not). But it’s less open to debate that 
Hegel (in a way that needs spelling out) does take them to have done so. Given that, as I 
established in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.1.), this study concerns philosophers’ beliefs about theories 
rather than theories themselves, I take it that my case will go through as long as Hegel is indeed 
committed to this view (something that, as I will demonstrate later, it’s relatively easy to 
show).242 The reason is simple: in this chapter, I defend the thesis that, according to Hegel, past 
philosophical theories of the Absolute have been partially true rather than false. 
 
Second, Hegel’s notion of the Absolute is so encompassing that when he argues that the best past 
philosophical theories of the Absolute have been inadequate, he targets many different figures, 
and on many different grounds. Given that to cover all these figures and grounds is impossible in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 This is historically true of Preface-PhS, which is a preface to Hegel’s whole System, not just to Phenomenology 
(Köhler and Pöggeler 1998: 2, Jaeschke 2005: 181, Westphal 2009: xvii) 
242  Preliminarily, some quotes from Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy can help: “Plato first 
comprehended the Absolute as the Being of Parmenides.” (Hegel 1996: 250) “Plato’s inert ideas and numbers thus 
bring nothing into reality; but far different is the case with the Absolute of Aristotle.” (Ibid., 341) “Even Rousseau 
represented the absolute to be found in freedom; Kant has the same principle, but taken rather from the theoretic 
side.” (Ibid., 576) “It is the absolute form which Fichte laid hold of, or in other words, the absolute form is just the 
absolute Being-for-self.” (Ibid., 632) 
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the context of this chapter, I need to decide what specific figures I want to focus on to make my 
case manageable. This methodological difficulty can be put in different terms in the following 
way. As we will see, one of the senses that Hegel’s Absolute admits is “reality,” whereby to 
argue that, according to Hegel, the best past philosophical theories of the Absolute are partially 
true amounts to arguing that, according to Hegel, the best past philosophical theories of reality 
are partially true. Whether true or not, this obviously is a very sweeping claim to make, quite 
falling outside the scope of the present chapter. Accordingly, what I need to do is to follow a 
strategy similar to the one I adopted in the case of Heidegger in order to make my task more 
manageable: to focus on a specific aspect about the Absolute that, for some reason or other, is 
interesting to discuss with respect to the notion of partial truth, and to construct my case around 
this aspect. For reasons that I will present in its due course, I propose to focus on language and, 
more specifically, on the expression of linguistic truth about the Absolute (specifically in the 
form of one single proposition). According to Hegel, I will then argue in this chapter, past 
philosophical theories about linguistic truth about the Absolute are inadequate, but not exactly 
false; rather, they are partially true (in the sense sketched in Chapter 1, to be further developed in 
Chapter 5). (We will later see that, above the rest, Hegel targets his predecessors Kant and Fichte 
(see below, section 4.2.2. and 4.4.)). 
 
4. 1 THE ABSOLUTE 
 
In this first section I want to explain what Hegel understands by the Absolute. This task faces 
considerable difficulties and brings us head on into substantial interpretative issues.243 In the case 
of Sartre and Heidegger, things were not as difficult, because “consciousness” and “human being” 
more or less coincide with our ordinary understanding of these terms (even if, philosophically 
speaking, Sartre’s and Heidegger’s theories clash at many points with our ordinary 
understanding of these objects). Hegel’s Absolute, by contrast, doesn’t have an ordinary 
equivalent that might be used as easily as a starting point. Perhaps a good choice of a term which, 
understood ordinarily, more or less coincides with Hegel’s notion of the Absolute would be God, 
for two reasons. First, Hegel himself sometimes uses “God” (Gott) as an alternative to the term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that to explain what Hegel means by the Absolute is almost equivalent to 
spelling out his entire philosophy. 
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“the Absolute.” Second, similar to God as we ordinarily understand it, Hegel’s Absolute is an 
entity244 on which all the rest of entities depend, but which itself doesn’t depend on any entity. 
However, different from God as ordinarily understood, Hegel’s Absolute is not a transcendent 
entity, access to which is for us impossible, indirect, or faith-based; rather, Hegel’s Absolute is 
immanent to reality as we know it and accessible to reason,245 if only the right standpoint toward 
it is found and adopted.  
 
4.1.1 Science and Knowledge 
 
It will soon become clear that, according to Hegel, genuine knowledge of the Absolute is 
philosophical and, conversely, genuine philosophy is essentially knowledge of the Absolute. So a 
good place to start discussing what, according to Hegel, the Absolute is and what is inadequate 
with past philosophical theories of the Absolute, is to discuss what, according to Hegel, is 
inadequate with past views about the proper goals and tasks of philosophy.    
 
Hegel shares with Descartes and Kant, among others, but not with Hume or Locke, among others, 
the view that philosophy occupies a privileged position with respect to the rest of sciences. Hegel 
differs from Descartes and Kant, however, in two aspects: first, in the way Hegel accounts for 
this privileged position; second, in the way he moreover radicalizes it, to the point of considering 
philosophy, quite unlike Descartes or Kant, the only science worth of this name. We will see in a 
minute that this circumstance ties in with the idea that in the last analysis, according to Hegel, 
there is one single object of knowledge, the Absolute and, conversely, there is only one sort of 
knowledge of the Absolute. But let’s first consider closer how Hegel’s notion of philosophy 
departs from a more traditional one. 
 
To start with, Hegel does not believe that philosophy is privileged by being a form of knowledge 
separated from the rest of sciences, contributing to their ultimate validity; in quite different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Broadly construed; as we will see, the Absolute for Hegel is not really an entity, if by entity something self-
identical and more or less permanent is understood. 
245 Indeed, as we will see, for Hegel the Absolute and reason are the same thing under two different names. But then, 
again, what reason means for Hegel needs substantial spelling out. 
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senses, this was both Descartes’ and Kant’s views.246 Instead, Hegel believes that philosophy and 
the sciences form a continuum or, rather, that philosophy contributes sciences’ scientific status 
across the board, at every point of their development.247 Additionally, Hegel believes that there 
ultimately is one single science, namely philosophy itself, a form of knowledge that Hegel calls, 
precisely, “Science” (Wissenschaft). Again against Descartes and Kant (among others), it is 
Hegel’s view that the rest of sciences, paradigmatically logic, mathematics and physics, 
presumably privileged in virtue of the kinds of truth they deliver, derive their scientific status 
from philosophy alone; if left by themselves, Hegel holds, their validity is relative. As we will 
see, for Hegel there is such a thing as absolutely, not just relatively valid knowledge; and 
absolute knowledge is knowledge of the Absolute. (This will involve the consequence that 
adopting the right standpoint toward the Absolute is for Hegel crucial to have the right theory of 
the Absolute. Past philosophers may well have had in view the right object as far as the Absolute 
is concerned; but by failing to have adopted the right standpoint toward it, what they have been 
able to observe is only an aspect of it.) 
 
Of course, Hegel holds such a prima facie extreme view about science and philosophy because 
his notions of both science and philosophy differ substantively from that of Descartes and Kant, 
or for that matter from that of any other past (and future!) philosopher. It is important to keep in 
mind that the terms “science,” “Wissenschaft,” and “scientific,” “wissenschaftlich,” have for 
Hegel a somewhat idiosyncratic meaning which greatly differs from what we understand by 
them nowadays.248 To start with, in Hegel’s writings “science” does not refer to specific sciences, 
in particular “hard sciences,” that is, sciences based on the mathematical treatment of 
phenomena aiming at establishing universally valid laws (physics as a paradigm, and sciences 
inspired by physics subsequently). This is what we typically associate with the terms “science” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 According to Kant, for instance, critical philosophy, “does not aim at the amplification of the cognitions 
themselves but only at their correction.” (Critique of Pure Reason, A12/B26; Kant 1998: 149).  
247 Conversely, and this is a point too usually forgotten, Hegel believes that without the rest of sciences, empirical 
ones in particular, philosophy on its own would not have been able to advance from the point at which the Greeks 
left it (Jaeschke 2005: 339). 
248 Not so idiosyncratic, if we keep in mind that, in German, Wissenschaft is a wider-encompassing word than the 
English equivalent “science,” including humanistic disciplines such as history, philology, etc. It is also important to 
keep in mind that Fichte, Hegel’s most immediate predecessor after Schelling, introduced the term Wissenschaft 
(specifically, Wissenschaftslehre, “doctrine of Science”) as a quasi-technical term for what we would call 
“philosophy.” As opposed to practical disciplines, perhaps a better translation of Wissenschaft and wissenschaftlich 
is, in the context of German Idealism, theory and theoretical, respectively. 
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and “scientific” today. Instead, Hegel uses the term “science,” “Wissenschaft,” to refer to one 
single type of knowledge, in which, moreover, by no means does mathematization play a central 
role.249 Science in Hegel’s sense, furthermore, is not a theoretical stage that human cognition 
may achieve by way of an addition; rather, Hegel thinks, knowledge is bound to become Science 
by its very nature.250 Thus, Science in Hegel’s sense opposes itself both to ordinary knowledge 
and to scientific knowledge. A sign of Hegelian Science is that, unlike these two types of 
knowledge, with a focus on finite objects, its object is, rather, infinite ones.251 Preliminarily, I 
understand by finite objects determinate objects, that is, anything in so far as it is something as 
opposed to something else, whatever it may be.252 This provides us with our first clue concerning 
what the Absolute is, according to Hegel: whatever the Absolute may eventually be, it is an 
infinite sort of thing, indeed the only truly infinite. Alternative terms used by Hegel, as we will 
see below, are unlimited and unconditioned. Of course, this characterization of the Absolute is 
by now insufficient, but I will argue in my next section that this infinite, unlimited, and 
unconditioned sort of thing is, ultimately speaking, the whole of what there is, reality. Reality, as 
Hegel understands it, is the object of philosophy, that is, Science. Science in Hegel’s sense is 
cognition of the Absolute, but Science in Hegel’s sense opposes itself to non-conceptual 
cognition of the Absolute.253 To stress this fact, Hegel claims that Science has the Notion (Begriff) 
as the element of its existence.254  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Hegel is quite critical of the idea, quite extended in Modern Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and 
Christian Wolff), that mathematics is an exemplary type of knowledge. More specifically, Hegel is opposed to the 
view that mathematics is the type of knowledge philosophy should model itself on: “Spinoza, Wolff, and others let 
themselves be misled in applying it [the method of pure mathematics] to philosophy and in making the external 
course followed by Notion-less quantity, the course of the Notion, a procedure which is absolutely contradictory.” 
(Hegel 1998: 53) According to Hegel, philosophical and mathematical truth are two radically different types of 
truth, and the former stands higher in virtue of the Wirklichkeit (actuality, reality) of its object. See Preface-PhS: 24-
27. 
250 “The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature.” (Preface-PhS:3) 
251 We shall see in a minute what “finite” and “infinite” are supposed to mean here. 
252 In my previous chapter on Heidegger, I used a similar definition of “entity” as opposed to Being. 
253 That is, immediate knowledge of the Absolute or, in other words, knowledge of the Absolute by means of 
intuition or feeling (Preface-PhS:4) According to Hegel, the goal of an intuitive knowledge of the Absolute expects 
of philosophy, not so much insight, as edification (Preface-PhS:5).This edification, “this modest complacency in 
receiving, or this sparingness in giving, does not, however, befit Science. … [P]hilosophy must beware itself of the 
wish to be edifying.” (Preface-PhS:5-6) 
254 “[T]he true shape of truth is scientific –or, what is the same thing, … truth has only the Notion as the element of 
its existence-.” Preface-PhS:4. “What, therefore, is important in the study of Science, is that one should take on 
oneself the strenuous effort of the Notion.” (Preface-PhS: 35) 
 137	  
What I want to argue now is that, according to Hegel, Science isn’t really knowledge about an 
object, but an overcoming of the gap in virtue of which the former happens to be “about” the 
latter.255 This insight of Hegel’s, I will moreover suggest, provides us with a good way of further 
characterizing the Absolute and show that, according to Hegel, the Absolute is the whole of what 
there is, that is, reality. I will unpack later on the prima facie obscure formula that Science isn’t 
really knowledge about an object, but an overcoming of the gap in virtue of which the former 
happens to be “about” the latter, but by now it should be clear that neither logic nor mathematics 
nor physics, nor any other science as usually understood (indeed, not even philosophy itself), can 
be genuine science on Hegel’s standard: all of them attempt to acquire knowledge about 
something, instead of attempting to suppress the gap between knowledge and whatever 
knowledge is about.  
 
4.1.2 Absolute Knowledge 
 
How is this suppression supposed to be understood? Hegel gives us a clue in Preface-PhS with 
his huge statement that what he attempts to do is to transform philosophy from being “love of 
knowing” to being actual knowing, or Science.256 According to Hegel, this enterprise includes as 
one of its tasks grasping the True not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.257 The True, 
Hegel claims no less famously, is the whole.258 Knowledge, Hegel elaborates on, must be 
exposed as a System.259 Philosophy’s goal, finally, is to present the Absolute as Spirit (Geist).260 
All of these claims have virtually become slogans for Hegel’s whole philosophy, but what do 
they mean? Answering this question will help us demonstrate that for Hegel the Absolute is the 
whole of what there is, reality, and that the best past theories of the Absolute have been partially 
true rather than false; so it is worth stopping for a while and spend some time on it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 “The standpoint of [an individual’s] consciousness which knows objects in their antithesis to itself, and itself in 
antithesis to them, is for Science the antithesis of its own standpoint.” (Preface-PhS:15) “[K]nowing is not an 
activity that deals with the content as something alien, is not a reflection into itself away from the content.” 
(Preface-PhS: 33) “[The] nature of scientific method … consists in not being separate from the content…” (Preface-
PhS:35) “[I]t is only in absolute knowing [Science] that the separation of the object from the certainty of itself 
[knowledge] is completely eliminated.” (Hegel 1998: 49) 
256 Preface-PhS: 3. 
257 Preface-PhS: 9-10. 
258 Preface-PhS: 11. 
259 Preface-PhS: 13. 
260 Preface-PhS: 14. 
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By way of an answer, let us concentrate on what arguably is Hegel’s most important claim so far, 
namely that the Absolute must be conceived not only as Substance, but also as Subject.261 This 
formula gives Hegel’s programmatic recipe for both synthesizing and overcoming two opposite 
extremes into which Modern philosophy fell, at two different times. It is not mere chance, but of 
the greatest philosophical significance, that these two positions can be situated in relation to Kant, 
one before and one after. Kant is significant here because his philosophy strikes a historical 
divide in favor of idealism, against realism, as what might be called epistemology’s “default” 
position.262 (This circumstance will help us to understand why Hegel believes that philosophers 
before him have targeted the Absolute as a philosophical object about which theories or theses 
should be defended.) Probably the first Modern philosopher who, according to Hegel, was 
observing the right object as far as the Absolute is concerned was Spinoza, something that can be 
shown by briefly considering the terms in which Modern philosophy handles a debate in 
epistemology and metaphysics that can be traced much further back.  
 
The debate between realism and idealism is as old as philosophy itself, and it is relevant at this 
point, because Hegel’s notion of Absolute arises as an attempt to overcome it. Realism claims 
that there is an objective reality independent of human knowledge. Idealism claims that there 
isn’t such independent objective reality, but that reality totally or partially depends on our 
knowledge of it. To simplify things a bit for the purposes of this section, we can start from the 
fact that in Modern philosophy, the dispute between realism and idealism turns around the 
question what comes first, the subject or the object, that is, knowing or being. What is being 
asked here is: is there first being (i.e., an independently existing reality) out of which our 
knowing of being subsequently emerges? Or is there first knowing of being, out which questions 
and answers about the nature or being subsequently emerge? This question can be raised 
epistemologically or metaphysically, that is, from the standpoint of our knowledge or from the 
standpoint of being, independently from our knowledge. From either standpoint, either realism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 This is one of, or perhaps the most famous and difficult claims of Hegel’s. What I offer here isn’t a complete 
interpretation, but a brief sketch of what stands at its background. For recent discussion see Jaeschke 2005: 182 ff. 
262 One can further refine the picture by distinguishing naïve realism prior to Descartes and Locke, for which we 
perceive things as they are, from the latter’s sophisticated realism, for which we partially perceive things as they 
are; the refinement can be completed by pointing out that Berkeley and Hume took a further step, and rejected 
realism as a tenable position (Schacht 1975:19-20). 
 139	  
or idealism can be defended (although defending one of the alternatives from a standpoint 
typically results in defending the same alternative from the other). In either case, however, there 
is (or so Hegel is going to argue) a common philosophical assumption: knowing and being stand 
in a sort of relation of which both knowing and being are real factors with equal right. In 
different words, in the debate between realism and idealism in Modern philosophy (roughly, 
from Descartes to Kant), the relation between knowing and being, regardless of which one 
comes first, is pictured in analogy with a relation, or more precisely put, with a relation between 
two entities (or processes).263 This assumption, Hegel suggests, is potentially harmful regarding 
that factor, knowing, of which it’s least clear that it should be thought of in analogy with an 
entity (or process). To see what the problem could be, let us consider the philosophical position 
holding that knowing arises from being, that is, realism.  
 
Traditional realism claims that being, independent from knowing, is primary. Knowing, it is then 
argued, comes from being. How is this “coming-from” typically accounted for, however? At 
some point or another, it is argued, being produces knowing or, alternatively worded, being 
creates knowing, being causes knowing, being brings forth knowing, and so on. One can see that 
all these terms suggest a relation between being and knowing which is thought of in analogy with 
one holding between two entities (or processes) (for instance, heat in the water produces vapor, 
certain chemical reactions produce life, and so on). We can say that the relation as thus 
represented is that of cause to effect (broadly conceived). 
 
Realism thus claims that, in virtue of having emerged out of being, knowing is somehow 
dependent on being, whereas being is, allegedly, independent from knowing. But is being, thus 
pictured, really independent from knowing? What is overlooked here, or so Hegel believes, is 
that in a relation of cause to effect, even if pushed to the limits of the whole of what there is, the 
cause is as much dependent on the effect as the other way round. By causing knowing, being is 
somehow dependent on it, even if, metaphysically and epistemologically speaking, being takes 
precedence over knowing. Traditional realism, Hegel concludes, is a self-defeating doctrine: if 
we accept that there is an objective reality independent of our knowledge, and we are committed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 This holds for dualism too. Descartes held that the mutual relation between res cogitans (knowing) and res 
extensa (being) not only was real, but it could be located somewhere in the human body (the pineal gland in the 
brain): The Passions of the Soul art. 34 (Descartes [1649] 1985:341) 
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to the view that this reality has at some point produced knowledge, in the sense that knowledge is 
an effect of reality, we will be forced to admit that reality somehow depends on knowledge 
(because a cause doesn’t exist totally unrelated to its effect), which is what realism, precisely, 
wants to deny.  
 
Is there any alternative picture? The picture offered by what I will call “absolute realism” (to 
make a first step into construing Hegel’s notion of the Absolute; as opposed to simple, or 
metaphysical realism) is that of knowing as a mode or attribute of being. For someone 
committed to absolute realism, the relation between being and knowing is no longer seen as that 
of cause to effect, but rather, using traditional terminology, as that of substance to accident. This 
philosophical maneuver drops the picture of knowing and being as two real components of what 
there is, and accepts instead one single component, being, of which knowing is, not a product or 
an effect, but an accident (or property): being has knowing as one of its accidents (properties). In 
so doing, being knows itself (as being). The idea here is that being is no longer being as opposed 
to knowing, as it usually happens in traditional realism. Rather, being includes knowing as one of 
its aspects. We thus have a new notion of being that, Hegel believes, goes beyond the customary 
one in so far as it is neither metaphysically nor epistemologically basic in relation to knowing, 
but both of them at the same time, or (using Hegelian jargon) absolutely so. I contend that this 
notion of being is what Hegel refers to as the Absolute (although, as we will see in a minute, this 
is just a partial aspect of it). 
 
What is important to stress now, as a second step into construing Hegel’s notion of the Absolute 
is that the notion of Absolute so far construed is, interestingly, non-committal regarding the 
choice between realism and idealism. One can indeed defend that knowing is an accident of 
being but, conversely, one can defend that being is (what is traditionally called) an accident 
(property) of knowing. This doesn’t need to commit one to Berkeleyan idealism; the picture of 
how exactly being is an accident of knowing can be more sophisticated than Berkeley’s 
(especially after Kant). Historically, the notion of Absolute thus constructed arose against 
metaphysical realism (more accurately put, against Descartes’ metaphysical dualism), as (what I 
called) “absolute realism.” Being precedes knowing both metaphysically and epistemologically, 
thus absolutely so. Knowing is dependent on being, not as an effect from a cause, but as an 
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accident (or attribute, or mode) of a substance. Thus, we can say, following historical 
terminology, being is Substance. This is, in a nutshell, what can be called Spinoza’s theory of the 
Absolute,264 one of the extremes that Hegel has in mind in his formulation that the chief task of 
philosophy is to grasp the Absolute not only as Substance, but equally as Subject (recall that our 
preliminary task is to explain this formulation). When Hegel affirms that the Absolute must be 
grasped not only as Substance, but also as Subject, he has Spinoza in mind as far as the first half 
of the formula is concerned. It would be easy to show that Hegel both rejects Spinoza’s theory of 
the Absolute as being philosophically inadequate and acknowledges that it contains 
philosophically interesting truth (if only because the right object, the Absolute, is being targeted; 
something which, per Chapter 1, section 1. 2. 2.). This suggests that, whatever the inadequacies 
Hegel sees in Spinoza’s theory of the Absolute, they can’t be spelled out in terms of falsehood 
simpliciter. (However, in the remainder of this chapter I will put Spinoza aside and focus on 
Kant and Fichte for my case). 
 
What about the other extreme? It consists in admitting Spinoza’s model of an absolute Substance 
of which knowing is one of its accidents. However, it is the opposite version of this model, since 
this time knowing is the Absolute, on which being depends. Historically, it was Fichte who 
endorsed this view, or rather, according to Hegel, who made a first step towards it.265 As 
suggested before, it is not a chance that Fichte’s endorsement of an Absolute in the form of 
knowing266 comes right after Kant’s idealistic turn (as Spinoza’s came before). In summary, 
Hegel’s famous formula according to which the Absolute must be grasped not merely as 
substance, but just as much as subject, contains an allusion to Spinoza (with his conception of the 
absolute as substance) and Fichte (with his conception of the absolute as ego or subject).267 What 
Hegel wants is neither of these two alternatives but both of them at the same time.268 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Of course, this is no more than a barebones picture of Spinoza’s theory. I focus only on what is necessary to 
understand what the Absolute is according to Hegel, and what is inadequate with past theories of it. 
265 The circumstance that Fichte’s Absolute seems to be the exact opposite of Spinoza’s was already felt by Fichte’s 
contemporaries. Most famously, according to the critic of the Enlightenment and of Kant’s and Fichte’s philosophies 
F. H. Jacobi, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is “an inverted Spinozism.” (Jacobi 1799: 4). 
266 Fichte’s term for this Absolute was “Ego” or “Ich” (“I”). 
267 See for example Kaufmann 1965: 389. For Fichte on Spinoza see f. ex. Fichte 1997: 74. 
268 The point can be elaborated on by saying that Hegel wants to endorse a view of the absolute both as an 
“unchanging, determinate character” (Spinoza’s absolute as substance) and as “pure activity or dynamic agency” 
(Fichte’s absolute as subject) (Schacht 1975: 45). 
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Loosely following Hegel, I have sketched the notion of an Absolute understood as the whole of 
what there is, the whole of reality. It is reasonable to hold that knowledge of the Absolute is the 
object of philosophy. The notion of Absolute thus constructed is supposed to make philosophical 
progress over the dualist picture of being and knowing opposing each other, an ongoing source 
of puzzles and difficulties in Modern philosophy up to Kant (included). The progress allegedly 
consists in claiming that instead of being and knowing opposing each other, or instead of either 
of them producing the other, one of them is an aspect of the other. However, and again very 
crudely put, we have thus reached two possible choices: the Absolute as Object (Spinoza)269 or 
the Absolute as Subject (Fichte), that is, Absolute Being or Absolute Knowing. 
 
Before going any further, I must point out that my exposition so far is somewhat faulty as far as 
Fichte is concerned. In my attempt to oppose Fichte to Spinoza, I have said that Fichte’s 
Absolute is analogous to Spinoza’s in so far as being is (somehow) an attribute of knowing, in 
exact opposition to Spinoza’s picture in which knowing is an attribute of being. In fact, or at 
least Hegel thinks so, it seems more accurate to say that Fichte attempts to reach this picture, 
without succeeding. Hegel believes that Fichte’s attempt fails, because the Absolute in the way 
Fichte accounts for it turns out to be only partially absolute.270  
 
4. 2 STANDPOINT: SPECULATIVE VERSUS REFLECTIVE 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Given the crudeness of my account, my terminology is somewhat sloppy. For example: Spinoza never talks of 
“Absolute” or “Object” (these terms were introduced by the philosophers of German Idealism, the period to which 
Hegel historically belongs); rather, Spinoza talks of “God” or “Substance:” “Deus, sive Substantia” (Spinoza [1677] 
1914: 43).This is not simply a terminological issue. Spinoza didn’t think of himself as defending what I have called 
“(Absolute) realism.” Realism as a thesis that needs defending did not arise until Kant’s idealistic turn made that 
maneuver necessary.  
270 For the sake of completion of exposition, a third alternative, suggested before, should be mentioned: the Absolute 
is both Substance and Subject; but this unity of Substance and Subject is immediate, available to intellectual 
intuition. This is Schelling’s position. To sum up, and as Hegel makes plain (Preface-PhS:10), Hegel’s thesis that 
the Absolute should be grasped both as Substance and as Subject, has three targets, not two: 1) Spinoza’s idea that, 
ultimately speaking, the whole of reality is Substance, Being alone; 2) Fichte’s idea that, ultimately speaking, the 
whole of reality is Subject, Knowing alone; 3) Schelling’s idea that the Absolute is an original and immediate unity 
of Substance and Subject. Against 1) and 2), Hegel argues that reality must be grasped as both Substance and 
Subject. Against 3), Hegel stresses that the true unity of Substance and Subject is not immediate, but mediated, not 
an origin but a result: “Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself –not an original 
or immediate unity as such- is the True.” (Preface-PhS:10); “Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a 
result, that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to be actual, subject, 
the spontaneous becoming of itself.” (Preface-PhS:11) 
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4. 2. 1 Reflection and Speculation 
 
Recall from Chapter 1, section 1.1.2., that standpoints toward objects can be seen to be 
phenomenologically (or epistemologically) grounded on other standpoints. A standpoint is 
grounded on another standpoint when the latter takes precedence over the former and makes it 
phenomenologically (or epistemologically) possible to begin with.271 We have just seen that, 
according to Hegel, the Absolute is a philosophical object, and what sort of object it is. What I 
want to argue in this section is that, according to Hegel, we can adopt two different standpoints 
toward the Absolute, and that, furthermore, one of them is grounded on the other. Using the 
terminology I introduced in Chapter 1, section 1. 1. 2., I will say that one of them is secondary 
with respect to the other, which is basic. To understand the nature of these two standpoints, we 
need to supplement my previous introductory exposition with an exposition about the difference 
between what Hegel calls reflection (Reflexion) and speculation (Spekulation). As we will see in 
a minute, Hegel ties each of these two standpoints toward the Absolute with what can be called a 
cognitive faculty: Reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand).  
 
I will start explaining what, according to Hegel, is the basic standpoint we can adopt over the 
Absolute. This is the speculative standpoint. According to Hegel, from a speculative standpoint 
toward the Absolute, we observe the Absolute as it truly is. This happens because, according to 
Hegel, speculation is the cognitive act by which an insight of the Absolute is achieved. This 
insight is not “mystical” or “ineffable,” an intuition of a whole without determinations. On the 
contrary, this cognitive act by which an insight of the Absolute is achieved is characterized by a 
quite specific sort of intuition.272 In particular, Speculation includes three moments: 1) the 
consciousness that our consciousness faces, and so opposes itself to, whatever consciousness is 
conscious of; 2) the consciousness of this consciousness itself; entailing (or so Hegel thinks) that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 As said in Chapter 1 (pg. 6), an alternative terminological option is to say that the former phenomenologically (or 
epistemologically) supervenes on the latter. 
272 My formulation is again somewhat sloppy. According to the Hegel of Phenomenology, what speculation achieves 
at first is not an insight of the Absolute, but, rather, of the first appearance of the Absolute in consciousness. In 
terms of the historical appearance of speculation, and thus of the notion of Science, this insight of the Absolute 
“comes on the scene for the first time in its immediacy or its Notion. Just as little as a building is finished when its 
foundation has been laid, so little is the achieved Notion of the whole the whole itself.” (Preface-PhS:7) An insight 
of the (whole) Absolute is achieved, if at all, at the end of a long process in which consciousness traverses a host of 
incomplete forms until it eventually achieves a complete and adequate concept of the Absolute. Only then the 
Absolute can be effectively known. This last stage is called Absolute Knowing.   
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3) the original opposition between consciousness and what consciousness is conscious of is 
(what Hegel calls) “cancelled” (aufgehoben), that is, deprived of its primitive273 status.274 In 
other words, speculation is the (second-order) cognition that the opposition between our 
cognition and the object of our cognition is not an ultimate given.275 Everyone’s everyday 
consciousness is able, indeed bound, to raise a distinction between the world (“out there”) and 
one’s consciousness of the world. By in turn becoming conscious of this distinction, what Hegel 
calls “absolute” opposition between world and consciousness does not disappear, if by that is 
meant that, say, a divine force fuses together world and consciousness in a quasi-pantheistic 
intuition; but that what at first seems an ultimate opposition does become relative to this latter 
consciousness. This can only mean, or so does Hegel think, following Fichte and Schelling, that 
the apparently primitive, ultimate opposition between world and consciousness is not really 
primitive, but grounded on, and so secondary with respect to, an original identity of both.  
 
Hegel uses a number of alternative ways to characterize this cognitive act, including the 
following: speculation is consciousness of the identity of subject and object,276 speculation is 
Reason’s self-intuition,277 speculation is a cognitive grasp of the whole,278 and so on. All these 
expressions seem to mean different things, but they rather express the same insight in different 
ways.279 
 
Following Hegel, I want to contrast the speculative standpoint toward the Absolute with the 
reflective one which, I want to argue, is the one Hegel takes his predecessors to have adopted. 
The reflective standpoint toward the Absolute is secondary with respect with the speculative one. 
This happens because, negatively characterized, reflection is the cognitive act that lacks 
speculation. By means of reflection, in more positive terms, we grasp and set limitations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 In Hegel’s terms, “absolute.” 
274 “In empirical intuition, subject and object are opposites; the philosopher apprehends the activity of intuiting, he 
intuits intuiting and thus conceives it as an identity.” (Preface-Difference: 120) 
275 “[P]ure science [speculation] presupposes liberation from the opposition of consciousness.” (Hegel 1998: 49) 
276 “The principle of speculation is the identity of subject and object.” (Preface-Difference: 80)  
277 “Speculation is the activity of the one universal Reason directed upon itself.” (Preface-Difference: 88) 
278 “Speculation acknowledges as the reality of cognition only the being of cognition in the totality. For speculation 
everything determinate has reality and truth only in the cognition of its connection with the Absolute.” (Preface-
Difference: 99)	  
279 Here is evidence that Hegel’s earliest characterization of the concept of speculation stays intact in his mature 
position (in the Logic): “It is … in the grasping of opposites in their unity or of the positive in the negative, that 
speculative thought consists.” (Hegel 1998: 56) 
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oppositions. Reflection is thus the faculty of the limited or of the finite.280 Hegel distinguishes 
two types of reflection. By lacking any insight of the Absolute, ordinary reflection is opposed to 
speculation.281 Philosophical reflection, however, is a synthesis or mediation between the non-
Absolute and the Absolute.282 Philosophical reflection nullifies the finite by being conscious that 
it is finite.283 Thus, philosophical reflection opposes itself to common or ordinary reflection. The 
Reason-driven, that is, rational aspect of reflection is connected to the Absolute; as such, it can 
nullify itself and the limitations.284 Only in this connection can reflection become real, genuine 
knowledge.285 Does this mean that speculation and reflection oppose to each other? Yes, from a 
purely logical point of view; but in reality, Hegel suggests, speculation must somehow include 
reflection,286 because reflection sets up limitations, and it is precisely through limitation, more 
precisely, through overcoming it, that the speculation, and thus genuine knowledge of the 
Absolute, gets off the ground. Eventually, the Absolute is only real as a result, not as an original 
given, and reflection, as much as speculation, makes the Absolute a result, not a mere given.287 
 
With this, we have a first tentative, preliminary elaboration of the suppression of the gap 
between knowledge and whatever knowledge is knowledge of, which I indicated above as 
constituting the fundamental feature of Science (i.e., philosophy) as Hegel understands it. I said 
that whereas both ordinary and scientific knowledge consist in knowledge about objects, 
philosophy as Hegel sees it goes a step further by having as its task the suppression of this gap 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 “Reflection in isolation is the positing of opposites, and this would be a suspension of the Absolute, reflection 
being the faculty of being and limitation.” (Preface-Difference: 94). “Reflection [is] the faculty of the finite … ” 
(Preface-Difference: 96) 
281 “Like everything else, reflection has standing only in the Absolute; but as reflection it stands in opposition to it.” 
(Preface-Difference: 94) 
282 “The Absolute is to be posited in reflection. But then it is not posited, but cancelled; for in having been posited it 
was limited [by its opposite]. Philosophical reflection is the mediation of this contradiction.” (Preface-Difference: 
94)  
283 “Yet the final act of philosophical reflection is still lacking: that is to say, the consciousness of the nullification of 
these finite things [i.e., matter and Ego as the two finite poles at their furthest distance from ordinary common 
sense].” (Preface-Difference: 101) 
284 “But reflection as Reason has connection with the Absolute, and it is Reason only because of this connection. In 
this respect, reflection nullifies itself and all being and everything limited, because it connects them with the 
Absolute.” (Ibid). 
285 “Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it Reason and its deed a knowing.” (Preface-
Difference: 97) 
286 “Reason, therefore, is misunderstood when reflection is excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive 
moment of the Absolute.” (Preface-PhS:12) 
287 “It is reflection that makes the True a result.” “[R]eflection does not have a subordinate place in the system, and 
… the two standpoints, that of speculation and that of reflection, are absolutely necessary and without union at the 
center of the system.” (Preface-Difference: 122) 
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between knowledge and its object. The suppression of this gap doesn’t mean that ordinary 
knowledge must come back to a primitive ignorance. On the contrary, ordinary (everyday and 
scientific) knowledge must be preserved. But in order to become actual knowledge of its object, 
ordinary knowledge must incorporate the extra insight that the object qua brute given “out there” 
does not oppose itself to consciousness ultimately speaking, but only relatively so. Speculation, 
by being aware that ordinary reflection is a legitimate, but incomplete form of consciousness, 
does not directly suppress the gap between knowledge and its object, if this means that the object 
is intuited as just belonging to consciousness, as in Berkeley’s idealism. But the possibility of a 
methodical, step-by-step suppression of this gap is indeed opened by speculation. 
 
4. 2. 2 Understanding and Reason 
 
Perhaps a good way to elaborate on the two different standpoints Hegel believes we can adopt 
over the Absolute (i.e., the whole of what there is), is to consider the two traditional terms Hegel 
couples with each standpoint. Hegel opposes Reason (Vernunft) to Understanding (Verstand). 
These terms, or rather, their philosophical import, derive from Kant.288 Whereas Understanding 
is the cognitive capacity to know finite items, Reason is the cognitive capacity to know infinite 
items. Thus, Understanding and reflection, on the one hand, and Reason and speculation, on the 
other, go together. Intellect is finite thought;289 Reason is an infinite one. Understanding is the 
faculty to set limits;290 Reason is the faculty to overcome these limits, or to apprehend the 
unlimited. The Understanding is the faculty of determination;291 Reason is the faculty to capture 
the indeterminate, or, more accurately speaking, the supra-determinate.292 The Understanding, 
however, possesses “the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power,” 
namely, “the activity of dissolution.”293 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998), passim. See in particular: Understanding, A67/B92 ff (Kant 1998: 204 ff); 
Reason, A299/B355 ff (Kant 1998: 387 ff). 
289 “Reason as a practical faculty had been presented [by Kant] as it must be conceived by finite thought, i.e., by the 
intellect [Understanding].” (Preface-Difference: 81, my emphasis) 
290 “The intellect [understanding], as the capacity to set limits, [erects a building and places it between man and the 
Absolute].” (Preface-Difference: 89) 
291 “The intellect essentially aims at thoroughgoing determination.” (Preface-Difference: 95) 
292 The indeterminate understood as that which has no determinations at all, is nothing in Hegel’s view; or else, 
being indeterminate is still a (privative) determination of something. 
293 Preface-PhS:18. 
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Kant’s thesis is that whereas the Understanding can attain to objective truth, Reason can not.294 
According to Kant, our knowledge is, ultimately, knowledge only of the finite and conditioned; 
as for the infinite and unconditioned it remains a purely subjective demand, never to be fulfilled 
on pain of internal contradictions in our knowledge.295 Hegel’s criticism to Kant is simple: 
exactly the inverse picture holds. 296  According to Hegel, Reason attains to real truth; 
Understanding does not. Real knowledge is knowledge of the infinite and unconditioned; as for 
the finite and conditioned, it is only partial, and thus not ultimately real, knowledge. Only 
speculative knowledge is true knowledge. Speculative knowledge is both knowledge of specific 
items and knowledge or intuition of the whole in which the specific items occur.297 The 
Understanding, according to Hegel, plays a significant role in eventually achieving a view of the 
absolute substance as being, commented before.298 In fact, Understanding is itself Reason, 
without being aware of this circumstance.299 
 
With these terminological resources in mind, we can come back to Fichte and Hegel’s 
dissatisfaction with Fichte’s position. Fichte’s point of departure seems to Hegel adequate 
enough: instead of being and knowing opposing each other, knowing and being, subject and 
object, result from one single principle, knowing (subject) itself. Again, in other words, the 
opposition between being and knowing, or object and subject, is not a primitive one (in Hegel’s 
terms, an absolute one). This is the principle of speculation at the basis of Fichte’s philosophical 
system, which Hegel, against Kant, emphatically endorses. Hegel, however, raises a distinction 
between Fichte’s speculative principle,300 the ground insight from which alone philosophy is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 “The transcendental use of reason is not objectively valid at all, thus does not belong to the logic of truth, i.e., the 
analytic, but rather, as a logic of illusion, requires a special part of the scholastic edifice, under the name of 
transcendental dialectic.” A131/B170 (Kant 1998: 267) 
295 Critique of Pure Reason, Concluding Remark to the entire antinomy of pure reason, A565/B593-A567/B595 
(Kant 1998: 549-550). 
296 “[Kant’s] result is … that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a strange result for –since the infinite is the 
Rational –it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing the Rational.” (Hegel 1998: 56, translation altered). 
297 “In philosophizing the Absolute gets produced by reflection for consciousness, it becomes thereby an objective 
totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of cognitions. Within this organization, every part is at the same 
time the whole; for its standing is its connection with the Absolute.” (Preface-Difference: 98) 
298 “[W]e can now see clearly … its [i.e., the Understanding’s] significance in reference to the determination of 
substance as being.” (Preface-PhS: 33-4). 
299 “[C]ommon understanding, too, is a becoming, and as this becoming, it is reasonableness.” (Preface-PhS:34). 
300 “The Principle of Fichte’s system is the pure thinking that thinks itself, the identity of subject and object, in the 
form Ego=Ego.” (Preface-Difference: 81) 
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possible, and Fichte’s philosophical system in which this principle is developed.301 Whereas the 
principle adequately grasps the Absolute, the system inadequately develops this very same 
principle and inadequately reconstructs the Absolute. According to Hegel, this inadequacy of 
Fichte’s philosophical system goes quite beyond a simple inadequacy of exposition that could be 
solved by choosing a better one. If the philosophical System does not succeed in reconstructing 
the Absolute in the form of Absolute Knowledge, the principle, although correct in its beginning, 
gets infected by this inadequacy, and thus reveals itself to be inadequate after all.302 We will see 
in a minute how this can be seen to happen in more precise terms (see section 4.4.). 
 
4.3 PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
Perhaps a good way to prepare the discussion on partial truth that is going to follow is to briefly 
consider what, according to Hegel, truth is, or rather, what truth is not. There are three points to 
consider on this score: first, Hegel does not believe that truth consists in a correspondence 
between our knowledge and reality (4.3.1.); second, Hegel does not believe truth opposes itself 
to falsehood on final philosophical analysis (4.3.2.); third, Hegel credits his predecessors with 
having contributed philosophically interesting truth about the Absolute, whereby, whatever the 
inadequacies Hegel sees in their theories, they can’t be spelled out in terms of falsehood 
simpliciter (4.3.3.). 
 
4.3.1 Truth and Correspondence  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 “There are two sides of Fichte’s system. On the one hand it has established the pure concept of Reason and of 
speculation and so made philosophy possible. On the other hand, it has equated Reason with pure consciousness and 
raised Reason as apprehended in a finite shape to the status of principle.” (Preface-Difference: 82). “[W]e are 
concerned … with Fichte’s philosophy as a system and not as authentic philosophizing. As philosophy it is the most 
thorough and profound speculation.” (Preface-Difference: 118) More in general, “[i]t can happen that an authentic 
speculation does not express itself completely in its system, or that the philosophy of the system and the system 
itself do not coincide.” (Preface-Difference: 114) 
302 “[Fichte’s] pure ego … is not … the familiar, ordinary ego of our consciousness … That act [“the absolute act 
through which the ego purges itself of its content and becomes aware of itself as an abstract ego”], strictly speaking, 
would be nothing else but the elevation to the standpoint of pure knowing where the distinction of subject and object 
has vanished. But as thus immediately demanded, this elevation is a subjective postulate; to prove itself a genuine 
demand, the progression of the concrete ego from immediate consciousness to pure knowing must have been 
indicated and exhibited through the necessity of the ego itself.” (Hegel 1998). This progression is what the 
Phenomenology of Spirit describes. 
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While Hegel’s concept of truth opposes itself to various alternative concepts, there is one chief 
target concept of truth that Hegel attacks: the traditional one of truth as correspondence between 
our knowledge and an independently existing reality. Here is how Hegel himself characterizes 
the position he wants to attack: 
 
Truth is the agreement of thought with the object, and in order to bring about this agreement –for it does not exist on 
its own account- thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate itself to the object.303 
 
While Hegel agrees that, to some extent, truth can be defined in this way, he rejects this 
definition of truth as being the one of interest to philosophy. What Hegel objects to is not so 
much the notion of correspondence as the idea that the philosophically interesting 
correspondence is the one occurring between our knowledge and an independently existing 
reality. Hegel is happy to admit that this kind of correspondence can occur (or fail to occur), and 
that this circumstance has some interest for philosophy. However, Hegel thinks that the kind of 
correspondence which philosophy must chiefly focus on is an altogether different kind: 
correspondence between an object and itself. According to Hegel, correctness (Richtigkeit) is the 
“correspondence of an object with our representation,” whereas truth (Wahrheit) is the 
“correspondence of an object with itself.” What is this supposed to mean, though? Perhaps the 
best way to put it is to have in mind that, according to Hegel, truth in its basic sense is a 
metaphysical category: truth is not known, believed, asserted, predicated, and so on, but truth 
somehow is (whatever this ultimately means). 
 
Absolute truth (the Absolute). According to Hegel, truth is what (ultimately) exists; truth is the 
(ultimate) substance of reality. Of course, this notion of truth strongly diverges from our 
contemporary use. In this sense, “truth” is for Hegel a term that is equivalent to “the Absolute,” 
“Spirit,” “God,” and so on. Hegel also uses, particularly in Phenomenology, the substantivized 
adjectival form to refer to truth in this metaphysical sense: “the true” (das Wahre). Thus used, 
“true” is for Hegel equivalent to “real” or “actual;” “the true,” for Hegel, is what is real, what is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Hegel 1998: 44. Of course, there are two claims here, not one: first, truth is correspondence between our thought 
with the object; second, our knowledge must correspond to an independently existing reality, not the other way 
round. 
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actual. Taken in its logical aspect, Hegel calls truth so understood the Idea. This is the most 
important concept of truth for Hegel; all the rest are founded on it.304  
 
Relative truth. In another sense, truth for Hegel is not reality itself,305 but the finite entities 
included therein. These finite entities are abstract moments of the Absolute. They don’t have 
self-standing ontological reality. However, in this relative sense, these finite entities can still be 
true (or false). For example, a table, a planet, a friend, a state, a work of art can be true (or false). 
Succinctly put, e.g., a true table is an object that matches the concept of a table, false otherwise; 
a true friend is a person who matches the concept of a friend, false otherwise; and so on. This is 
the sense in which, for Hegel, truth consists in a correspondence of an object with itself. 
 
4. 3. 2 Truth and Falsehood 
 
From the point of view of common sense, truth opposes itself to falsehood, and vice versa. Up to 
a point, Hegel doesn’t dispute this everyday truism, not even if pushed a bit further into a quasi-
robust logical, semantic, or epistemological thesis; from the point of view of our knowledge, 
Hegel admits, truth and falsehood oppose each other.306 What Hegel objects to, however, is the 
view that truth and falsehood oppose each other ultimately (i.e., on final philosophical analysis). 
The received opposition between truth and falsehood as an ultimate given is emphatically 
rejected by Hegel. This was to be expected; as we saw in my expository introduction that for 
Hegel there is no such a thing as “ultimate givens” in philosophy.307 According to Hegel, 
ultimately given oppositions constitute the starting point of philosophy, not its result.308 I said 
before that, according to Hegel, the fact that there apparently is a primitive, irreducible 
opposition between our consciousness of the world and the world itself can only mean that, on 
final philosophical analysis, this opposition is secondary with respect to an identity between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 “The Absolute alone is true, or the truth alone is absolute.”(Preface-PhS) 
305 The Absolute, Spirit, God, and so on. 
306 Indeed, it is the existence of this opposition what defines this kind of knowledge as being knowledge “for us,” 
that is, as being finite, not absolute knowledge. 
307 To some extent, Hegel defines philosophy as the type of knowledge for which there can’t be “ultimate givens.” 
308  Still stronger, philosophy arises according to Hegel only when those oppositions come to be seen as 
insurmountable; before that, philosophy does not really have a substantial point. “When the might of union vanishes 
from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need 
of philosophy arises.” (Preface-Difference: 91) 
 151	  
two. The same holds in the case of truth and falsehood; its prima facie irreducible opposition is 
secondary with respect to an original identity between the two.  This underlying identity between 
truth and falsehood deserves, according to Hegel, to be called truth in a more pregnant and 
robust sense than truth as opposed to falsehood;309 it’s this underlying truth the one with which 
philosophy is concerned. 
 
4.3.3 Past Philosophers on the Absolute: Philosophically Interesting Truth 
 
It is easy to show that Hegel acknowledges past philosophers with having contributed 
philosophically interesting truth about the Absolute. In other words, the circumstance that, 
according to Hegel, past philosophers have adopted a secondary standpoint toward the Absolute 
doesn’t exclude the fact that their theories contain philosophically interesting truth. What is 
necessary, Hegel suggests, is to separate what past philosophers say (which is wrong) from the 
insight behind what they said (which may well be right). That is why, for instance, “the Kantian 
philosophy needed to have its spirit distinguished from its letter;”310 because the letter is 
wrong,311 but the spirit behind it right.312 Indeed, even though Kant’s philosophy embodies, as 
Hegel sees it, the reflective (secondary) standpoint at its quintessential, there is, unbeknownst to 
Kant, a speculative (basic) standpoint behind his best insights. Thus Hegel can say that Kant’s 
philosophy requires “to have its purely speculative principle lifted out of the remainder that 
belonged to, or could be used for, the arguments of reflection.” (Difference: 80, my emphasis)  
 
Fichte, Hegel admits, made a big step towards getting the nature of the Absolute313 right. 
However, despite his progress, he was still situated on the secondary standpoint: “These are the 
two sides of Fichte’s system. On the one hand it has established the pure concept of Reason and 
of speculation and so made philosophy possible. On the other hand, it has equated Reason with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Again, we find an intriguing parallelism between Hegel and Heidegger on this point. In my previous chapter, I 
showed how, according to Heidegger, there is a notion of truth which underlies the opposition between (derivative) 
truth and falsity. That notion of truth, truth as aletheia, Heidegger claims, is a more pregnant one than the truth as 
correspondence. Despite dramatic differences in this more pregnant notion of truth itself, Hegel seems to defend an 
analogous thesis. 
310 Preface-Difference: 80. 
311 “Letter” can be taken to be what is said about the Absolute as observed from the secondary standpoint. 
312 “Spirit” can be taken to be what is said about the Absolute as observed from the basic standpoint. 
313 Fichte’s term is “I.” 
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pure consciousness and raised Reason as apprehended in a finite shape to the status of principle.” 
(D: 82, my emphasis)  
 
4. 4 PARTIAL TRUTH: ABSOLUTE BASIC PROPOSITION 
 
By now we have all the elements necessary to construct my case. Recall that my goal is to show 
that, according to Hegel, past philosophical theories about linguistic truth about the Absolute are 
inadequate, but not exactly false; rather, they are partially true (in the sense sketched in Chapter 
1, to be further developed in Chapter 5). What I intend to do is to make my focus even more 
narrow and consider Hegel on propositional truth about the Absolute, that is, truth about the 
Absolute expressed by means of a single proposition. It is common to Hegel’s predecessors the 
view that a single proposition can be (or fail to be) true of the Absolute. While Hegel is 
committed to the view that truth about the Absolute can (indeed, must) be known and 
linguistically communicated, he believes (or so I shall argue) that a single proposition is true, at 
best, of a part (or aspect) of the Absolute (which I will construe as: true of the Absolute as 
observed from a secondary standpoint). Accordingly, my goal in what follows is to show that, 
according to Hegel, one single proposition is true of only part of the Absolute (is partially true of 
the Absolute, following the terminology I introduced in Chapter 1, section 1.1.3., two final 
paragraphs). The strategy I will follow focuses on a special kind of proposition, what Hegel calls, 
following Fichte (and, indirectly, Kant), an Absolute Basic Proposition (Absolut Grundsatz). 
 
Suppose that a proposition expresses the Basic Principle of a philosophical System.314 Since a 
philosophical System, in Hegel’s view, is the totality of knowledge or Science, a Basic Principle 
of a philosophical System is the Basic Principle of the totality of knowledge or Science. A Basic 
Principle, as Hegel understands it, is a proposition expressing a (putative) absolutely 
unconditioned truth.315 Being absolutely unconditioned, this truth founds the rest of truths of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 “Suppose that the Absolute is expressed in a fundamental proposition, validated by and for thinking, a 
proposition whose form and matter are the same.” (Hegel Preface-Difference: 103) Hegel borrows the terms 
“matter” and “form,” bizarre-looking in talk about propositions, from Fichte’s Grundlage der Gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehere (Jaeschke 2005). 
315 The idea of an absolutely unconditioned principle goes back to Kant via Fichte (and Schelling). Here is how Kant 
presents the idea in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Reason in its logical use seeks the universal condition of its 
judgment (its conclusion), and the syllogism is nothing but a judgment mediated by the subsumption of its condition 
under a universal rule (the major premise). Now since this rule is once again exposed to this same attempt of reason, 
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totality of knowledge or Science. An absolutely unconditioned truth, according to Hegel, is a 
truth that holds true logically, epistemologically and metaphysically, that is, absolutely so (I will 
explain what this means, although I have already partially explained it in the expository part). 
Let us suppose that (at least) one proposition successfully expresses this Basic Principle. Hegel’s 
claim is that the truth that such a proposition expresses, even when by hypothesis is absolutely 
unconditioned, is conditioned by the fact that it is expressed by a proposition, which Hegel 
equates with an expression from the reflective standpoint. I will translate Hegel’s claim into my 
own terms. According to Hegel, I will claim, a proposition successfully expressing a Basic 
Principle of a philosophical System, if it exists, is partially true, that is, it’s true of only part of 
the Absolute (i.e., it’s true of the Absolute as observed from a secondary standpoint). 
 
4.4.1 System and Foundation 
 
Let us start with the very idea of an absolute basic proposition. Hegel starts by assuming (so, to 
say, for the sake of the argument) that a system, i.e., a set of propositions true of the Absolute 
and related among themselves in terms of grounding, must be itself grounded on an absolute 
basic proposition; but he claims that such an assumption is wrong. This is how Hegel puts the 
point in a nutshell:  
 
One might demand that the system as an organization of propositions should present the Absolute which lies at the 
basis of reflection in the fashion of reflection, that is, as the highest, or absolutely fundamental proposition [absolut 
Grundsatz]. But such a demand entails its own nullity.316 For a proposition [Satz], as something posited by reflection, 
is something limited and conditioned on its own account.317  
 
Hegel’s basic idea is, at least at its most general level, relatively simple. The Absolute, the 
systematic cognition of which is the chief goal of philosophy, is an infinite sort of object. Recall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the condition of its condition thereby has to be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as far as we may, we see 
very well that the proper principle [Grundsatz] of reason in general (in its logical use) is to find the unconditioned 
for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed.” (A307/B364; Kant 1998: 
391-2) 
316 The same contradiction is suggested by Hegel in a previous passage: “The task of philosophy is to construct the 
Absolute for consciousness. But since the productive activity of reflection is, like its products, mere limitation, this 
task involves a contradiction.” (Preface-Difference: 94) 
317 Preface-Difference:103. On second thought, I suspect that the correct translation of Satz in this passage shouldn’t 
be proposition, but rather principle. For Hegel seems to refer to a propositional content in so far as this content 
founds other propositional contents, not by itself. What is defective in a Satz, according to Hegel, is not its content 
per se, but the fact that, by itself, it cannot found the rest of (organized) Sätze making up the system. 
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from section 4.1.1. that alternative terms for infinite are unlimited and unconditioned. According 
to Hegel, then, the Absolute, is an unlimited and unconditioned sort of object. As Hegel 
conceives it, a philosophical System is, however, organized (i.e., systematic) knowledge of the 
Absolute. This organized knowledge of the Absolute, that is, a philosophical System, Hegel 
claims, consists of an organizaton of propositions. Since this organization of propositions 
concerns the knowledge of the Absolute, however, one can expect to find one proposition in 
which, in some way or other, the rest of propositions are founded.318 The right to this expectation 
rests on three assumptions. First, this organized whole of knowledge is knowledge, precisely, of 
the Absolute, which is unconditioned. Second, this fundamental trait of the absolute must be 
present in the knowledge of the Absolute itself, which must be likewise unconditioned. Third, 
this knowledge of the Absolute is, however, an organized whole of (discrete) propositions, 
related among themselves in terms of foundation (condition). A first, unconditioned proposition 
must therefore found the rest. The proposition in which the rest of the propositions of the System 
are founded would be the absolutely unconditioned Principle of Knowledge. But, Hegel claims, a 
proposition, as something “posited by reflection,” is “limited on its own account.” Therefore a 
proposition, on its own, cannot adequately express an absolutely unconditioned Principle of 
Knowledge. Another, more economical way to put the whole point is simply to say that, 
according to Hegel, the notion of an absolutely fundamental proposition (absolut Grundsatz) 
involves a contradiction on its own terms. 
 
We must see first what exactly makes a proposition something limited and conditioned such that 
the task of expressing an unconditioned principle becomes impossible for it. Then we must 
consider why this circumstance entails (in my terms) that, should there be a proposition 
expressing the absolutely unconditioned principle of the totality of knowledge, this proposition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Hegel is (polemically) assuming, via Fichte, a Kantian picture of cognition, according to which Reason “uniquely 
prescribes and seeks to bring about … the systematic in [the Understanding’s] cognition, its interconnection based 
on one principle” Critique of Pure Reason, B673 (Kant 1998: 591). This view is put forcefully by early Schelling in 
the following way: “Wissenschaft überhaupt –ihr Inhalt sey, welcher er wolle- ist ein Ganzes, das unter der Form 
der Einheit steht. Dieß ist nur insofern möglich, als alle Theile derselben Einer Bedingung untergeordnet sind, jeder 
Theil aber den andern nur insofern bestimmt, als er selbst, durch jene Eine Bedingung bestimmt ist. Die Theile der 
Wissenschaft heißen Sätze, diese Bedingung also Grundsatz. Wissenschaft ist demnach nur durch eienen Grundsatz 
möglich.”: “Science as such (regardless of its content) is a whole, which stands under the form of unity. This fact is 
only possible in so far as all its [i.e., Science’s] parts are subordinated to one [single] condition, [and] each part 
determines another part only in so far as the first is determined itself by that one condition. The parts of Science are 
called propositions, and this condition [is called], therefore, fundamental proposition. Science is therefore only 
possible in virtue of a fundamental proposition.” Schelling [1794] 1985, I :16, my translation). 
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would be partially true, that is, true of only part of the Absolute (i.e., of the Absolute as observed 
from a secondary standpoint). 
 
At the most general level, Hegel says that what makes a proposition something limited and 
conditioned is the fact that a proposition is “posited by reflection.”319 Recall from section 4.2.2. 
that, according to Hegel, reflection is the faculty to cognize the limited and conditioned. All of 
its products are limited and conditioned. A proposition, being a product of reflection, is thus 
limited and conditioned. (Or rather, more exactly put, the cognitive content of a proposition is 
something limited and conditioned.) The content of a proposition is conditioned, that is, in 
relation to other cognitions. Now other cognitions are expressed, in the System, also by 
propositions. But the relation of proposition to proposition is (directly or indirectly) that of 
foundation. This explains why Hegel claims that a proposition is conditioned because “it requires 
another proposition as its foundation [Begründung], and so on ad infinitum.” (Preface-Difference: 
103) Here is how the passage continues: 
 
One might demand that the system as an organization of propositions should present the Absolute which lies at the 
basis of reflection in the fashion of reflection, that is, as the highest, or absolutely fundamental proposition. But such 
a demand entails its own nullity. For a proposition, as something posited by reflection, is something limited and 
conditioned on its own account. It requires another proposition as its foundation, and so on ad infinitum.320 
 
 
What does “foundation” (Begründung) mean here? According to Hegel, when a proposition is 
founded by another proposition, the latter is more basic than the former, as far as the truth of the 
proposition is concerned. But what kind of priority does Hegel have in mind? Is it logical, 
epistemological, metaphysical —or still another kind of priority? Since Hegel is concerned with 
a potential principle as the basis of the totality of knowledge, Hegel’s foundation must go beyond 
logical priority, logic being only concerned with the form of knowledge, abstracting from the 
question whether knowledge is true knowledge of its object.321 This means that epistemology, not 
only logic, must be taken into account here. Thus, any proposition is conditioned because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Hegel Preface-Difference: 103. 
320 Preface-Difference:103. 
321 Hegel is (polemically) assuming a Kantian(-Fichtean) notion of logic (against which he reacts). “General logic 
abstracts … from all content of cognition, i.e., from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical 
form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general.” Critique of Pure Reason, 
A55/B79 (Kant 1998: 195-6) 
 156	  
another proposition, according to Hegel, is epistemologically more basic, and so on ad infinitum. 
In this sense, a proposition is epistemologically founded on another proposition if, in order to 
know the former to be true, we need to have known the latter to be true (but not the other way 
round). Recall from section 4.1.2., moreover, that Hegel is committed to the view that our 
knowledge of reality and reality independently from our knowledge are, in fact, two non-
autonomous sides of what is one and the same thing, namely reality-coming-to-know-itself; 
therefore, for Hegel epistemological priority involves metaphysical priority. In this sense, a 
proposition is metaphysically founded on another proposition if, for what the former expresses to 
be the case, what the latter expresses must be the case (but not the other way round). In short, 
Hegel’s “foundation” concerns epistemological and metaphysical priority, not (or not only) 
logical priority. Or rather, Hegel’s term “foundation” concerns logical, epistemological, and 
metaphysical priority together, since for Hegel logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are 
different cognitive aspects of what ultimately is the same thing, Absolute Knowledge, or the 
Absolute-coming-to-know-itself. According to Hegel, thus, (the truth of) any proposition, in so 
far as it is a proposition, is logically, epistemologically and metaphysically founded by (the truth 
of) another proposition, and so on ad infinitum. 
 
Is Hegel right in this claim, however? Is any proposition necessarily founded, logically, 
epistemologically, and metaphysically, on another proposition, and so on ad infinitum? Can’t 
there be (at least) one proposition that is neither logically, nor epistemologically, nor 
metaphysically founded on another proposition? One might consider plausible candidates from 
Modern philosophy, such as, paradigmatically, Descartes’ “I think,” as examples of propositions 
prima facie not founded on another and, thus, absolutely unfounded. But this brings us to the 
crucial point: Hegel’s claim does not concern specific propositions, but, rather, any proposition 
in general, that is, the propositional form itself. Let us therefore be clear from now on that 
Hegel’s claim that a proposition “is conditioned on its own account” applies to any proposition 
qua proposition (including, for example, Descartes’ “I think”), not to such and such specific 
proposition. According to Hegel, thus, a (putative) absolutely unconditioned truth expressed by a 
(single) proposition is conditioned, precisely, by the propositional form that (by hypothesis, truly) 
expresses that truth. This propositional form, according to Hegel, not what is expressed by it, 
makes a putative Absolute Basic Proposition fail to be absolutely unconditioned, and thus, I will 
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argue, to be true of only part of the Absolute. We need to see, however, how this is supposed to 
happen, and this is what I am going to consider now in some detail. 
 
Let us suppose that there is a proposition P not founded on any other proposition, neither 
logically, epistemologically nor metaphysically. Such proposition, if it exists, can be considered 
a Basic Principle of a philosophical System, that is, the Basic Principle of the totality of 
knowledge. This proposition can be called (and Hegel does call it) an Absolute Basic Proposition 
(“absolut Grundsatz”)322. I will follow Hegel in showing that although the truth expressed by P 
can be taken to be (by hypothesis) absolutely unconditioned, the propositional form in which this 
truth is expressed renders that truth conditioned. I will take this to mean that an Absolute Basic 
Proposition is true from the reflective standpoint only, that is, true of the Absolute as observed 
from a secondary standpoint.  
 
4.4.2 Hegel’s Semantics of the Absolute Basic Proposition 
 
To follow Hegel’s case I am going to consider the propositional form in general, that is, a 
proposition qua proposition, and I will elicit what we may call Hegel’s implicit semantics for it 
(Hegel would not admit this term as adequate). This resource of making explicit a Hegelian 
semantics (even though informal and sketchy) will be helpful for explanatory purposes. However, 
or so I want to argue, appealing to semantics is supported by a substantial working hypothesis, 
namely that Hegel’s views of partial truth are at least sometimes intimately related with 
questions of meaning. In particular, Hegel’s idea that the Absolute Basic Proposition is true of 
“part” of the Absolute can be seen to amount to the idea that the Absolute Basic Proposition fails 
to really mean what it apparently means.323 
 
My strategy will be at follows. First, I will show that, according to Hegel, the propositional form 
has three layers of meaning, a logical, an epistemological and a metaphysical one. Second, I will 
follow Hegel in considering the Principle of Identity, that is, “A is A,” as the (putative) Absolute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Hegel Preface-Difference: 103. 
323 With this approach, I seem to join forces with what might be called a “semantic turn” increasingly discernible in 
Hegel studies. See for example Berto 2007. According to Berto, Hegelian dialectics “investigates the meanings of 
conceptual terms, shared by competent speakers and constituting their lexical competence.” (Berto 2007:19) See 
also Stekeler-Weithofer 1991 and 1996. 
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Basic Proposition, and will use the three layers of meaning just elicited to explain why Hegel 
(polemically) assumes, following Fichte, that the Principle of Identity is the (putative) Absolute 
Basic Proposition. Third, I will show that whereas the Principle of Identity, qua Absolute Basic 
Proposition, can be held to be true of the Absolute logically and (perhaps) epistemologically 
speaking, it turns out to be true of only part of the Absolute metaphysically speaking. Fourth, 
finally, I will conclude that, according to Hegel, the Principle of Identity, qua Absolute Basic 
Proposition, is true of only part of the Absolute, i.e., of the Absolute as observed from a 
secondary standpoint. 
 
Let us start by considering the three layers of meaning Hegel assumes to be present in any 
proposition qua proposition. 
 
I consider first the logical layer of meaning of a proposition. In its most basic form a proposition 
expresses that something is something, in the form “S is P.”324 The crucial question I will be 
concerned with is: what does “S is P” mean? Let us consider examples such as “The Earth is 
round,” “A horse is an animal,” “Obama is American,” and so on. What do these propositions 
mean? Prima facie, these propositions mean, or refer to, facts (in the world), namely that the 
Earth is round, that a horse is an animal, that Obama is American, and so on. Now in principle 
facts are complex.325 Facts, that is, involve (at least) two components. Neither the Earth nor being 
round (roundness) suffice, on their own, to constitute a fact.  For a fact to take place, the Earth 
and being round (roundness) are needed, not either of them alone (the Earth, for example, is not 
a fact, it is an entity with such and such properties). The same goes for horse and animal-ness, 
Obama and American-ness, and so on. Now whereas meaning (referring to) two components is a 
necessary condition in the semantics of a proposition, it is not sufficient. Also the expressions 
“Earth, roundness” (or “Earth and roundness”), “Horse, animal-ness,” “Obama, American-ness,” 
and so on, refer to (the same) two components. However, these expressions are not propositions. 
For a proposition to take place, the existence of a link between the two components must be 
expressed. Typically, the link between these two components is expressed by the verb “to be.” 
What does the verb “to be” link? In logically-grammatical terms, “to be” links a subject and a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Or that something is not something, but I shall take the affirmative form as being the primitive one. 
325 Throughout this discussion I talk about facts in a metaphysically non-committal sense. 
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predicate. Logically-grammatically speaking, the meaning of a proposition of the form “S is P” 
includes three components: a subject, a predicate, and a link between them, typically in the form 
“is.” And what the proposition means is that there is an (objective) link between S and P. “The 
Earth is round,” for example, means, logically speaking, that there is a link between the Earth 
and roundness.  
 
Let us consider now Hegel’s epistemological layer in the meaning of a proposition. When we 
state (or believe) that the Earth is round, that a horse is an animal, that Obama is American, and 
so, on we link something to something. The question now is: what do we link? Apparently, we 
link two entities (in the world). (More exactly put, we link two terms referring to two entities). 
These two entities (terms referring to entities) are able, if linked in some way or other, to 
constitute (express) a fact. Now whereas the Earth, a horse, Obama, and so on, are entities, 
round-ness, animal-ness, American-ness, and so on, are best described, instead, as properties. (If 
Kantian terminology is preferred, we can say that the former are intuitions and the latter 
concepts.)326 In principle, the crucial difference between an entity and a property is that whereas 
an entity is (ultimately) an individual item, a property is a general trait.327 Many entities can 
share a property (the Earth is round, a plate is round, and so on). Thus, in a proposition of the 
form “S is P,” we typically link an entity to a property (Earth and roundness, horse and animal-
ness, Obama and American-ness and so on) (or rather, strictly speaking, a property to an entity.) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 A sample of the same idea put by an analytic philosopher: “The traditional doctrine we have to investigate is the 
doctrine that particulars can appear in discourse as subjects only, never as predicates; whereas universals, or non-
particulars generally, can appear either as subjects or predicates.” (Strawson 1959:137) Also Quine: “The basic 
combination in which general and singular terms find their contrasting roles is that of predication: ‘Mama is a 
woman’, or schematically ‘a is an F’ where ‘a’ represents a singular term and ‘F’ a general term. Predication joins a 
general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is true or false according as the general term is true or false 
of the object, if any, to which the singular term refers.” (Quine 1970: 96) Compare mature Hegel: “[T]he judgment 
[of existence] considered in respect of its form asserts that the individual is universal.” (Hegel 1998: 635) Quine’s 
sense of predication is narrow: a quite specific case in which we express in a proposition things true of things. 
According to Kant, “The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained 
under the universal.” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, IV; Kant 2000: 66) The view that any judgment ultimately 
traces back to judgment about an individual traverses different philosophical traditions. Late Husserl, for example, 
endorses this view thusly: “Original substrates are therefore individuals, individual objects, and every thinkable 
judgment ultimately refers to individual objects, no matter how mediated in a variety of ways.” (Husserl [1939] 
1973: 26) 
327 Hegel is going to argue against this, as commentators point out (for instance, Pippin 1989: 237: “Hegel objects to 
any abstract distinction between sheer particularity, on the one hand, and the universality of concepts, on the other, 
as if the latter are abstracted common features of the former.”) 
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As far as Hegel’s semantics of “S is P” is concerned, thus, the subject means (refers to) an entity, 
and the predicate means (refers to) a property.  
 
This brings us, finally, to the metaphysical layer of the meaning of a proposition. Whereas the 
entity is supposed to be real, the property is supposed to be ideal or conceptual (Hegel is going 
to argue against this, but he assumes these commitments for the sake of his critique). In different 
words, whereas entities are found in the world, properties are abstracted from entities, and, as 
abstracted, they are contributed by our cognition. In Kant’s terms again, whereas entities are 
immediately found (intuited) in the world, properties are mediately found (thought), by means of 
our cognition (thinking a common trait that many entities share). Let us thus say that, 
metaphysically speaking, entities belong to reality, whereas properties belong to our cognition. 
In the terms I introduced in section 4.1.2., entities belong to being, whereas properties belong to 
knowing. Thus, as far as the metaphysical level of Hegel’s semantics of “S is P” is concerned, “S” 
means (refers to) real items, things (entities) in the world, whereas “P” means (refers to) ideal 
items, concepts (properties) in our cognition.  
 
To summarize: as far as truth or falsity is concerned, Hegel believes that any proposition of the 
form “S is P” has three relevant layers of meaning, a logical, an epistemological and a 
metaphysical one; in other words, any proposition of the form “S is P” is saying three things at 
the same time: something logical, epistemological, and metaphysical. Logically, “S is P” says 
that P is true of S. Epistemologically, “S is P” says that P is a property that is true of an entity 
(for instance, being American is true of Barack Obama). Metaphysically speaking, “S is P” says 
that P is something contributed by our cognition, whereas S is an entity existing in the world 
(reality). 
 
Second, let us see why Hegel, (polemically) following Fichte, assumes that the Principle of 
Identity, “A is A,” must be the Absolute Basic Proposition.328 (In part, this has already been 
suggested in my exposition in section 4.1.2. above). First, logically speaking, “A is A” means 
that there is an objective link between the subject and the predicate. Now in the case of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 A=A can be seen as a generalization of Fichte’s chief principle Ego=Ego. “[I]n Fichte’s system Ego=Ego is the 
Absolute.” (Preface-Difference:117) “The foundation  of Fichte’s system is intellectual intuition, pure thinking of 
itself, pure selfconsciousness, Ego=Ego, I am.” (Preface-Difference: 119) 
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Principle of Identity, “A is A,” the subject and the predicate are the same. There is identity 
regarding what the subject and the predicate refer to. Subject and predicate refer to the same 
thing (entity or property). Second, “A is A” means that there is identity between A, whatever it is, 
qua entity, and A, whatever it is, qua property. This means, epistemologically speaking, that 
there is identity between A, whatever it is, qua real and A, whatever it is, qua conceptual (or 
ideal). Third, metaphysically speaking, “A is A” means that there is identity between reality (as a 
whole) and cognition (as a whole). This last meaning is the most important one to explain why 
Hegel accepts (again, for polemical purposes) that the Principle of Identity is the Absolute Basic 
Proposition: prima facie, the Principle of Identity successfully expresses the identity between 
reality and cognition, which is the principle of speculation at the basis of true philosophy, and 
thus the Absolute Principle of a philosophical System as Hegel conceives it. 
 
4.4.3 Absolute Basic Proposition as Partial Truth 
 
Third, finally, let us see why Hegel thinks that, whereas the Principle of Identity is true logically 
and (perhaps) epistemologically speaking, it is not true metaphysically speaking. The proposition 
“A is A” shares with propositions like “The Earth is round,” “A horse is an animal,” “Obama is 
American,” and so on, the form “S is P.”  When we state (or believe) the Principle of Identity, 
“A is A,” we state (or believe) that something is something too. There is an obvious but 
fundamental difference, however, namely that the subject and the predicate in the Principle of 
Identity are the same. However, the crucial circumstance remains that in “A is A” there is a 
subject and a predicate, and that, logically (not to mention grammatically) speaking, the subject 
is different from the predicate. Whereas A is not different from A (indeed, that is what the 
principle of identity says!), A qua subject is different from A qua predicate. Thus, in the 
Principle of Identity, A both is and is not A. On the one hand, A is A because, quite simply, that 
is what the Principle of Identity (truly) says. On the other hand, however, A is not A, in so far as 
in this proposition, one “A” is the subject and the other “A” is the predicate.  
 
This difference of subject and predicate is best seen on the basis of a further semantic 
commitment that Hegel, this time not following Fichte, introduces and explicitly endorses. 
Whenever we say that something is something, i.e., that S is P, Hegel believes, we are 
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simultaneously saying that, on the other hand, something is not something, i.e., that S is not P. 
Whereas the former is what we explicitly assert, the content of the assertion, the latter is what we 
implicitly co-assert, the form of the assertion. If I assert, for example, that snow is white, I am 
implicitly co-asserting that snow and being white, either as meanings or as entities or properties 
in the world, stand apart before the assertion; that is why, precisely, I can meaningfully join 
them in an assertion. The insight here is basically that an assertion both connects and separates 
simultaneously, not only the former (Heidegger makes a big deal of the same point, with 
different purposes). Of course, what is explicit is the connection; by hypothesis, we assert that 
something is something, thus connecting something to something (for example, whiteness to 
snow). But to connect two things, Hegel suggests, is to simultaneously acknowledge them as 
being separate. Thus, Hegel concludes, in the Principle of Identity A both is and is not A. On the 
one hand, A is A because, quite simply, that is what the Principle of Identity (truly) says. On the 
other hand, however, A in the subject is not A in the predicate, in so far as what is being 
connected in the assertion must somehow be separate prior to our asserting it, if it can be 
meaningfully connected at all. 
 
Thus, what is originally one (namely, A), splits itself into two different sides as soon as we assert 
the proposition “A is A.” This split, however, belongs to our cognition, not to A itself. Our 
cognition links A to itself in the form “A is A.” For Hegel, this means that the link thus 
established remains external to A. Thus, the propositional form “S is P” conditions, and thus 
alters, what the Principle of Identity expresses. A is A, yet A is not A. 
 
Still in different words, Hegel contends, the Principle of Identity does not express real identity, 
since the very possibility of meaningfully expressing this identity in a proposition piggybacks on 
an unexpressed prior difference of the two things being, precisely, identified. But the fact that the 
Principle of Identity does not express real identity suggests that the Principle of Identity does not 
really express identity, contra what the Principle seems to express. 
 
What I want to conclude from this analysis is that, according to Hegel, if the Principle of Identity, 
“A is A,” is taken to be an Absolute Basic Proposition, then it is true of the Absolute as observed 
from a secondary standpoint, i.e., it is true of only a part (an aspect) of the Absolute. “A is A” is 
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prima facie true of the Absolute, in so far as, at face value, A is A; “A is A” is, in fact, true of 
only part of the Absolute, in so far as, at a higher level of philosophical insight, A is not really A. 
Semantically put, what Hegel is suggesting is that “A is A” fails to really mean what it 
apparently means. Moreover, crucially, this failure in meaning is due to the propositional form in 
which the truth is expressed.329 
 
Thus, Hegel concludes, the idea that the Basic Principle of a philosophical System can be 
adequately expressed by a proposition, indeed the idea that there is a Basic Principle of a 
philosophical System at all, must be rejected. Instead, Hegel claims, the highest (although 
imperfect) form in which the Absolute Principle can be expressed is, precisely, in two 
contradictory propositions, that is, in (what Hegel, following Kant, calls) an antinomy.330  
 
If at (what I have called) the metaphysical level of meaning, A is not A, we can supplement the 
Principle of Identity, “A is A,” with its contradictory, namely “A is not A,” or rather, “A is B.” 
When linked to the Principle of Identity, “A is B” means, according to Hegel, that whereas “A is 
A” expresses the logical and (perhaps) epistemological identity of “A” and “A,” A qua subject 
and A qua predicate, “A is A” fails to express its metaphysical identity. “A is B” acknowledges 
this failure. Metaphysically speaking, “A” is not really “A” (in the proposition “A is A”). Thus A 
is not A, A is another thing, say B. At the metaphysical level of meaning, “A is A,” while 
apparently saying “A is A,” really says “A is B” (that is, “A is not A”). Incidentally, “A is B,” 
on its own, is partially true as much as “A is A” is. For whereas metaphysically speaking, “A is B” 
means that A and B are (two) different things, and thus that A is not B, logically speaking, “A is 
B” is implicitly saying that A is B.331 Thus of course we can say that A is B as far as the 
Absolute is concerned, for instance that the Absolute is Being (or Subject, or God, or what have 
you). This is by hypothesis true for Hegel. However, it is true of the Absolute as observed from a 
secondary standpoint (from a reflective standpoint). If I am right that, according to Hegel, 
adopting a reflective standpoint toward the Absolute doesn’t involve observing the wrong object, 
but the right object but still a part of it, then any proposition of the form “A is B” true of the 
Absolute is partially true in the sense I am construing this notion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 For a discussion of Heidegger on the principle of identity, see Der Satz der Identität (Heidegger 1957). 
330 Hegel Preface-Difference: 107. 
331 Hegel can be seen to suggest here a contradiction between the propositional form’s extension and its intension. 
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My claim is that Hegel’s conclusion is the following. Taken on their own, that is, as propositions, 
both “A is A” and “A is B” fail, on final philosophical analysis, to (really) mean what they 
(apparently) mean. “A is A” fails to (really) mean what it (apparently) means because, while this 
proposition (explicitly) (expresses, on the one hand, the identity of A and A, this proposition 
(implicitly) expresses, on the other, the difference of A and A. “A is B” fails to (really) mean 
what it (apparently) means because, while “A is B” (explicitly) expresses the difference of A and 
B on the one hand, this proposition (implicitly) expresses their identity, on the other. In this light, 
one can say that, as propositions, both “A is A” and “A is B” fail to capture the truth despite 
expressing what (by hypothesis) is true.332 
 
Taken together, however, that is, as an antinomy, “A is A” and “A is B,” explicitly mean what 
they implicitly mean on their own. They mean, that is, that there is a contradiction. Different 
from a proposition that misses the truth, a contradiction (antinomy) that acknowledges itself as 
such “hits on” (as opposed to “misses”) the truth, if only formally speaking. This is meant by 
Hegel in such a robust sense that, moreover, lack of contradiction is for him, quite simply, index 
of falsehood.333 It is in effect Hegel’s claim that, since “A is A” and “A is B” together effectively 
express a contradiction acknowledging itself as such, they attain to the highest formula of truth 
formally speaking.334 The caveat “formally speaking” is necessary, and it stresses that even when 
an antinomy or contradiction acknowledging itself as such contains more truth than a proposition 
qua proposition, still it lacks real truth until the contradiction is, in turn, sublated. 
 
We can understand better now what a Principle of a philosophical System really is, and why 
Hegel claims that there simply can not be any genuine Principle, qua Principle, for philosophy. A 
Principle is a proposition which allegedly is true of the Absolute (simpliciter). It is able to found 
the rest of true propositions of a philosophical System. According to Hegel, however, the 
Principle, if by hypothesis true, is true of only part of the Absolute, i.e., the Absolute as observed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
332 “A=A expresses merely an identity of the intellect.” (Preface-Difference: 116) I take this quote to show that for 
Hegel A=A is true only from a reflective standpoint, which is what I want to claim in this section. 
333 “Contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi.” “Contradiction is a standard of truth, non-contradiction of 
falsehood.” (Hegel 1970, vol. II: 533)  
334 “If one reflects only on the formal aspect of speculation and holds fast to the synthesis of knowledge [only] in 
analytic form, then antinomy, that is, the contradiction that cancels itself, is the highest formal expression of 
knowledge and truth.” (Preface-Difference: 107) 
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from a secondary standpoint, that is, not true of the Absolute simpliciter.335 A Principle can only 
be an absolutely true principle for a System that fails to become Science (real knowledge, 
knowledge (really) true of its object). A Principle, in other words, can only be absolutely true for 
knowledge, not for reality. It is in this way that, according to Hegel, a Principle is true of only 
part of the Absolute, i.e., of the Absolute as observed from a secondary standpoint.336 
 
4. 5 SUMMARY 
 
To conclude this chapter, let me summarize the chief claims I have defended in it. In this chapter 
I have argued that, according to Hegel, the best past theories of the Absolute have been 
inadequate but not exactly false; rather, they have been partially true in the sense sketched in 
Chapter 1 (to be further elaborated in Chapter 5). To make my case I’ve drawn on Hegel’s 
prefaces to his first significant philosophical publication, The Difference between the Systems of 
Fichte and Schelling, and to his most influential work, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Because 
Hegel’s notion of the Absolute is so encompassing, it’s best to focus on a specific aspect and 
construct the case based on it. An aspect well suited to connect with the notion of partial truth is 
cognition of the Absolute and the expression of linguistic truth about it, particularly by means of 
a single proposition. While Hegel targets many figures in the Western philosophical tradition, his 
most significant targets are their immediate predecessors Kant, Fiche, and Schelling (with 
Spinoza in the background). According to Hegel, Kant is committed to the idea that the Absolute 
is beyond our cognition, and no proposition about it can be true; whereas Fichte is committed to 
the idea that the Absolute is within the reach of our cognition, and cognition of the Absolute rests 
on an absolute basic proposition. The thesis I have defended in this chapter is that, while Hegel 
believes that both Kant’s and Fichte’s theses about the Absolute are false simpliciter, what it’s 
really at stake for Hegel is Kant’s and Fichte’s underlying view of the Absolute, a view which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Whereas in Preface-Difference, Hegel thus attacks the idea of an Absolute Principle of philosophy, and thus 
Fichte, in Preface-PhS, he links the idea of an Absolute Principle with that of absolute intuition, thus attacking 
Schelling as well. According to Hegel, the notions of Absolute Principle and Absolute Intuition, Fichtean and 
Schellingian respectively, include an analogous flaw: “If the form is declared to be the same as the essence, then it is 
ipso facto a mistake to suppose that cognition can be satisfied with the in-itself or the essence, but can get along 
without the former –that the absolute principle or absolute intuition makes the working-out of the former, or the 
development of the latter, superfluous.” (Preface-PhS:11) 
336 In Preface-PhS, Hegel reiterates the same point thus: “A so-called basic proposition or principle of philosophy, if 
true, is also false, just because it is only a principle.” (Preface-PhS: 13) 
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not really false but partially true. Crucial to my claim is the idea that, according to Hegel, what is 
inadequate in Kant’s and Fichte’s views of the Absolute is their having adopted a standpoint 
toward it which is inadequate; this standpoint isn’t inadequate in the sense that is wrong, but in 
the sense that is secondary: a more basic standpoint toward the Absolute takes precedence over it 
and makes it possible in the first place. 
 
To understand what the Absolute exactly is for Hegel faces more difficulties than in the case of 
consciousness for Sartre and human being for Heidegger, as the latter two more or less coincide 
with our ordinary understanding of those terms; not so with the Absolute. A possible choice is 
God, given that Hegel himself uses “Gott” (“God”) as an equivalent term for the Absolute, and 
that, similar to God, Hegel’s Absolute doesn’t depend on any other entity, whereas the rest of 
entities depend on it. However, different from God, Hegel’s Absolute isn’t a transcendent entity, 
but immanent to reality as we know it; also, knowledge of it isn’t impossible, indirect, or faith-
based, but accessible to Reason, if only the right standpoint toward it is found and adopted. 
Another possible choice as ordinary equivalent to Hegel’s Absolute is reality. To flesh out what 
“reality” means in this case, however, it is important to get clear about Hegel’s views of what the 
proper tasks and goals of philosophy are. 
 
According to Hegel, philosophy is ultimately speaking knowledge of the Absolute and, 
conversely, genuine knowledge of the Absolute is philosophical. Philosophy, Hegel urges, is a 
privileged sort of knowledge, unlike the rest of the sciences; what is more, philosophy is the only 
science worthy of this name. What characterizes philosophy as Science (Wissenschaft) is that it 
cognizes infinite, that is, unlimited and unconditioned sorts of objects. Ultimately speaking, 
Hegel suggests, there is only one infinite sort of object, the Absolute or reality. Philosophy can 
thus be defined as knowledge of the Absolute. Conversely, the Absolute can be defined as reality 
plus philosophical knowledge of it, i.e., reality knowing itself as such. For Hegel, this means that 
philosophical knowledge isn’t knowledge about something (in this case, the Absolute) but, rather, 
the overcoming of the gap in virtue of which the former happens to be “about” the latter. To 
overcome this gap, according to Hegel, involves the task of transforming philosophy from being 
“love of knowing” to being actual knowing; of grasping the True not only as Substance, but 
equally as Subject; of exposing knowledge as a System; and of presenting the Absolute as Spirit 
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(Geist). To understand what the Absolute is, according to Hegel, and to show that the Absolute 
so understood is for Hegel the whole of what there is, i.e., reality, a good way to proceed is to 
consider what reality, for Modern philosophy, ultimately is, i.e., what comes first, being or 
knowing. 
 
According to realism, there is an objective reality independent of human knowledge; according 
to idealism, there isn’t such independent objective reality: reality totally or partially depends on 
our knowledge of it. Regardless of which option is defended, both traditional realism and 
idealism share one common assumption: being and knowing are thought in analogy with a 
relation between two entities, one of which produces, causes, brings about, etc. the other. What 
according to Hegel both traditional realism and idealism overlook is that in a relation of cause to 
effect, the cause is as much dependent on the effect as the other way round; given that the goal of 
traditional realism and idealism is to establish than one of the sides (being and knowing, 
respectively) is independent of the other (whereas the other depends on it), both traditional 
realism and idealism fail to be tenable or coherent philosophical pictures of the whole of what 
there is, i.e., of reality.  
 
An alternative picture is what can be called absolute (as opposed to traditional) realism or 
idealism. According to absolute realism, defended by Spinoza, being is basic and knowing is 
secondary; however, knowing isn’t an effect or product of being, but an accident or property 
thereof. According to absolute idealism, defended by Fichte, knowing is basic and being is 
secondary; however, being isn’t an effect or product of being, but an accident or property thereof. 
Despite the fact that Hegel acknowledges philosophical progress in Spinoza’s and Fichte’s 
options, he rejects both of them for being partial (not false): according to Hegel, the Absolute is 
both Spinoza’s being (Substance) and Fichte’s knowing (Subject), not either of them. This means 
that for Hegel it must be shown that the true Absolute is both (absolute) being and (absolute) 
knowing interacting with each other in a process in which, at the end, the Absolute knows itself 
as being. This process is what Hegel calls Absolute Knowledge. Absolute Knowledge is 
according to Hegel nothing other than the Absolute itself, that is, the whole of that there is, i.e., 
reality, knowing itself as such. This is what Hegel understands by the Absolute, and the object of 
which, I defend, he takes past theories to have been inadequate but not exactly false. 
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According to Hegel, there are two standpoints philosophers can adopt over the Absolute: the 
reflective and the speculative one. From a reflective standpoint, the Absolute appears as 
something about which we can’t have knowledge (Kant) or something about which we can have 
knowledge that can be expressed in true single propositions (Spinoza, Fichte). Reflection, 
according to Hegel, is the cognitive capacity that both sets oppositions, limitations, and 
conditions and is able to cognize finite, limited, and conditioned entities (for instance, numbers, 
nature, the mind, history, etc.). From the reflective standpoint, the Absolute can be cognized; but 
only a part (aspect) of it can be cognized. Speculation, by contrast, is according to Hegel the 
cognitive capacity to overcome oppositions, limitations, and conditions and thus to cognize 
infinite, unlimited, and unconditioned entities (that is, ultimately speaking, the Absolute). 
Correlating with each of these two cognitive capacities there is two cognitive faculties, Reason 
and Understanding. According to Hegel, Reason is the faculty able to adopt a speculative 
standpoint toward entities and thus cognize them over the background of infinite, unlimited and 
unconditioned ones; the Understanding is the faculty able to adopt a reflective standpoint toward 
entities and thus cognize them as finite, limited, and conditioned.  
 
According to Hegel, one of these two standpoints is grounded on the other, which makes the 
former possible in the first place: the reflective standpoint is grounded on the speculative one. 
Using the terminology I introduced in Chapter 1, I say that, according to Hegel, the reflective 
standpoint is secondary with respect to the speculative one, which is more basic. According to 
Hegel, Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte have all adopted a reflective standpoint toward the Absolute. 
What is philosophically inadequate about adopting a reflective standpoint toward the Absolute 
isn’t that this standpoint is wrong, but that is secondary: a more basic standpoint, i.e., the 
speculative one, takes precedence over it and makes it possible in the first place. (Using the 
alternative terminology introduced in Chapter 1, section 1. 1. 2, we can say that, as far as the 
Absolute is concerned, a reflective standpoint toward it supervenes on a speculative one). 
 
There are a number of ways it can be shown that, according to Hegel, a reflective standpoint 
toward the Absolute isn’t wrong but secondary and, moreover, adopting a secondary standpoint 
toward the Absolute provides us with, not falsehood, but partial truth about the Absolute. In this 
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chapter I have chosen to focus on the expression of linguistic truth about the Absolute, 
particularly in the form of a single proposition. Suppose there is a proposition that can play the 
role of the Basic Principle of Science (Wissenschaft), that is, of a philosophical System. Such a 
proposition, if it exists, must be absolutely unconditioned, and thus true of the Absolute. Arguing 
by reductio, it turns out that this proposition, if it exists, is true of only a part of the Absolute, 
that is, true of the Absolute as observed from a secondary standpoint. To show this, I showed that, 
according to Hegel, there are three layers of meaning in the propositional form (that is, in what 
any proposition qua proposition has in common with any other proposition), a logical, an 
epistemological, and a metaphysical one. By virtue of the logical layer, any proposition qua 
proposition says that something is something (for instance, that Barack Obama is American). By 
virtue of the epistemological layer, any proposition qua proposition says that a predicate, 
contributed by our cognition, is true of a subject, an existing entity in the world (for instance, that 
being-America is true of Barack Obama). By virtue of the metaphysical layer, any proposition 
qua proposition says that the predicate is contributed by our cognition, whereas the subject refers 
to an entity in the world. Given these semantic commitments of Hegel, the most plausible 
candidate for Absolute Basic Proposition is “A is A,” the principle of identity. Logically 
speaking, “A is A” says that the subject and predicate are the same thing, i.e., something is itself. 
Epistemologically speaking, “A is A” says that there is identity between A qua existing in the 
world and A qua contributed by our cognition. Metaphysically speaking, “A is A’ says that there 
is identity between reality (as a whole) and cognition (as a whole). 
 
According to Hegel, “A is A,” the principle of identity seems to be an unconditionally true 
proposition, i.e., a proposition true of the Absolute. However, he suggests that, under analysis, 
this proposition fails to be true of the Absolute. While “A is A” explicitly says that A is A, it 
implicitly says that A is not A, by virtue of its propositional form. This doesn’t entail that “A is A” 
is false of the Absolute, only that it is partially true: true, but only of a part (an aspect) of the 
Absolute. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORY, FALSEHOOD, AND PARTIAL TRUTH 
 
 
In this final chapter, I want to draw some conclusions concerning the three notions around which 
this study revolves, object, standpoint, and partial truth. Rather than summarizing my chief 
claims in the central chapters, I will concentrate on the notions of object, standpoint, and partial 
truth themselves and will look for more substantial results. My overall suggestion will be that the 
notions of object, standpoint, and partial truth, as I construe them, can help us to make sense of a 
sort of relation sometimes established between philosophers and their predecessors that, I claim, 
constitutes a significant pattern in the philosophical praxis and the history of philosophy. For this 
suggestion to be philosophically interesting, however, I need to give the notion of partial truth a 
more robust content than I have so far. I will argue that this content is given by the unique nature 
of the entities to which partial truth can be seen to apply (in this study, consciousness, human 
being, and the Absolute), in virtue of which a philosophical theory that fails to be based on a 
basic standpoint, not a secondary one, is bound to misrepresent their nature, instead of simply 
failing to capture it.  
 
5.1 PARTIAL TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD                     
 
In the first place, I want to make a case for the legitimacy of the notion of partial truth as 
sketched in Chapter 1 and put to practice in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, however we later 
philosophically spell out that notion in more detail. Essentially, I argue that the notion of partial 
truth is needed in at least some cases in which philosophers reject theories by their predecessors, 
specifically when they reject these theories while acknowledging that they contain 
philosophically interesting truth. I leave for the second part of this chapter the attempt to 
characterize with more precision the notion of partial truth so construed.  
 
I start from two facts. First, philosophers tend to reject, much more than to accept, past 
philosophical theories of x (reality, knowledge, morality, language, the mind, etc.).337 Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 From now on “philosophical accounts” simpliciter, meaning “philosophical accounts of x (reality, knowledge, 
morality, language, the mind, etc.”  
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philosophers don’t hesitate, in many instances, to admit that the theories they reject contain 
philosophically interesting truth. Our first problem is to square these two facts: how can 
philosophers reject philosophical theories that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically 
interesting truth?  
 
The obvious candidate answer is that philosophical theories can well combine truth with 
falsehood, and it’s on account of the latter that they are rejected. I want to contend, however, that 
this answer isn’t quite satisfactory, for at least two reasons. First, if we accept the answer as it 
stands we are still confronted with the task of explaining how exactly truth and falsehood are 
combined, a task which, I show below, brings us back to our original problem, namely to explain 
why some philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain truth. Second, more 
decisively, some theories can be constructed as containing only truth (thus no falsehood), while 
they are still rejected. This circumstance constitutes a straight counterexample to our first 
candidate answer and forces us to look for a different one. Under the plausible assumption 
(which I will briefly discuss below too) that philosophical theories are ultimately evaluated and 
thus accepted or rejected in terms of truth and falsehood, I will conclude that, at least in some 
instances, the only adequate way to square the two facts above mentioned is with help of the 
notion of partial truth as construed in this study. This will be my answer to our first problem. 
 
5.1.1 Combination of Truth and Falsehood as Explanation 
 
Let me show in the first place that arguing that theories can combine truth with falsehood doesn’t 
explain why some philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically 
interesting truth. I obviously don’t dispute that philosophical theories can (and do) combine truth 
with falsehood, something that is difficult to deny. What I’ll dispute is that this fact provides us 
with an explanation (straight one, at any rate) of the puzzle at hand. 
 
The basic problem is that truth and falsehood can be combined in a variety of ways, and that an 
adequate classification requires philosophical, not just taxonomic work; but this philosophical 
work requires elucidating, for each sort of combination, to what extent what prima facie is 
falsehood is genuine falsehood, which leaves up in the air, for at least some cases, whether what 
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prima facie is a combination of truth and falsehood isn’t something else, for instance truth with 
no falsehood. In other words, the expression “combination of truth and falsehood” is by no 
means univocal, and one of the options that this expression allows, depending on how far we 
stretch its meaning, is, precisely, that of partial truth as construed in this study.  
 
Consider, to illustrate the point, a toy philosophical theory consisting of the claim that reality 
consists of numbers, physical material, and God. Suppose that a philosopher rejects this theory 
while acknowledging that the theory contains philosophically interesting truth. If we ask 
ourselves why this philosopher rejects a theory that, she acknowledges, contains truth, and 
someone answers that it is because the theory combines truth with falsehood, we don’t know if 
this should be taken to mean that, according to this philosopher, the theory contains falsehood in 
addition to truth (for instance, she believes it’s false that reality consists of, say, numbers, but 
believes it’s true that it consists of physical material and God) or that, according to this 
philosopher, the theory is only partially true with no falsehood (if it’s the case that she believes 
that reality consists of numbers, physical material, God, and something else, say moral values); 
in some sense, this can still count as a “combination of truth and falsehood,” as the theory can be 
seen to be true, given that reality consists of, say, numbers, physical material, and God, but also 
false, in so far as it’s false that this is all reality consists of.338 In short, nothing in the expression 
“combination of truth and falsehood” rules out, without further philosophical elucidation, the 
possibility of partial truth with no falsehood.  
     
Roughly the same conclusion can be established by means of a different, a bit more elaborate 
argumentative strategy. Let’s think of possible ways in which truth and falsehood can be 
combined in terms of a spectrum going from a less to a more essential combination (or a more to 
a less non-essential one),339 the criterion consisting, crudely, in how easy is to pull apart 
falsehood from truth in each case.340  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 I will come back to this “combination of truth and falsehood” in section 5.2.1. (methodological solution to robust 
rejections of partially true theories).  
339 Of course, the term “combination” is somewhat question-begging, since it suggests non-essential rather than 
essential unity. By now I use the term non-committedly. 
340 The formula “how easy is to pull apart falsehood from truth” is of course casual; refinement would be needed to 
make it more precise and rigorous. 
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At its most non-essential (least essential), truth and falsehood can be easily pulled apart, as in the 
case of statements combined truth-functionally (at its most simple, in the case of a conjunction of 
a true and a false statement). For instance, the assertion “Barack Obama is the 44th president of 
the USA and Barack Obama is a Republican” can be said to combine truth with falsehood, but in 
a quite non-essential manner, probably at the low end of the spectrum: if we remove the false 
statement “Barack Obama is a Republican,” the statement “Barack Obama is the 44th president of 
the USA” remains unaffected in its truth.341  
 
At its most essential, truth and falsehood can be seen as being so tightly tied together that it’s 
very difficult (at the limit, impossible) to pull them apart; crudely, removing the falsehood 
affects its truth counterpart significantly (at the limit, completely).342 Examples are more difficult 
to find in this case, but perhaps dialetheias (statements which, according to some philosophers, 
are genuinely both true and false) or semantic paradoxes might work. The Liar paradox, for 
instance in the form “This sentence is not true,” can be seen as combining truth with falsehood, 
but arguably in a more essential (less accidental) way than in the case of a conjunction of a true 
and a false statement: it is precisely because the statement is false that is true, and vice versa; if 
we remove the falsehood (supposing we can), its truth counterpart is significantly affected: if we 
think of the statement as not being false, it is eo ipso no longer true. 
 
Along the spectrum, we can think of intermediate sorts of combinations of truth and falsehood, 
partly non-essential and partly essential. The statement “The sky is blue,” for instance, can be 
seen as combining truth with falsehood, in the sense that the statement is true at face value (as 
opposed to, for instance, “The sky is red”), but false in reality (the sky isn’t blue outside the 
Earth atmosphere; more abstractly, and assuming a commitment to anti-realism about secondary 
qualities, things are colorless; etc.). Even though you can pull apart falsehood from truth (i.e., 
you can say that the statement is true at face value, false in reality), there is a connection between 
them that is more essential than the conjunction of a true and a false statement.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Both regarding the brute fact that it is true and regarding what makes it true. 
342 This “affects” would of course need to be spelled out in more detail. 
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If we keep in mind the distinction between essential and non-essential combination of truth and 
falsehood and come back to our candidate answer, its inadequacy can be shown in the following 
way. Suppose someone claims that some philosophical theories combine truth with falsehood, 
and that this circumstance can explain why some philosophers reject theories that, they 
acknowledge, contain philosophically interesting truth. Suppose we ask ourselves: how 
essentially (or non-essentially) are truth and falsehood combined in this case? We have two 
possible responses (or, rather, two directions of response along the spectrum), and my contention 
is going to be that neither one shows that the theory is rejected on account of its falsehood.  
 
First, if truth and falsehood are combined non-essentially (at the limit, at its low end: the theory 
is, say, a conjunction of true and false assertions), the situation is best described by saying that 
it’s the false statements in the theory, not the theory, that are being rejected.343 Suppose, to 
illustrate the point, that we have a “philosophical” theory about Barack Obama consisting of a 
conjunction of two statements, one true and one false: “Barack Obama is the 44th President of the 
USA and Barack Obama is a Republican,” and that a philosopher rejects this theory, while 
acknowledging that it contains interesting truth. I contend that it’d be perverse to describe this 
situation by saying that what this philosopher is rejecting is a theory about Barack Obama; what 
she is rejecting, rather, is a false statement in the theory (“Barack Obama is a Republican”), 
while (presumably) acknowledging the other as containing interesting truth.344 What I conclude 
is that the more non-essential the combination of truth and falsehood is, the less sense it makes to 
appeal to this combination to argue that the theory, as theory, is being rejected. 
 
Second, if truth and falsehood are combined essentially (at the limit, at its top end: it’s 
impossible to pull apart falsehood from truth), it’s unclear to what extent it’s really on account of 
falsehood that the theory is being rejected (even if we grant that the theory does contain 
falsehood). Suppose, to illustrate the point, that we have a “philosophical” theory consisting of 
the single claim “This sentence is not true.”345 I contend that we can reject this theory and we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Of course, the philosophers rejecting the theory may be mistaken that the statements are false to begin with, but 
that’s a different issue. 
344 Of course, a conjunction of a true and a false statement gives us a false statement anyway, but that affects the 
operation of truth values, not truth and falsehood proper. 
345 That certainly would be a weird theory; what is important though isn’t the semantic paradox form, but the fact 
that truth and falsehood are combined essentially. 
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can take it to combine truth and falsehood; but it’s unclear whether we’re rejecting the theory 
because it combines truth and falsehood. If we take the theory to be false with no truth at all, 
then we’re rejecting the theory without acknowledging that it contains truth in the first place; but 
this is not, by hypothesis, the case to be accounted for (we want to account for the case in which 
a philosopher rejects a theory that, she acknowledges, contains philosophically interesting truth). 
If, on the other hand, we take the theory (in this case, assertion) to contain truth at all, it seems 
contradictory (or non-rational) to reject it on the grounds that it contains an alleged falsehood 
that (in some loose sense that would require spelling out) “contributes” to its truth: for, 
remember, it’s because the sentence “This sentence is not true” is false that is true, and vice 
versa. What I conclude in this case is that the more essential the combination of truth and 
falsehood is, the less sense it makes to argue that the theory is rejected on account of its 
falsehood. 
 
What I conclude from the overall argumentative strategy deployed in my last seven paragraphs is 
the following: on the non-essential side of the spectrum, we are not rejecting a theory on account 
of its falsehood, at least qua theory: what we are rejecting is the false assertions therein. On the 
essential side, we are not rejecting a theory on account of its falsehood; if anything, we are 
rejecting truth and falsehood together, given that one affects the other. My overall conclusion is: 
surely we can reject a theory while we acknowledge that it contains interesting truth, and do so 
on the grounds that “it combines truth and falsehood;” but it’s unclear whether falsehood is 
doing here the explanatory job required to make sense of the puzzle: for all we know, it’s still 
possible that falsehood doesn’t play a role in our rejection, which leaves us with partial truth, 
with no falsehood, as a possible option for rejecting a philosophical theory.             
 
My argumentation so far doesn’t establish that we can’t reject a theory on the grounds that it 
combines truth with falsehood; only that this combination doesn’t rule out the possibility of 
partial truth. Partial truth, in other words, is a possible reason why philosophers reject theories 
that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically interesting truth. But is it in fact the reason why 
this happens? Is it, in particular, in the case of Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel on consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute? 
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From this point onwards we have two possible routes to press the need for the notion of partial 
truth as construed in this study: an ambitious one on the one hand and a moderate one on the 
other. The ambitious route results from arguing that, at least in some cases, in particular Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel in this essay, philosophical theories can be construed as containing only 
truth while they are still rejected. It thus follows that they can’t be rejected on the grounds of 
falsehood; partial truth would then be the natural explanation of why they are being rejected. The 
moderate route results from pressing the point that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe the 
theories they reject are false or wrong, not partially true or misleading; if that’s the case, partial 
truth can’t be construed as truth and only truth of part of an object, but as truth of part of an 
object combined with falsehood after all, in a way that needs further spelling out. 
 
What I do in what follows is to consider the two alternatives, first the ambitious and then the 
moderate. In either case, I believe partial truth emerges as a useful notion to make sense of at 
least some instances in the pattern that is the goal of this study to elucidate: rejection of a 
philosophical theory that, it is acknowledged, contains philosophically interesting truth. 
 
5. 1. 2 Ambitious Route: Theories Construed as Only True           
 
Let’s attempt the ambitious route in the first place. It consists in arguing that, at least in some 
cases, a combination of truth and falsehood cannot be a reason why philosophers reject theories 
that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically interesting truth (and in my next section I will 
conclude that, in this case, partial truth is the only reason why philosophers do so). The argument 
is straightforward: at least in some cases, theories can be construed as containing only truth (thus 
no falsehood), while they’re still rejected. It then follows that they aren’t rejected because they 
combine truth with falsehood. For this argument to be persuasive, however, we need first to 
clarify what is meant by construing a philosophical theory as containing only truth and no 
falsehood, as it’s highly doubtful that any philosophical theory has ever achieved this 
desideratum.346 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 And probably, on a purely priori grounds, that the desideratum can ever be achieved. 
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Of course, the point is that a theory can be construed as containing no falsehood, not that it 
doesn’t contain any. Now construing a theory as containing no falsehood obviously involves a 
significant amount of idealization, as, again, it’s highly doubtful that any philosophical theory 
has ever achieved this desideratum. The question is: how much does this idealization affect my 
claim that these theories are not rejected on account of their falsehood? Remember, the goal in 
the ambitious route is to argue that some theories can be construed as containing no falsehood, 
while they are still rejected; and to do so, in particular, by presenting as examples the cases of 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this study. But here’s an obvious worry: 
doesn’t construing the best past theories of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute as 
containing no falsehood achieve the goal trivially? For trivially, indeed, if we construe a theory 
as containing no falsehood, it can’t be on account of its falsehood that the theory is rejected. The 
defender of the ambitious route responds that the appearance of triviality is misleading: while it 
is trivial that, if we construe a theory as containing no falsehood, it can’t be on account of its 
falsehood that the theory is rejected, it’s not trivial that the theory be construed as containing no 
falsehood in the first place. For this response to be convincing, however, we need to think of 
good reasons to construct theories as containing no falsehood. 
 
The first thing to realize is that any theory, even the most prima facie implausible ones, can 
always be construed as containing no falsehood. All we need to do is be charitable enough 
interpreting its claims, accommodating evidence against it, adding ad hoc hypotheses, and so on. 
At the limit, even the theory that, say, there is a planet called Vulcan between Mercury and the 
Sun can be construed as containing no falsehood; all we need to do is to refuse to acknowledge 
the empirical evidence, cook up a story explaining why the existence of Vulcan can’t be 
empirically ascertained, appeal to cosmological non-entities that exist, etc. However, it’s more 
plausible for some theories than for others to be construed as containing no falsehood. For 
instance, it’s more plausible for Newtonian mechanics or Darwin’s theory of Natural Selection 
than for Ptolemaic heliocentrism or Lamarckism; and so on. Now the problem under discussion, 
namely why philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain truth, doesn’t concern 
theories, but beliefs about theories (see Chapter 1, section 1. 2. 1.).  What we need to take into 
account, I contend, is the grounds on which theories are rejected, in addition to what the theories 
themselves say. If we consider these grounds, it’s more plausible for some theories to be 
 178	  
construed as containing no falsehood than for others, and that puts a constraint on what we take 
theories to contain; it then isn’t trivial to construct a theory as containing no falsehood.  
 
Suppose, to illustrate the point, that a biological theory about elephants consists of the single 
assertion “Elephants can fly,” and that two philosophers (or biologists in this case) reject this 
theory, one of them on the grounds that elephants can’t fly, and the other on the grounds that the 
expression “to fly” is vague (depending on the meaning of “to fly,” the latter might be ready to 
admit that elephants can fly). Given that the first philosopher (or biologist) is essentially 
rejecting the theory on the grounds that it’s false, it would be clearly perverse (or fallacious) to 
construe the theory as containing no falsehood and then argue that the philosopher rejects it on 
grounds different from falsehood. But the situation is different in the case of the second 
philosopher: she rejects the theory on the grounds of vagueness, so construing the theory as 
containing no falsehood doesn’t affect those grounds; what is more, for purposes of illuminating 
the reasons why the second philosopher rejects the theory (vagueness in this case) it’s even 
better to assume that, as far as she is concerned, the theory is true (i.e., that elephants can fly): in 
this way, issues of falsehood won’t distract our attention from issues of (in this case) vagueness, 
which in this case is our central concern. A similar strategy, I hold, might be useful in the case of 
philosophers and the grounds on which they reject philosophical theories. In particular, a similar 
strategy would be useful in the case of Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel on the best past theories of 
consciousness, human being, and the Absolute. The only difference is that now we heuristically 
construe the theories rejected as containing no falsehood, in order to find out Sartre’s, 
Heidegger’s, and Hegel’s grounds of rejection (we presumably don’t know them yet). It turns out, 
I will argue, that while there definitely are claims in the theories Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel 
reject that they take to be false, those claims do not alter the substance of what Sartre, Heidegger, 
and Hegel see as philosophically inadequate in the theories they reject; what is more, for 
purposes of illuminating the reasons why the Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel reject the theory it’s 
even better to assume that, as far as they are concerned, the theories are true. 
 
Let’s first consider Sartre on consciousness. For my present purposes, I will discuss only one 
assertion (thesis) that, according to Sartre is false, but whose falsehood can be seen as not 
affecting the grounds on which Sartre rejects it. One can follow a similar strategy for the rest of 
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assertions in the theory. According to both Descartes and Husserl, there is a self in consciousness 
as the subject of our conscious acts. As I explained at length in Chapter 2, Sartre believes that 
this claim is false: if there is a self at all, Sartre believes, it is a self for consciousness, not in 
consciousness, an object for our conscious acts, not a subject of them. Still, as we saw in Chapter 
2, and with due qualifications, Sartre admits that there is a self. Thus, against the view that there 
is no self at all (for instance, Hume’s or Nietzsche’s347), Sartre can be seen as agreeing with 
Descartes and Husserl after all. Of course, this is just one step towards the present case, not all of 
it: Sartre agrees that there is a self as opposed to no self, but that doesn’t mean that he agrees that 
that there is a self in consciousness as opposed to for consciousness. Now what are the grounds 
on which Sartre argues, against Descartes and Husserl, that there is no self in consciousness? As 
I explained in Chapter 2, Sartre argues that there is no self because consciousness unifies itself 
by being conscious of something other than itself: it is the object consciousness is conscious of, 
not a self in consciousness, that plays the unifying role. According to Sartre, furthermore, 
consciousness does so at the same time that it is non-positionally conscious of itself. In other 
words, consciousness does not need reflection to be conscious of itself: consciousness is 
conscious of itself, in the first instance, by being conscious of an object; subsequently, 
consciousness can always (and optionally) take itself as an object (which is what happens in the 
case of reflection). In other words, and here comes what I take to be Sartre’s fundamental insight 
against Descartes and Husserl: unreflective self-consciousness precedes the reflective one, both 
phenomenologically and ontologically. Given that, as I showed in Chapter 2, Descartes’ and 
Husserl’s theoretical insights about consciousness are based on a reflective standpoint toward it, 
the truth or falsehood of these insights (in this case, that there is a self in consciousness) doesn’t 
alter the fact that, according to Sartre, both Descartes and Husserl adopt a standpoint toward 
consciousness, i.e., the reflective one, which is secondary with respect to the basic one, i.e., the 
unreflective one. Thus, allowing that the self is in consciousness (as Descartes and Husserl 
would want it) would undoubtedly do violence to Sartre’s views about the self, but it would have 
a limited impact on his view that the unreflective standpoint toward consciousness is the basic 
and the reflective one the secondary. Now this view is, if my conclusions in Chapter 2 are correct, 
what is really crucial in Sartre’s criticisms of Descartes and Husserl. Therefore, I conclude, as far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 These two examples need qualification, especially Nietzsche, in which one might find alternative notions of self 
(for instance, successful integration of different drives into one single project). I mean the view there is no self 
understood in the way Descartes and Husserl understand it.  
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as the claim that there is a self in consciousness is concerned, Descartes’ and Husserl’s theories 
about consciousness can be construed as containing no falsehood without altering the essence of 
what Sartre sees as being philosophically inadequate with them. 
 
Something roughly analogous holds for Heidegger on human being. According to both Descartes 
and Kant, human being is an entity that might conceivably lack a world:348 it’s always up for 
grabs whether there is an external reality to which we (human being) relate. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Heidegger believes that this claim is false: human being cannot conceivably lack a 
world; wondering whether there is an external reality is a relation towards entities (that of global 
skeptical doubt) that already assumes that a world has been disclosed in advance. Still, and again 
with some qualifications, Heidegger would be happy, at least to some extent, to allow that claim 
to be true. Of course, that would violence to Heidegger’s view of the relation between human 
being and world, but Heidegger’s fundamental insight about the nature of human being doesn’t 
concern this relation (although it’s tightly connected to it). Rather, as explained in chapter 3, 
Heidegger’s two fundamental insights about human being are that (i) to be for human being 
means a radically different thing than to be for the rest of entities, and that (ii) there is a 
standpoint toward things generally and over human being in particular, the pre-theoretical one, 
that is more basic than another standpoint, the theoretical one. It’s only when philosophers fail to 
see (i) that they can claim that human being might not relate to the rest of entities in the first 
place, that is, that it might lack a world. But this claim, false as it is according to Heidegger, 
might be seen as being true without altering his points (i) and (ii) above against Descartes and 
Kant. Thus, I conclude, Descartes’ and Kant’s views about human being can be construed as 
containing no falsehood, without altering the essence of what Heidegger sees as being 
philosophically inadequate with them. 
 
Something roughly analogous holds, finally, for Hegel on the Absolute. According to Kant, the 
Absolute is the sort of entity about which we can’t get to acquire knowledge; according to Fichte, 
the Absolute is a sort of entity about which all knowledge rests on one single fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
348 Again, this needs qualification: for Kant it makes sense to claim that human being might conceivably lack a 
world, but in his “Refutation of Idealism” section of Critique of Pure Reason (B274) he famously offers a proof 
meant to show that this is not in fact the case. It still holds for Kant that, on principle, human being might lack a 
world (which is what Heidegger wants to contest). 
 181	  
proposition, A=A. Both Kant’s and Fichte’s claims, Hegel believes, are false simpliciter. But 
once again, Hegel would, at least problematically, be happy to allow the two claims to be true, as 
long as his fundamental insight against Kant and Fichte is respected: that there is a standpoint 
toward things generally, and over the Absolute in particular, the speculative standpoint, which is 
more basic than the standpoint adopted by Kant and Fichte to make their respective claims, the 
reflective one. From their standpoint the claims can be seen as being true, and that doesn’t affect 
Hegel’s chief thrust that the reflective standpoint is made possible by the speculative one, and 
that the reflective standpoint isn’t so much wrong as secondary with respect to the speculative 
one. Thus, once again, Kant’s and Fichte’s views about the Absolute can be construed as 
containing no falsehood without altering the essence of what Hegel sees as being philosophically 
inadequate with them. 
 
What I conclude from these three brief discussions is the following: while there are assertions 
(theses) in the theories of their predecessors that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel take to be false 
simpliciter, what is essential in their criticisms can be seen as remaining unaltered if, for 
purposes of clarifying what these criticisms really say, we assume that those claims are true. 
What is more, it’s better to assume for methodological purposes that these claims are true, as the 
thrust of these criticisms, namely, that what is inadequate in the best past accounts is the 
adoption of a standpoint that isn’t as much wrong as secondary, can be made more salient. But 
this means, I want to conclude now, that the theories in question can be construed to be true and 
only true (with no falsehood), while they are still being rejected.  
 
If the reader isn’t satisfied with the results of this ambitious route, perhaps it can help to stress 
that its bottom line is not that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel would be happy to take to be true 
such and such theories (or, in my discussions above, claims); rather, it is that if Sartre, Heidegger, 
and Hegel were happy to take to be true those theories (claims), they would still reject them (on 
the grounds indicated in my discussions). What is being stressed here is the fact that Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel would reject those theories, not that they would be happy to consider them 
true. The claim, in other words, is not a modal one about possibility (i.e., “Perhaps Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel might take to be true such and such theories”), but a counterfactual (or 
subjunctive) conditional: if, per impossibile (imagine an odd parallel world inhabited by a Sartre, 
 182	  
a Heidegger, and a Hegel admitting views they wouldn’t dream of even conceiving in reality) 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel were happy to take to be true and only true such and such theories, 
it would still hold that that they’d reject them. 
 
5.1.3 Moderate Route: Past Theories Are False 
 
As an alternative to the ambitious route we have the moderate route, skeptical of the idea of 
philosophical theories construed (even counterfactually) as containing truth and only truth; at any 
rate, not as far as Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel is concerned. This, it will be objected, flies in the 
face of the fact that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel suggest in abundant and various ways that the 
theories they are rejecting are false or wrong (and fundamentally so at that). At most, it will be 
conceded, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel grant the theories they reject contain some truth; but it 
can’t be the case that they take the theories to be true and only true, as defended in the previous 
section.  
 
There are a number of alternative ways one can express the central point of the moderate route 
(more accurately, of the position that is going to motivate a moderate route in this chapter). One 
can say that the ambitious route makes the mistake of pulling apart the truth or falsehood of past 
philosophical theories, on the one hand and issues of priority of standpoints, on the other. Both 
things, it will be urged, go hand in hand: even if Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel take their 
predecessors to have adopted a secondary, not wrong, standpoint toward consciousness, human 
being, and the Absolute, it still holds that the theories and claims are really false, not partially 
true or misleading. What is more, to get to see the falsehood of those theories and claims is 
essential to understanding the importance of a shift of perspective to a more basic standpoint. 
Another way to phrase the position adopted by the proponents of the moderate route is to say that 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel are not only fighting to switch standpoints toward consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute: they want us to see the actual falsehood (not partial truth) of the 
claims and theories they reject.  
 
If the proponents of the moderate route are right, the chief thesis of this study seems to be in 
danger, for, remember, the thesis says that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel don’t believe the 
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theories they are rejecting are false, but rather partially true. In fact, however, I think the thesis 
can be made to be consistent with the position motivating the moderate route, provided we 
elucidate the thesis further and, in particular, we elucidate how believing that theory θ is 
partially true can be made consistent with believing that theory θ is false or wrong. I prefer to 
leave this task for later (see section 5.3.1.) and pursue by now the option of the ambitious route 
to make the strongest possible case for the usefulness of the notion of partial truth. So let’s 
pursue the ambitious route a bit further and come back to the moderate one at the end of the 
chapter (section 5.3.1.) 
 
5. 1. 4 Truth and Falsehood as Grounds for Rejection      
 
If the argumentation on which the ambitious route is accepted, it results that, at least in some 
instances (in this case, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel on the best past theories of consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute), some theories can be construed as containing no falsehood, 
while they are still rejected. This puts the puzzle introduced at the beginning of 5. 1. in a 
stronger form: how can a philosopher (rationally) reject a theory that, she acknowledges, 
contains philosophically interesting truth, and only truth? The answer I want to defend is the 
following: Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, reject theories that, they acknowledge, contains 
philosophically interesting truth, and (counterfactually) only truth, because they believe the 
theories are partially true in the sense developed in this study. But to draw this conclusion I need 
to assume that it’s on the grounds of truth and falsehood alone349 that philosophical theories are 
evaluated and, thus, accepted or rejected. This assumption is needed to rule out the possibility 
that theories be rejected on non-epistemic, or, more precisely, non-alethic, grounds,350 which 
would prevent me from concluding that partial truth is the only plausible alternative to falsehood.  
 
Philosophers can of course reject philosophical theories on many different grounds, both rational 
and non-rational (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.1. for a preliminary discussion). An exhaustive 
survey of all these possible grounds is impossible here, so what I am going to do is to simplify 
things a bit for the purposes of the dialectic of this final chapter (I am aware that there will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Or, more weakly, on the grounds of truth and falsehood for the most part (or chiefly). 
350 I.e., grounds not based on issues of truth and falsehood (“alethic,” adjective form from Ancient Greek word for 
“truth,” “aletheia”). 
 184	  
significant holes remaining in my argumentation; to fill them out would be a task worth 
completing). On the non-rational side of the spectrum, one can think of cultural, social, political, 
historical, ideological, and even racial and sexual grounds for “rejecting” philosophical theories. 
At the limit, and to put the point in a provocative and humorous form, a philosopher might 
“reject” a theory on the grounds that, say, he doesn’t like the ties that the philosopher proposing 
the theory wears. (Of course, to “reject” has here somewhat of a bogus meaning, hence the scare 
quotes). On the rational side of the spectrum, philosophical theories can be rejected for a variety 
of grounds: implausibility, obscurity, vagueness, lack of economy, evidence, elegance, simplicity, 
and so on. My contention now is that, as far as rational grounds is concerned, we can 
conveniently subsume all of them under the umbrella terms of “truth” and “falsehood” broadly 
construed. What I want to capture with this claim is the (a) theoretical and the (b) normative 
aspect of philosophical theories. The goal of philosophical theories, I contend, is to get to know 
the truth about things; some theories get to do so, and some don’t. Whether truth is construed 
realistically (as correspondence with an independently existing reality), idealistically (as 
coherence of our beliefs with one another), pragmatically (as successful coping with things), 
deflationarily (as passing from talk about language to talk about the world), and so on, doesn’t 
alter the fact that, crudely put, we distinguish between “good” and “bad” theories, and we do so 
by appealing to how things are. I simply assume that philosophy, in other words, is a theoretical 
enterprise that, as any theoretical enterprise, has truth as its goal (however truth is subsequently 
understood). Crudely, when we consider a philosophical theory (or claim), we ask ourselves 
whether the theory (or claim) is true, not whether it’s pleasant, useful, moving, funny, and so on. 
In addition, if we believe the theory to be true, we accept it; if we believe it to be false, we reject 
it.  
 
Some people, of course, may take all of this to be far from uncontroversial. What I’ll briefly 
respond now, however, is that this is because the terms “theoretical” and “truth” are loaded with 
unnecessary baggage. Once this baggage is removed, my contention that philosophical theories 
are evaluated (and thus accepted or rejected) in terms of truth and falsehood becomes relatively 
harmless but still good enough for my purposes.  
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Philosophers who object to the theoretical character of philosophy are likely to do so on the basis 
of (a) a practical or (b) a therapeutic view of philosophy. Both “practical” and “therapeutic” 
oppose themselves to “theoretical,” but in different ways. A practical view of philosophy rejects 
the primacy of knowledge and puts the stress on action broadly understood: the goal of 
philosophy, it is held, isn’t to get to know the nature of reality but, rather, to act (in a variety of 
ways: for instance, pursuing happiness or excellence, developing moral virtues, living a 
meaningful life, engaging in historic or political action, etc.) A therapeutic view of philosophy 
rejects the primacy of knowledge, but in a different sense: the goal of philosophy isn’t to expand 
our knowledge but to protect it against unnecessary theoretical confusions; philosophy, in other 
words, doesn’t solve theoretical problems, but shows how what looks like legitimate theoretical 
problems are in fact pseudo-problems.  
 
My response to both a practical and a therapeutic view of philosophy is simple: even if 
philosophy is in nature a practical or a therapeutic enterprise, it still remains theoretical at least in 
the broad sense that, at some point or other, assertions are made (for instance, about the best 
action to be pursued, about the origin of such and such theoretical confusion, and so on) that, as 
any assertion, are (or ought to be) evaluated in terms of truth or falsehood. More polemically, 
just to contend that philosophy is a practical (or a therapeutic) discipline is itself an assertion that, 
as any assertion, needs to be evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood. To claim that philosophy 
is a theoretical enterprise, I conclude, doesn’t need to commit us to any substantial view neither 
about the nature of philosophy nor of theoretical enterprises. 
 
Philosophers who object to the view that philosophy has truth as its goal are likely to do so 
because they’re skeptical of the idea of an objective reality out there that our philosophical 
theories are supposed to capture. Perhaps, these people object, there isn’t any such reality, and 
what we call “truth” is simply the coherence of our beliefs with one another, or the explanatory 
capacity of our theories, or their allowing us to cope with things in a more successful way, and so 
on. (This second complaint goes hand in hand with the first one: assuming a sufficiently robust 
notion of theory, it’s contradictory to engage in a theoretical enterprise that doesn’t have truth as 
its goal, and the other way round). My response to this worry is roughly analogous to the one just 
seen: surely there might not be a reality out there that our philosophical theories are supposed to 
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capture; perhaps what we call “truth” doesn’t consist in a correspondence between our theories 
and this reality, but in the coherence of the different claims of the theory among themselves, in 
pragmatic success, and so on. But even in this case, I hold, we discriminate between “good” and 
“bad” philosophical theories. This is enough for philosophical theories to acquire the normative 
aspect I am interested in eliciting. It is this discrimination what I call evaluation (and thus 
acceptance or rejection) in terms of truth and falsehood. How truth and falsehood are 
subsequently construed (whether in terms of correspondence, of coherence, of pragmatic success, 
of semantic descent, etc.) is a separate issue that doesn’t affect our discrimination of 
philosophical theories between “good” and “bad” ones. 
 
5.1.5 Summary                                 
 
Before proceeding to consider a second problem concerning the rejection of theories 
acknowledged to contain philosophically interesting truth, let me summarize what we’ve got so 
far. Philosophers reject in many instances past accounts of x (reality, knowledge, morality, etc.), 
even when they acknowledge that these accounts contain philosophically interesting truth about x. 
The problem is how to square these two facts, rejection and acknowledgement of philosophically 
interesting truth. The obvious candidate answer, that philosophical accounts can combine truth 
with falsehood, doesn’t really help: without further philosophical elucidation, nothing in the idea 
of combination of truth and falsehood rules out the possibility of partial truth with no falsehood. 
Assuming an ambitious route for a defense of the notion of partial truth, it can be argued that 
some theories can be construed as containing no falsehood, while they’re still rejected. If that’s 
the case, our puzzle acquires a stronger form: how can philosophers reject theories that contain 
philosophically interesting truth and (by hypothesis) only truth? I’ve argued that philosophical 
theories are (or ought to be) evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood; philosophy is, in other 
words, a theoretical enterprise that has truth as its goal. Neither the term “theoretical” nor the 
term “truth” needs to include substantial commitments. Even if philosophy is seen as a practical 
or therapeutic enterprise, it still remains theoretical in the broad sense that it makes use of 
assertions that are evaluated (and thus accepted or rejected) in terms of truth or falsehood. If, on 
the other hand, one is suspicious of the idea of truth as something that makes philosophical 
theories capture an independently existing reality, it still holds that we discriminate between 
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“good” and “bad” theories. This discrimination, normative in nature, doesn’t need to rely on the 
notion of truth as correspondence, nor on any philosophically committed notion of truth. 
Ultimately speaking, then, philosophical theories are accepted or rejected on the grounds of truth 
and falsehood (however truth and falsehood are philosophically construed). Having into account 
that the puzzle we are facing is: how can philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, 
contain truth and only truth?, the only possible answer I see is: because they believe the theory is 
only partially true. The overall conclusion so far, therefore, is the following: partial truth is the 
only possible reason why philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain truth and 
only truth. 
 
5.2 REJECT VERSUS COMPLETE               
 
With this conclusion so far, we are confronted with a new problem: why is a partially true 
theory351 rejected at all? Of course, partial truth has something bad to it: it’s incomplete. A true 
theory (or description) of Ancient Rome that only covers its Kingdom period is a bad theory, 
because this period is only a part of Ancient Rome’s history. But doesn’t it suffice to complete a 
partially true theory to render it adequate? Why not add to the Kingdom period the Roman 
Republic and the Roman Empire and thus render it true simpliciter?352 If that is possible (and it 
does seem possible),353 a partially true theory (or description) would of course be insufficient, but 
not necessarily problematic. If a theory strikes us as insufficient we will likely reject it as 
adequately describing its object, but “to reject,” I contend now, has here what can be called a 
neutral sense: while we believe the theory is insufficient in so far as it lacks further information, 
we presumably don’t believe the theory is problematic as it stands. I want to contrast “to reject” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 And by hypothesis only true, from now onwards. 
352 From now on I’ll be using “true simpliciter” and derivatives as contrast pair to “partially true.” Alternative 
options like “wholly true” or “completely true” involve the idea that there is such a thing as the whole or complete 
truth about something, an idea which is of course problematic. Even Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, for instance, 
don’t mean to capture everything of philosophical interest about consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, but 
only what is essential to understand their nature. (Using logical terms, their respective accounts would be outlines 
rather than full proofs). 
353 Someone might protest that, once the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire are added, surely there’re still 
further periods or historical facts about the Roman Empire that aren’t still covered (since it’s arguably impossible to 
include every claim of historical importance about Roman History); but once these periods or facts are included, 
further periods or facts can still be absent (for the same reason), and so on, ad infinitum. Therefore, the protester 
would conclude, truth will keep on being partial on and on; as a result, the very idea of a completely true account is 
bogus. My response is simply to concede the point, as I take it not to make any difference for my present purposes: 
the successive accounts will still be partial in the neutral sense I am now trying to characterize. 
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in this neutral sense with “to reject” in what can be called a robust sense. We reject a theory in a 
robust sense when, in addition to our believing that the theory is insufficient in so far as it lacks 
further information, we believe the theory is problematic in so far its assertions (theses) are (or 
can be) misleading, i.e., true but conducive to make someone believe something false.354 In what 
follows, I investigate (i) whether and, if so, in what sense a partially true theory can be seen as 
problematic, which is another way to ask (ii) whether, and if so, in what sense it’s possible to 
(rationally) reject a partially true theory in a robust, not just neutral sense.355 I will argue that 
there is a relatively obvious sense in which partially true theories can be seen as problematic and 
thus rejected in a robust sense; but, in addition, there is a stronger one, which is apt to make 
sense of Sartre’s, Heidegger’s, and Hegel’s positions on the best past theories of consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute. As to the question in what sense these theories can be as seen as 
problematic, I will provide two answers: a methodological and a substantial one. The latter will 
prove instrumental in giving a robust content to the notion of partial truth and thus make it more 
philosophically interesting than it has been so far in this study. 
 
First of all, there is a relatively innocuous sense in which partially true accounts can be seen as 
problematic, simply deriving from the quasi-truism that partial truth is, to some extent, always 
misleading.356 In everyday life we sometimes speak of half-truths instead of partial truth, and 
think of them as virtual lies. Examples are easy to come up with. Suppose I am stopped by drunk 
driving, and I truthfully declare that I’ve drunk one beer. This claim is obviously misleading if, 
in addition, I’ve also drunk three whiskies and don’t say so. What we have here is clearly a case 
of a problematic, not simply insufficient, partially true assertion. My declaration is obviously 
misleading, not simply uninformative: what I claim is true (i.e., I have drunk only one beer), but 
it’s clearly conducive to make someone believe something false (i.e., that that’s all the alcohol 
I’ve consumed). If the official who has stopped me knew all the relevant information about my 
alcohol consumption, he would of course reject my declaration as adequately describing that 
consumption, and indeed not just in a neutral sense, but in a robust one: crudely, he wouldn’t 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 In a way that would require spelling out. 
355 From now on I assume that whenever a partially true account is seen as problematic, it is rational to reject it in a 
robust sense. 
356 Which is not the same as the claim that partial truth is misleading by the very fact that is partial; in that case it’d 
be analytically true that partial truth is misleading. But because I want to contrast misleading and non-misleading 
partial truth, I’m obviously not interested in partial truth being misleading to be analytically true. 
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think something like “His declaration is incomplete, but that’s fine; let’s wait and see if he can 
provide further information later on” but, rather, something like “What he says is literally true, 
but downright deceiving. This guy is pretty much lying to me.”  
 
It’s clear that something similar can happen with a set of interconnected assertions constituting a 
theory (or description of  an object). Imagine a biography of William Shakespeare consisting of 
exclusively true assertions about his life, but failing to mention that he wrote dramatic 
masterpieces such as Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, and Othello. Of course, there is a sense in 
which, as it stands, the biography is simply insufficient; we might reject it in the neutral sense 
that we believe it’s incomplete, but not misleading. However, there is another sense in which the 
biography is problematic, as it can mislead us into believing that William Shakespeare was, say, 
a dramatic impresario or an actor, but not a dramatic author (and a major one in the history of 
Western literature), which is what we essentially take Shakespeare to be. Of course, the 
misleading character of the declaration for drunk driving in the example above is much more 
salient than in the case of the biography of Shakespeare; but that is, I contend, because in the 
example above what counts as relevant information is much more clearly defined, not to mention 
the fact that an official making a question quite explicitly sets the expectation that this relevant 
information be reported. By contrast, it’s less clear what is expected to be reported in a 
biography, or whether it should be reported in the first place.357 The two examples, I thus claim, 
don’t present differences of essence, but only of degree, at least concerning my present point, 
which I summarize thus: a partially true account can be seen as problematic and (rationally) 
rejected in a robust sense, but only in the relatively uninteresting sense that partial truth can 
always be misleading because relevant information is not reported. 
 
A side complication, which I won’t pursue here in all its ramifications, concerns the question 
where exactly the line lies between a problematic partially true account and a non-problematic 
one. Coming back to the example of drunk driving, imagine the same scenario as above, but 
suppose that my declaration now is “I’ve drunk three whiskies” instead of “I’ve drunk one beer.” 
In this case my declaration is also partially true, because I’ve drunk one beer besides the three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Of course, a biography is expected to report facts (and an interpretation thereof) about someone’s life; but which 
facts to include in this report is, on a variety of grounds, quite an open question (this merits further discussion). 
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whiskies; but I’m not reporting that. Intuitively, however, failing to report that I’ve drunk one 
beer in addition to three whiskies is less misleading than the other way round. What’s the 
difference? Prima facie it’s the fact that what I am reporting now has a stronger informative 
content than before or, correlatively, that what I’m failing to report has a weaker one.358 So how 
problematic a partially true account is seems to depend on how strong is the informative content 
of what one fails to report. One might complicate the example imagining a continuum in the 
drink consumption (say, a bottle of tequila, three whiskies, two glasses of wine, a beer, a shot of 
soda, a glass of water, etc.), and a corresponding continuum in the declaration, from most 
problematic to least problematic, depending on how strong is the informative content of what 
fails to be reported: it would be very misleading to declare that I’ve drunk a shot of soda, if I’ve 
also drunk a bottle of tequila, three whiskies, two glasses of wine, and a beer, and don’t say so; it 
would be little misleading to declare that I’ve drunk a full bottle of tequila, three whiskies, two 
glasses of wine, and a beer, if what I fail to report is that I’ve also drunk a shot of soda too. In 
between, we have various degrees along the continuum. The bottom line here, which is a 
relatively side point in my overall argumentative line, is that “problematic” and “misleading” 
admit of degrees, depending on how strong or weak is the informative content of what one 
reports or fails to report.  
 
Analogous considerations hold for the example of the biography of Shakespeare, thus for 
theoretical accounts (broadly construed). Compare, for instance, two biographies of William 
Shakespeare consisting of exclusively true claims about his life, one mentioning that one of his 
daughter’s name was Susanna but failing to mention that he wrote dramatic masterpieces such as 
Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, and Othello; and the other mentioning that he wrote dramatic 
masterpieces such as Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, and Othello, but failing to mention that one 
of his daughter’s name was Susanna. Arguably, the former is more problematic (i.e., more 
misleading) that the latter, as the fact that Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, Macbeth, King Lear, 
Othello has more informative content than the fact that one of his daughter’s name was Susanna. 
In between these two extremes, we can think of degrees along the continuum making up a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Of course, the notion of informative content is casual and needs spelling out. On the other hand, informative 
content is always relative to some specific expectation. In the example, the informative content of, say, what I ate 
for dinner is weak, because what matters is what I drunk; but it might become strong if, for instance, I went to the 
hospital for alimentary indisposition and the doctor asked me about the food I consumed. 
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biography more or less problematic (misleading) depending on how significant the information 
failing to be reported is. 
 
Let’s come back to my chief argumentative line. What I conclude from my last considerations is 
that partially true accounts (theories) can of course be seen as problematic and thus rejected in a 
robust sense, not simply as insufficient and thus rejected in a neutral one. However, to repeat, 
this happens in the relatively uninteresting sense that whenever we fail to report relevant 
information we can mislead people into believing something false (on a variety of grounds that 
would merit further spelling out).359 
 
What I want to contend now is that a partially true account can be seen as being problematic in a 
stronger way than so far considered. The idea here is that there can be a connection between 
what is and what fails to be reported which is tighter than the one seen in previous examples. 
More precisely, sometimes what fails to be reported doesn’t concern specifics about what is 
being reported on, but about its nature. In the former case we fail to know facts about what is 
being reported on; in the latter case, we fail to know what it is. Suppose I describe a robbery by 
means of exclusively true assertions about it, for instance that it happened on march 1st 2012 at 8 
in the evening in Michigan Avenue in Chicago, that a gun was used by the robber, that 10.000 
dollars were stolen, that the victim was Bill Gates, and so on. All of these are facts about an 
event, about which, of course, further specifics might fail to be reported, some of them perhaps 
truly surprising. Suppose, for instance, that I was the robber, but don’t say so. Obviously my 
description of the robbery would then be a partially true account, and indeed of the problematic 
type: by default, I am clearly misleading my interlocutor into believing that it wasn’t me who 
committed the robbery. Suppose, however, that I add the true assertion “I committed the robbery.” 
In that case, even though a surprising piece of information is added, the nature of the event, a 
robbery, isn’t altered by it; the event is still a robbery. Contrast this with failure to report 
something which doesn’t affect specifics about what is being reported, but its nature. Suppose for 
instance that the new piece of information is, say, that the “robbery” was staged in a movie set by 
two actors. In this case, it’s no longer specifics about the event that are being reported, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 But which, on the other hand, are well known by philosophers of language (see, classically, for instance, Paul 
Grice on conversational implicatures). 
 192	  
information that affects something more substantial: if the “robbery” was staged in a movie set 
by two actors, what we are talking about is no longer a real robbery, but a fictional (staged) one, 
that is, in some sense, not a robbery at all. 
 
The lesson I extract from this example is the following. What fails to be reported in a partially 
true account (theory) of the problematic type can be of two sorts. On the one hand, we may fail 
to report something that affects the specifics of what is being reported on, no matter how 
surprising; for instance, that I committed the robbery in the example above. On the other hand, 
we may fail to report something that affects the nature of what is being reported on; for instance, 
that a “robbery” was staged at a movie set by two actors, which is as much as reporting that the 
event in question wasn’t really a robbery. My contention now is that what Sartre, Heidegger, and 
Hegel see as failing to be captured in the theories of consciousness, human being, and the 
Absolute that they reject is of the latter type (of course, in a more complex way that in the case 
of my example; I’ll get to this in a minute). 
 
Before elaborating on my last contention, let me make a step back and consider again my 
distinction between to reject in a neutral sense and to reject in a robust sense. What I’ll contend 
in what follows is that there are two reasons, not just one, why Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel 
reject the best past accounts of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute in a robust sense: 
one methodological and one substantial. Together, I will suggest, they explain why Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, despite acknowledging that the accounts contain significant truth and only 
truth, still see something problematic in these accounts, and reject them as being misleading, not 
merely insufficient. 
 
5. 2. 1 Methodological Reason 
 
Let’s first consider my methodological reason. Basically it consists in raising a distinction 
between a description (theory) and the passing of judgment of a description. With the help of this 
distinction, it is possible to make sense of the fact that someone can (rationally) reject, in a 
robust way, an account (description) that, she acknowledges, is true, and only true, of that object. 
The distinction results from observing the following fact: a description can be partially true, with 
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no falsehood, if one doesn’t describe an object but only part of it; yet falsehood might slip into 
the picture as soon as we judge the description to (completely) describe its object. Of course, a 
description and a passing of judgment on the description are two quite separate things, but I will 
contend in a minute that, in many instances, and especially in theoretical descriptions, the 
passing of judgment is implicit in the description itself or, to put it in different words, the 
description is its own passing of judgment. What results from this contention is what I take to be 
a methodologically interesting explanation of why a partially true description can be seen as 
problematic (misleading). This explanation could be exploited to make sense of the fact that, on 
the one hand, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel credit the best past accounts about consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute with containing philosophically interesting truth; yet, on the 
other hand, they see those accounts as misleading and thus reject them in a robust sense. 
 
To have a better sense of how exactly the distinction between description and passing of 
judgment works, let’s come back to the first example I used in this study, back in Chapter 1. 
Suppose I ask you to describe the Statue of Liberty and you answer something like: “It’s a tabula 
ansata, that is, a tablet evoking the law; on it is inscribed the date of the American Declaration of 
Independence, July 4, 1776,” and you proceed to describe this tablet with minute detail. We 
agreed that this description is not false, in so far as the right object is being described, but it still 
is inadequate, in so far as only a part of it is being described; the description, in other words, is 
partially true in the sense developed in this study. So far, I then establish, we don’t have 
falsehood in the description. (We would have falsehood if your description went like this: “It’s a 
man wearing jeans and a T-shirt, bearing a baseball bat in his right hand and a newspaper in his 
left one,” and so on.) Now suppose I pass judgment on my description, saying that it does 
describe the Statue (this judgment can take a variety of forms and can antecede or follow the 
description). It is here, on my passing judgment, that falsehood comes into the picture. While my 
description isn’t false but partially true, my saying (judging) that the description (completely) 
describes the object being described is false (simpliciter).  
 
Something analogous, I contend, can be seen as happening in philosophy.360 In particular, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 As it turns out, my opinion is that it happens a lot in philosophy; but demonstrating this would require much 
more work than I do here. 
 194	  
something analogous can be seen as happening in the three cases presented in this study. What I 
claim is that Sartre believes that Descartes and Husserl provide us with partially true descriptions 
of consciousness, not with false ones; that Heidegger believes that Descartes and Kant provide us 
with partially true description of human being, not with false ones; and that Hegel believes that 
Kant and Fichte provide us with partially true descriptions of the Absolute, not false ones. 
However, because Descartes, Husserl, Kant, and Fichte pass judgment on their descriptions to 
the effect that they completely describe their objects, they combine their partially true 
descriptions with a false claim. I contend that this explains why, on the one hand, Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel reject those accounts in a robust sense, while, on the other, they see those 
accounts as being partially true (not false). 
 
What emerges from the last paragraph is that the central thesis I’ve defended in this study (i.e., 
according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, previous accounts of consciousness, human being, 
and the Absolute aren’t really false but, rather, partially true) goes hand in hand with the 
distinction between a description and the passing of judgment on a description. While according 
to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel the descriptions aren’t false simpliciter but, rather, partially true, 
the passing of judgments (i.e., the claim that the descriptions adequately describe their objects) 
are false simpliciter. From the fact that the latter are false we should not jump to the conclusion 
that the former are false too. 
 
Someone can object that a description and the passing of judgment on a description are two quite 
different things. My response is that, in many instances, the passing of judgment on a description 
isn’t explicit but, rather, implicit, built into the description itself. This happens when a 
description is both a description simpliciter and an (implicit) passing of judgment that a) the 
description describes the object it’s supposed to describe; b) completely does so.  
 
Let’s consider an example. Suppose I’m asked to describe the Statue of Liberty and I antecede 
(or complete) my description with the following claim: “This is how the Statue of Liberty looks 
like.” In this case, I am passing explicit judgment on my description: essentially, I am claiming 
(not just leaving it as self-understood) that my description describes the Statue of Liberty, not one 
of its parts. Now suppose I don’t claim anything at all, but just start describing: “It’s a tablet 
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evoking the law…,” and so on. In this case, even though I don’t pass explicit judgment on my 
description, the very fact that I start with the words “It’s….” contains an implicit judgment that 
my description is describing the Statue of Liberty, not one of its parts (a judgment which, as we 
said, is false, since the statue represents a woman wearing robes and holding a torch, etc.). In this 
case two things can be seen as happening: on the one hand, we have a description which is not 
false, but rather partially true (in so far as what I describe is part of the Statue; compare to a 
description saying that the Statue is a man wearing jeans and a T-shirt, and so on, which is false); 
on the other, we have a description which (at least in some sense) is false, in so far as tacitly, by 
the mere fact that I am making a description of a tablet evoking the law, I am implicitly claiming 
that the Statue is a tablet evoking the law.  
 
It would be nice if, whenever something is being described, we had a neat separation of the 
description on the one hand and the passing of judgment on the description on the other. If this 
were the case, it would be easy, in cases in which there is a description which is partially true in 
my sense, to pull apart the two inadequacies from one another, partial truth on the one hand and 
falsehood (simpliciter) on the other. We would be able to say: the description isn’t false, but 
partially true; the passing of judgment (namely, that the description (completely) describes the 
object being described) is false. My contention now is that in philosophy (as in theoretical 
disciplines generally), it is usually the case that descriptions are simultaneously their own passing 
of judgment: a philosophical description (theory) both says that (for instance) reality is 
composed of physical stuff, numbers, and God, and that this description (completely) describes 
reality. 
 
The fact that descriptions (theories) can be their own passing of judgments adds a complication 
to philosophical descriptions, i.e., descriptions of (theories about) philosophical objects. But this 
explains that, on the one hand, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel reject the best past accounts in a 
robust sense while, on the other, they acknowledge that these theories contain philosophically 
interesting truth. I hope one of the contributions of this study is to at least call attention to this 
tight connection between the distinction, on the one hand, between partial truth and falsehood 
simpliciter and, on the other, between a description (of reality, consciousness, human being, the 
Absolute, etc.) and the passing of judgment on this description.  
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Let’s stop for a minute and summarize what we’ve got so far before proceeding to my final point 
of this chapter and of this study. In this chapter, I started calling attention to what I take to be a 
common pattern in the philosophical praxis and in the history of philosophy, namely that 
philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain philosophically interesting truth. 
The question is: how can a philosopher (rationally) both reject a theory and acknowledge that it 
contains interesting truth? The prima facie obvious response, namely, that theories can well 
combine truth with falsehood, doesn’t help until it is spelled out what this “combination” exactly 
consists in: without spelling this out, nothing in the expression “combination of truth of 
falsehood” rules out the possibility of partial truth with no falsehood. Second, furthermore, some 
theories can be construed as containing no falsehood, while they’re still rejected. Under the 
plausible assumption that philosophical theories are accepted or rejected on the grounds that they 
are true or false, I conclude that the only possible explanation is partial truth: true and only true 
philosophical theories are rejected because they are partially true. This gives raise to a second 
question: how can a philosopher (rationally) reject a theory that, she acknowledges, is partially 
true but by hypothesis only true? Why not complete (or supplement) it instead? My preliminary 
response is: some partially true theories can be seen as problematic, not simply insufficient, in so 
far as their assertions (theses) are (or can be) misleading: while they are true, they can induce 
someone to believe what is false. That accounts for the fact that at least some partially true 
theories are rejected in a robust, not just neutral sense. But how exactly can failing to report 
relevant information mislead someone into believing what is false? I have contended that this can 
happen in two ways: first, failing to report something can mislead someone to believe something 
false about the specifics of what is being reported (for instance, of a robbery, if I fail to report 
that I committed it); second, it can mislead someone to believe something false about the nature 
of what is being reported (for instance, of a robbery, if I fail to report that that the “robbery” was 
staged at a movie set). In the first case, we get to know new facts about what is being reported 
(ranging from uninteresting to surprising ones); in the second case, we change our perspective 
about what is being reported: we understand it to be something else than we thought it was. 
There is a methodological reason why philosophers can (rationally) reject in a robust sense a 
theory that, they acknowledge, contains philosophically interesting truth and only truth: partially 
true (and only true) theories can be robustly rejected because the philosopher proposing the 
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theory judges (falsely) that the theory (completely) describes (accounts for) its object. Of course, 
one thing is a description and another a passing of judgment on the description, but descriptions 
can be seen as their own passing of judgment: to describe the Statue of Liberty as being a tablet 
evoking the law (partial truth) can be seen to, at the same time and eo ipso, be implicitly saying 
that that description (completely) does describe the Statue of Liberty (falsehood). It is based on 
these methodological considerations that partial truth can be seen to be problematic (misleading), 
not simply insufficient (incomplete). 
 
5.2.2 Substantial Reason 
 
Let’s consider now my substantial reason why a partially true (and only true) account can be 
(rationally) rejected in a robust sense (i.e., be seen as problematic, not simply insufficient). The 
guiding insight here is that, in some instances, partial truth361 can be seen as problematic 
(misleading), not simply insufficient (incomplete), on ontological grounds. The idea is that for 
some entities, on account of its peculiar nature (of course, we need to spell this out; see below), 
any description (theory) that fails to capture the whole362 is bound to misrepresent their nature, 
instead of simply failing to capture it. Consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, in the way 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel see them, are precisely entities of this sort. But why should a 
partially true theory misrepresent, instead of simply failing to capture, their nature? 
 
This is the time to pick up my idea that some philosophical objects can be seen to have three 
properties that make them philosophically special (Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.). Remember, in 
Chapter 1 I claimed that philosophical objects aren’t philosophical in virtue of possessing special 
properties making them philosophical, but rather in virtue of the special approach we adopt 
towards them. However, I added, while philosophical objects in general are not philosophical by 
possessing special properties, at least some philosophical objects do possess special properties 
that makes them philosophically interesting.  My suggestion in what follows is going to be that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 And, remember, by hypothesis only truth (no falsehood). 
362 By “whole” here I don’t mean descriptions (theories) that capture everything about an entity (the idea that a 
theory can capture everything about an entity is of course problematic; see footnote 342), but that capture the entity 
at its ground, most basic level. 
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these objects are good candidates of philosophical objects a theory of which that fails to capture 
the whole is bound to misrepresent their nature, instead of simply failing to capture it. 
 
This leads us to consider the notion of uniqueness and elusiveness concerning entities studied by 
philosophers. From a philosophical point of view, there are many entities363 that, for various 
reasons, can be said to possess a unique and elusive nature. (Someone might object that, from a 
philosophical point of view, any entity, including ordinary objects, can be seen to do so). 
Examples of entities of this sort include numbers, moral values, time, meaning, language, and so 
on. Among these entities, however, some of them have been singled out by some philosophers, at 
various moments in history, as having a foundational role in philosophy. I take an entity to have 
a foundational role in philosophy if, crudely, the entity is seen as being central in a philosophical 
understanding of reality as a whole. As I suggested in Chapter 1, this doesn’t need to mean that 
reality as a whole is reducible to or explainable in terms of that entity. It might simply mean that 
an adequate understanding of the entity in question makes understanding of reality as a whole 
philosophically manageable. Philosophy as a theoretical discipline, I contend, has historically 
had a strong tendency to have some entity or another play this foundational role. Examples 
include: Ideas in Plato, God in Medieval philosophy, the mind in Descartes, God in Spinoza, the 
Monads in Leibniz, Reason in Kant, the Absolute (Spirit) in Hegel, History in Marx, 
consciousness in Husserl, language in analytic philosophy, and so on.  
 
Assume now a commitment to ontological holism in virtue of which the following principle 
holds: for a whole x, any account that fails to completely describe x misrepresents, not simply 
fails to capture, its nature. I contend that such principle, although it doesn’t necessarily apply to 
reality as a whole, can be seen to apply to entities that are central in a philosophical 
understanding of reality as a whole. My contention, more qualifiedly put, is the following: 
according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, this principle applies to, respectively, consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute. The reason why an account that fails to completely describe 
consciousness, human being, and the Absolute misrepresents their nature draws on the 
distinction I drew before (see section 5.2.1.) between partial truth in virtue of which we fail to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 From now on I use “entity” in a maximally broad sense, including many things that many philosophers won’t 
perhaps consider to be entities at all. I’ll come back in a minute to this preliminary terminological choice. 
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know facts about what is being reported on and partial truth in virtue of which we fail to know 
what it is that it’s being reported on, its nature. For this insight to be convincing, however, we 
need to see what is unique about consciousness, human being, and the Absolute as seen, 
respectively, by Sartre, Heidegger, and Sartre. 
 
What is unique about the nature of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, what fails to 
be reported in the best past accounts, is the fact that they aren’t things that can somehow be 
observed, but things that do the observing. In other words, consciousness, human being, and the 
Absolute aren’t so much entities as themselves standpoints toward entities.364 All of those things 
say roughly the same, namely, that consciousness, human being, and the Absolute aren’t entities, 
no matter how elusive, but what makes entities available for us in the first place, elusiveness 
itself at its most basic. Having into account that consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, 
are central in a philosophical understanding of reality, they are, what can be called “global” 
standpoints: not standpoints toward such and such types of entities or region of the world (for 
instance, mental, cultural, or religious phenomena), but over entities generally, over the whole of 
what there is. 
 
The concept of circular structure can help to further characterize an entity-standpoint, so let’s 
pause for a while here. For convenience’s purposes, I am going to define entities having a 
circular structure as a whole made of parts (although other definitions are possible). What makes 
them circular is that, first, the whole makes up the parts and, conversely, the parts make up the 
whole; second, the parts constitute each other. One might be tempted to identify an entity-
standpoint with an entity having a circular structure, for, as we said, the entity constitutes the 
standpoint and conversely, and these two “parts” constitute the whole (the entity-standpoint) and 
conversely. But this temptation should be resisted, for at least two reasons. First, there are 
entities having a circular structure that aren’t entities-standpoint.365 Second, there are entities 
having a circular structure, one of whose components is a standpoint toward reality, which still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Speaking in traditional terms, consciousness, human being, and the Absolute aren’t something object-like but 
something subject-like; or, rather, they just are what Modern philosophy calls the subject, subjectivity. 
365 For instance, the Solar system can be seen as having parts (the Sun and the planets) interacting with one another 
(by means of gravitation) and making up the whole; conversely, the whole makes up the parts. A biological cell (for 
instance, the eukaryotic cell) has parts (cell nucleus, organelles, cell membrane, and cytoskeleton) interacting with 
one another and, in turn continuing to maintain the organized bounded structure that gives rises to these parts. 
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aren’t entities-standpoint either.366 So what distinguishes an entity-standpoint from other entities 
having a circular structure? As suggested, what is distinctive about an entity-standpoint is the 
fact that it is, rather than “has,” a circular structure. But what does this mean?  
 
Crudely, it means the following. In an entity having a circular structure, first, the whole makes 
up the parts and, conversely, the parts make up the whole; second, the parts constitute each other. 
But, to start with, we have a reasonably well-defined whole, and well-defined parts.367 This isn’t 
the case, I contend, for an entity-standpoint. An entity-standpoint isn’t a “whole” of which the 
entity and the standpoint are “parts.” In some sense, strictly speaking, there is no “whole.” The 
fact that the standpoint is a standpoint toward the entity (because the entity itself is part of reality, 
and the standpoint (by hypothesis) is a standpoint toward reality) means that the entity changes 
depending on what the standpoint toward the entity is. Conversely, the standpoint being a 
component of the entity, the standpoint changes depending on the nature of the entity. Thus, 
different from, say, a Solar System or a cell, in which we can “go up” from the parts and see the 
total whole (the whole plus the parts), in the case of the entity-standpoint we can’t do that. There 
isn’t any total whole. 
 
The fact that an entity-standpoint has, indeed is a circular structure means that it isn’t clear in 
advance just what the entity really is. The entity changes depending on the standpoint we take 
over it.368 Indeed, the entity being part of reality, we take a standpoint toward it too.369 (And 
conversely, as I said earlier, the standpoint is largely determined by what the entity is in the first 
instance.) Of course, this doesn’t mean we don’t have any idea about what the entity is either, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 For instance, society can be seen as a whole making up the parts and conversely, whereas the parts make up each 
other; additionally, one of these “parts” is a standpoint. For instance, the standpoints we take over both the parts 
(other members of society, social institutions, etc.) and the whole itself (society) largely makes up what society is in 
the first instance. Another example would be history (I guess all the examples, and not by chance, should come from 
the human sciences). 
367 This basically means that, at least by abstraction, the whole can be thought apart from the parts and conversely. 
We come back to the examples of the apple and the cat. For instance, the Solar System is still the Solar System (at 
least conceptually), apart from the planets and their motions. 
368 See Niklas Luhmann (1997, vol. 1: 15). Luhmann uses the notion of circular structure in reference to society. For 
this sociologist, society is a global entities-standpoint. But there is reason to believe that Luhmann draws this notion 
from Heidegger (see, for instance, Jahraus 2004: 237) 
369 We can think of examples illustrating this sort of “evanescent” entities, determined by the standpoint we take 
over them. An apple remains an apple independently of our standpoint towards it. Consider an artifact or an artistic 
object, by contrast. Whereas materially speaking an artifact or artistic object is independent of our standpoint, it is 
our standpoint towards it that largely (or, more strongly, completely) makes it up qua artifact or qua artistic object.  
 201	  
because we have a pre-theoretical comprehension of it. Somehow, we already “know” the entity. 
This is precisely what it means to say that this object has a circular structure.370 Being 
knowledge about an entity-standpoint, the knowledge involved in this “knowing” is, at the same 
time, both observation and constitution of the entity. 
 
Let me stop at this point for a minute. So far I’ve simply presented the notion of entity-
standpoint. Admittedly, this characterization is quite crude as it stands.371 However, nothing I’ve 
said so far attempts to demonstrate that there are entities-standpoint, or even that the notion of 
entity-standpoint is legitimate to start with.372 What I want my two claims to be for this section, 
rather, are: (i) according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, respectively, consciousness, human 
being, and the Absolute are global standpoints toward reality;373 (ii) according to Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel, any partially true account of consciousness, human being, and the 
Absolute doesn’t simply fail to capture their essence: it positively misrepresents it. 
 
Partial truth so construed, that is, concerning entities whose status is fundamental in a 
philosophical account of reality (like consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, according 
to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel), and whose nature is bound to become misrepresented (not just 
incomplete) if a philosophical account of it falls short of capturing the whole (i.e., fails to place 
itself in the basic standpoint toward it), stands behind a significant amount of cases in which 
philosophers reject philosophical theories by their predecessors while crediting the latter with 
having discovered important philosophical truth. The reason why partial truth in the way I 
construe it can be seen as a helpful tool to make sense of this pattern which I take to be relatively 
common in the history of philosophy and the philosophical praxis is that philosophy, in many 
instances, tends to concentrate on various entities (or concepts) the foundational role mentioned 
above, that is, a role in understanding reality as a whole. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 For instance, Hegel says that in order to do philosophy, we need to presuppose the Absolute (otherwise we won’t 
even get started). The Absolute “is the goal that is being sought.” Now Hegel adds that the Absolute is “already 
present, or how otherwise could it be sought?” (Preface-Difference: 93, my emphasis.) Heidegger says essentially 
the same thing about human being: “In determining itself as an entity, Dasein [human being] always does so in the 
light of a possibility which it is itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands.” (BT: 69) 
371 This is one of the points in which this study needs further work. 
372 Perhaps the notion is contradictory: ontologically, there couldn’t be entities-standpoints; perhaps it’s vague; 
ambiguous; confused; and so on. 
373 In other words, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, consciousness, human being, and the Absolute have, 
indeed are, a circular structure in a global sense. 
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5.3 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
There are three worries one might want to see addressed before concluding. First, despite the 
evidence provided in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 and in section 5.1.2. of this final chapter, it can still be 
questioned, as the proponents of the moderate route do (see Section 5. 1. 3), whether Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel really see significant truth in the accounts they reject: more often than not, 
these philosophers seem to suggest that the accounts they reject are false simpliciter. Second, 
Sartre, Heidegger and Hegel are fond of making priority claims to the effect that some 
perspectives, points of view, stances, etc. are, philosophically speaking, more basic than others, 
not just depending on the phenomenon to be described or the philosophical issue at hand but, so 
to say, absolutely so. These priority claims take a variety of forms depending on the author 
considered and it’d be unwise to expect the same exact formulation in each of the three, but still 
they are common to the three. While I don’t think any of the chief theses in this study depends on 
accepting these priority claims (because, remember, my theses concern what philosophers 
believe about x, not whether those beliefs are in fact true or false), one might want to hear more 
about them anyway: how justified are Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel in making them, and how 
bad would my theses suffer if these priority claims were questioned or rejected? Third, finally, 
one might want to hear more about the notion of standpoint. The significance of this notion has 
been already big when making my individual cases in the central chapters; but it just became 
bigger, as I contended that, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, consciousness, human 
being and the Absolute, aren’t as much entities as themselves standpoints toward entities. This 
case will require clarification of what is meant by standpoint in this more fundamental sense, but 
also qualification of the terms “object,” “thing,” and “entity,” which can be seen, on a variety of 
grounds, to be quite misleading to characterize what consciousness, human being, and the 
Absolute are, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel. 
 
5.3.1 Moderate Route Revisited 
 
Remember that so far I have been pursuing the most ambitious route to defend the usefulness of 
the notion of partial truth, by arguing that sometimes philosophers reject theories that, they 
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acknowledge, are true and only true; not necessarily because they in fact believe those theories 
are true and only true, but because the theories can counterfactually be so construed without this 
circumstance altering the grounds on which the philosophers rejecting those theories reject them. 
At this point, someone might grant that construing theories as being true and only true might 
perhaps make sense in a number of cases; but protest that, at least in the case of Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel on the best past theories of, respectively, consciousness, human being, and 
the Absolute this is wildly implausible, as these philosophers seem to make clear in various ways 
that the theories they reject really are false or wrong (and fundamentally so at that), not partially 
true (and, much less, only true).  
 
How can we accommodate this protest? What we have here is essentially the same contention I 
introduced in section 5.1.3. above, which I ascribed to proponents of what can be called 
moderate route for defending the usefulness of the notion of partial truth. According to the 
proponents of the moderate route (or, more accurately, to the proponents of that position that, as 
a response, motivates a moderate route), it is completely misguided to construe the best past 
theories of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute to be, according to Sartre, Heidegger, 
and Hegel, true and only true. Doing that, they will insist, flies in the face of the fact that Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel suggest in various ways that the theories they reject are false or wrong 
(and fundamentally so at that).374 At most, it will perhaps be conceded, Sartre, Heidegger, and 
Hegel acknowledge some philosophically interesting truth in the theories they reject (and then 
the burden is on me to spell out exactly how much, and in what sense); but, on the whole, Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel take these theories to be false, not true (even partially). For instance, it will 
be argued, Sartre believes it’s really false, not partially true, to say there is a self in 
consciousness; Heidegger believes it’s really false, not partially true, to say that human being is 
an object or, more in general, to say that entities are pure presences instead of tools; Hegel, 
finally, believes any assertion about the Absolute made from a reflective standpoint is really 
false, not partially true.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 There’s a number of ways in which this could be shown, and I grant from the start that there’s no lack of potential 
textual support. 
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If this is correct, partial truth can’t be construed any longer as truth and only truth of part of an 
object, perhaps not even as truth in the first place. What should we take partial truth to be, then? 
I believe I have two possible responses here. As opposed to the line pursued in the ambitious 
route, these two responses offer a modest defense of the usefulness of the notion of partial truth, 
but I believe they have the virtue that, while they grant my opponent what she wants, they 
preserve, at a minimum one or, more optimistically, two of the chief intuitions I want to defend 
in this essay. 
 
First, partial truth can be construed as observation of the right object. The idea here is, first, that 
observing the right object, as opposed to the wrong one, involves interesting truth (at least 
potentially, for instance disposition of the observer to make true assertions about that object); 
and, second, that observing the right object is perfectly consistent with making false assertions 
about it, provided one offers an interesting reason why those false assertions are made.  
 
I believe my claim that partial truth can be construed in this way is pretty straightforward, and in 
my opinion quite plausible: in many instances, it isn’t clear what object we are supposed to be 
observing in the first place, whereby to get to observe the right object, as opposed to the wrong 
one, involves interesting truth (more accurately, puts us in a position to get to know interesting 
truth) about that object. Suppose, for instance, that someone asks me to describe the Statue of 
Liberty, and I mistakenly represent myself the Eiffel Tower (say, because I have only second-
hand knowledge about these monuments, or because I mistake Paris with New York, and so on). 
In this case, if I describe what I am observing (i.e., representing myself), my description will of 
course be false (of the Statue of Liberty) because, to start with, I am observing the wrong object. 
Suppose now, by contrast, that I correctly represent myself the Statue of Liberty but that, for 
some philosophically interesting reason, I describe it wrongly. In this case, even though my 
description (or some assertion included therein) is false too, it holds that, as opposed to 
representing myself the Eiffel Tower, I am observing the right object, something that (potentially 
at least) involves interesting truth (i.e., puts me in a position to get to know interesting truth) 
about the Statue of Liberty.  
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Where my response to the objection requires a bit more work is in offering an interesting 
explanation of why someone should describe wrongly (i.e., make false assertions of) the right 
object. Here we have at least two possible options. First, it might be the case that although one is 
observing the right object, only a part (or aspect) is being observed (but here we’d need a further 
philosophical reason why this happens375). Second, it might be the case that although one is 
observing the right object, one makes assertions about that object to which one is not entitled to 
make on the basis of what she observes, because they go beyond the realm of direct observation. 
Suppose, for instance, that I am observing the Statue of Liberty through a very dense fog, and I 
make two claims: one, “It is a human figure” (which is true) and, two, “It is a human figure made 
of metal” (which is false). Let’s suppose that the first one is based on what I (vaguely) see, 
whereas the second one is partly based on what I see, partly based on (rational) guess; that is, the 
second one goes (at least partially) beyond what I observe. Whereas it seems implausible for 
someone to observe the right object and describe it wrongly assuming that the description is 
limited to what one can observe, it is less plausible that this should happen when the description 
(at least partially) goes beyond what one can observe.  
 
If partial truth is construed in this way, i.e., as observation of the right object, one can respond to 
the objection presented above by arguing that to claim that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel 
acknowledge philosophically interesting truth in the theories they reject (which is what I argue) 
is quite consistent with the fact that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe the theories they reject 
are really false  or wrong, not partially true (which is what my opponent argues). What’s going 
on, I respond, is that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel concede that the philosophers they argue 
against are observing the right object (at least with due qualifications),376 something that, as 
opposed to the cases of other past philosophers who are observing the wrong object, involves 
philosophically interesting truth; but at the same time, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe that 
the philosophers they argue against make (fundamentally) false assertions about that object and, 
more generally, propose theories that are really false about that object.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 One can refer back to Chapter 1 (section 1.1.3.) for preliminary guidance. 
376 For instance, one can argue that, as far as consciousness is concerned, Descartes and Husserl are according to 
Sartre observing the right object, i.e., consciousness as disclosed to consciousness itself, at least as opposed to 
philosophers who take consciousness to be something material or biological, and thus observe it from a third person 
perspective. Something analogous could be defended for the cases of Heidegger and Hegel. 
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To this response it can be counter-argued that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel don’t believe the 
philosophers they argue against are observing the right object at all, but precisely the wrong one 
(indeed, one might insist, this is precisely what bothers Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel). Following 
the analogy of the example above, Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe the philosophers they 
argue against are representing themselves the Eiffel Tower, not the Statue of Liberty (and, of 
course, what results from this fact is false claims and a false theory about the Statue of Liberty). 
If this is correct, partial truth can’t be construed as observation of the right object any more. 
 
My response to this counter-argument is to propose a second, even more modest, way to construe 
partial truth. More modestly then, partial truth can be construed as adoption of a standpoint 
grounded on a more basic standpoint. The idea here is that even if I concede my opponent that, 
according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, the philosophers they argue against are observing the 
wrong (not right) object (and, of course, that their theories are really false or wrong, not partially 
true), it still holds that the reason why these philosophers are observing the wrong object is, 
according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel,  the fact that they are adopting a standpoint toward 
that object which, unbeknownst to these philosophers, is grounded on a more basic one, which 
makes the former possible in the first place. Remember furthermore, assuming I am right in 
section 1.1.2. of Chapter 1, that if we agree that a standpoint can be grounded on a more basic 
standpoint, the former can be metaphorically thought of as being “included in,” and thereby be a 
“part” of, the latter. If we grant my opponent that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe that the 
philosophers they argue against are observing the wrong object (not the right one), it still holds, I 
contend, that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe the standpoint adopted by these philosophers 
is, unbeknownst to them, “included in,” and thereby “part” of another. I believe this qualifies as 
partial truth as opposed to falsehood simpliciter; what happens now is that partial truth doesn’t 
apply to the theories being rejected nor the object being observed, but to the standpoint being 
adopted. 
 
I believe these two responses concede what my opponent wants: either (a) that Sartre, Heidegger, 
and Hegel believe the theories they are rejecting are false or wrong, not partially true; (b) that 
Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe the philosophers they argue against are observing the 
wrong, not the right, object, while at a minimum one the chief insights of this study still stands, 
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namely that there is a way of getting things wrong in philosophy that can be construed in terms 
of partial truth as opposed to falsehood simpliciter, where partial truth is either (a) observation of 
the right object (albeit perhaps only one of its parts); or (b) adoption of a standpoint which is 
grounded on (and thereby is a “part” of) a more basic standpoint. 
 
5. 3. 2 Priority Claims 
 
A second worry, intimately tied to my second attempt to accommodate the protest presented in 
the previous section, might concern the priority views adopted by Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel. 
Despite their philosophical differences, the three authors considered share a commitment to the 
view that certain standpoints toward reality (or over some entities) are prior to, or more basic 
than, others. Prioritism has some affinity with foundationalism, but the two should be 
distinguished. Foundationalism holds that all of our knowledge is ultimately founded on a single 
source; if we have insight enough to find it and isolate it, we can methodically reconstruct our 
knowledge on a firm and secure basis. Against foundationalism, we have the view that our 
knowledge doesn’t rest on a single foundation, but that there are several, mutually irreducible 
sources that contribute, in different ways, to the epistemological validity of our beliefs, and none 
of them takes priority over the rest (or if it does, it’s only in a relative, not in an absolute sense). 
The classic example of foundationalism is Descartes’ view that, first, the cogito (i.e., 
consciousness of our consciousness) is the ultimate source of certainty and thus of knowledge 
and, second, that starting from the cogito the philosopher can methodically reconstruct our 
knowledge on a firm and secure basis, thus defeating skeptical worries, including Cartesian all-
around skepticism.377 In contrast to foundationalism, prioritism isn’t an epistemological position: 
what prioritism privileges isn’t a source of knowledge, but a standpoint toward reality, which 
may or may not involve knowledge (for instance, one might hold, with Schopenhauer, that our 
basic standpoint toward reality is volitional rather than cognitive). Additionally, prioritism drops 
the idea that the standpointbeing privileged allows a reconstruction of what the standpoint is 
prior to: through philosophical insight we can get to situate ourselves in the basic standpoint, but 
all the standpoint allows us is to see things correctly, not reconstruct our knowledge of them.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 See Chapter 2, section 2.1. for a brief  treatment of Descartes’ view. 
 208	  
It’s clear that these priority views have a tight connection with my thesis that, according to these 
philosophers, the best previous accounts of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute are 
partially true because they are based on a standpoint which is secondary with respect to a more 
basic one: the standpoints toward things generally that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel privilege as 
being philosophically more basic than the rest (the unreflective, the pre-theoretical, and the 
speculative, respectively) coincide with the standpoints toward consciousness, human being, and 
the Absolute that, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, are more basic than the rest too. 
The question is whether this is a relation of entailment: in order to privilege a basic standpoint 
toward consciousness, human being, and the Absolute do Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel need to 
privilege a basic standpoint toward things generally too?, and conversely: because Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel privilege a basic standpoint toward things generally do they need to 
privilege a basic standpoint toward consciousness, human being, and the Absolute? These are 
two interesting questions whose response would merit further investigation but which, 
unfortunately, I must leave unanswered at this point.  
 
What is really important to keep in mind concerning prioritism is that none of the theses of this 
study relies on prioritism being in fact true. Remember I established in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.1.) 
that this study concerns philosophers’ beliefs about theories, not theories themselves. What is at 
stake in this dissertation is whether Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe that some standpoints 
toward certain objects are secondary with respect to some others that are more basic (i.e., prior), 
not whether this belief is in fact true; and I think that I have offered ample evidence in my central 
chapters that Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel believe that this is, indeed, the case. If Sartre, 
Heidegger, and Hegel turn out to be wrong about their prioritist views, then of course it can’t be 
the case that previous philosophers have defended theories that are partially true on account of 
having adopted a standpoint which is secondary with respect to a more basic one (since by 
hypothesis this is not the case); these theories could still be partially true in a different sense (for 
instance, in the intensional one of “approximately true”378), but then the interest of my idea, 
namely that sometimes we are able to observe only part of an object because we are adopting a 
standpoint toward that object which, unbeknownst to us, is grounded on a more basic one, would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 See chapter 1, section 1.1.3., last paragraph, for the distinction between partial truth in an intensional and in an 
extensional sense. 
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basically disappear. Yet, once again, my chief thesis in this study isn’t that this is the case, but 
that some philosophers in history have believed this to be the case, something that I take myself 
to have shown.                
 
5. 3. 3 Standpoint and Entity 
 
One of the chief insights that result from this final chapter is that consciousness, human being, 
and the Absolute, in the way Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel see them, aren’t so much objects 
simpliciter as standpoints toward objects themselves (section 5. 2. 2). Back in Chapter 1, I 
discussed some differences between an object and a standpoint toward an object (section 1.1.1.), 
but we need to say more things here. My guiding insight requires a bit of elaboration on these 
two important notions, standpoint and object. What exactly is meant by standpoint toward an 
object rather than an object itself? There are two claims I want to make in this regard. According 
to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel (a) consciousness, human being, and the Absolute aren’t 
standpoints simpliciter, but what can be called global standpoints, i.e., standpoints toward all 
objects (possible as well as actual), i.e., over the whole of what there is; this is what makes them 
philosophically significant; (b) consciousness, human being, and the Absolute aren’t detached 
but, rather, what can be called situated standpoints. Let’s briefly examine each these two claims. 
 
First, consciousness, human being, and the Absolute aren’t standpoints simpliciter, but what can 
be called global standpoints. What is meant by a global standpoint? This question brings us to 
the question: What is a standpoint at all?, which I introductorily answered in my Chapter 1 
(section 1. 1. 1.) At its most general, a standpoint is a way to observe a thing rather than a thing 
itself. This means that standpoint is a relational notion, which already is saying that a 
perspective isn’t a thing, if by entity is meant something like an object or thing, like a table, a 
building, a person, an atom or a planet. I already admitted in Chapter 1 that standpoints can 
themselves be observed (broadly construed, not necessarily optically or physically); to that 
extent, they can be taken to be something entity-like. Standpoints can vary, but vary over the 
same thing; second, that something or someone is perceiving: without perceivers there wouldn’t 
be standpoints.  
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Let’s now examine the second point, namely, that consciousness, human being, and the Absolute 
aren’t detached but, rather, what can be called situated standpoints. A big presupposition of 
traditional philosophy379 is the idea that there can be a standpoint toward reality essentially 
detached from it. This view has long fallen into discredit in several ways, but it’s important to 
see how much sense this position makes in the first place. It is difficult to see, indeed, how one 
can adopt a standpoint toward reality while being part of this reality. If my standpoint is part of 
reality, I can have a standpoint toward part of reality, but not over all reality.380 For one thing, 
my specific location in reality is going to affect the perspective over what I can observe. On the 
other hand, if it’s impossible to have a standpoint detached from reality, as it seems natural to 
assume, a standpoint toward all reality seems to be impossible too: all we can hope to achieve is 
partial standpoints, but they will always be relative to our specific location. This raises a 
dilemma: either there is a standpoint toward reality as a whole, but it is detached from it; or there 
isn’t, but then all standpoints are partial and thus relative.  
 
It’s important to see that this is prima facie a dilemma: we only have two options, and either one 
is unsatisfactory. If the first horn of the dilemma is accepted, we have the following problem: if 
the standpoint toward reality is detached from it, how can we be sure that the standpoint is about 
reality in the first place? A skeptical doubt that there is a gap between the standpoint and reality 
is always possible: for all we know, we might have a perfectly coherent view of reality… that 
doesn’t match reality at all. If, on the other hand, the second horn of the dilemma is accepted, we 
have the following problem: if our standpoint toward reality is partial and relative, doesn’t the 
idea of a single, objective reality become suspect? But that would be highly problematic, first, 
because the notion of a single, objective reality seems to make sense; and, second, because this is 
basically the notion of a reality seen independently from any partial standpoint. Crudely, then, 
the two problems that we are facing with the dilemma are skepticism and relativism.381    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 For convenience’s sake, let’s say philosophy before Hegel (although, of course, this characterization is crude). 
380 Or, strongly, reality as a whole, which is the sort of standpoint philosophers are interested in. 
381 These are thus the two problems traditional philosophy faced until it started to dawn on philosophers that perhaps 
the notions of reality and standpoint define each other. So for example Kant, the last great philosopher before Hegel, 
insists that reality conforms to our standpoint and not the other way around; but he still appeals to (i.e., makes 
philosophical use of) the notion of a reality independent from our standpoint (the thing-in-itself). On the other hand, 
Kant still thinks of the notions of standpoint and reality as fixed; Hegel’s reaction against Kant consists essentially 
in challenging this presupposition: reality and standpoint, for Hegel, essentially constitute each other; reality is 
standpoint-like (in Hegel’s jargon, self-like). 
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One of the ideas I want to retain from my last two paragraphs is that the notion of a standpoint 
detached from reality has long become philosophically suspect. It’s important that the standpoint 
be anchored to reality in some way or another. This doesn’t mean that the standpoint is an 
epiphenomenon. The standpoint is still a standpoint, and indeed a standpoint toward reality. But 
it should be seen as being continuous with, not detached from it. This can be done in at least the 
following three ways (although others are possible). First, as said, the standpoint is a component 
of reality, not something free-floating. A crude example would be the following: even the most 
abstract and seemingly detached standpoints toward reality, for instance, philosophical or 
mystical ones, have a bodily basis (perhaps, say, neuronal). Second, the nature of the entities in 
reality affects, should any of them possess a standpoint toward reality as one of its components, 
the sort of standpoint it possesses. So for instance, again crudely, cats see reality differently than 
humans, artists see reality differently than politicians, philosophers, and so on. Third, the 
standpoint has come-to-be at some time; using modal categories, its existence is contingent. It 
isn’t “necessary” or “eternal.” For instance, crudely, humans developed the capacity to 
detachedly observe reality at some point in time; the same holds ontogenetically: the child starts 
observing reality detachedly at a specific time too.  
 
5. 4 OVERALL SUMMARY 
 
Let’s conclude with an overall summary of this chapter and of this study.  
 
In this chapter, I’ve argued that the notions of object, standpoint, and partial truth, as I construe 
them, can be helpful to make sense of a sort of relationship between philosophers and their 
predecessors that constitutes a significant pattern in the philosophical praxis and the history of 
philosophy, to which more attention should be paid. This pattern is characterized by the fact that, 
in many instances, philosophers reject theories that, they acknowledge, contain significant truth. 
I have claimed that it doesn’t suffice to say that philosophical theories can combine truth with 
falsehood, as the expression “to combine truth with falsehood” doesn’t rule out, without further 
elucidation, the possibility of partial truth with no falsehood at all. What is more, I have claimed, 
some theories can be construed as containing no falsehood while they are still rejected. The only 
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solution to the puzzle, I have claimed, is the notion of partial truth: in at least some instances, 
philosophical theories are rejected, not because they contain falsehood about their objects, but 
because they are only partially true of them, where this is construed as: they are true of only part 
of them, which is construed in turn as: they are true of only an aspect of them, the one available 
to a secondary standpoint, as opposed to a basic one.  
 
A second puzzle concerns the notion of rejection: why should a theory that contains no falsehood, 
even if it’s partially true, be rejected at all? For all we know, it would suffice to complete the 
theory with the relevant information to render it true simpliciter. I have argued, however, that 
partial truth can in many instances be seen as problematic and misleading, not simply insufficient. 
This circumstance accounts for the fact that a partially true account can be rejected in a robust 
sense, not simply in a neutral one. This is the case in the relatively uninteresting sense that partial 
truth is (or can be) always misleading, if the information failing to be reported is such that the 
partially true account induces someone to believe something false about the particulars of what 
is being reported on; for instance, after being stopped by drunk driving, I can truthfully declare I 
have drunk one beer, which is obviously misleading if, in addition, I have also drunk three 
whiskies and don’t say so. But partial truth can be misleading in a philosophically more 
interesting sense, if the information failing to be reported is such that the partially true account 
induces someone to believe something false about the very nature of what is being reported on; 
for instance, failing to report that a “robbery” was staged at a movie set doesn’t mislead someone 
into believing something false about particulars of the “robbery,” but about its very nature: the 
prima facie “robbery” wasn’t a robbery in the first place. What Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel see 
as problematic and misleading in the partially true accounts they reject about, respectively, 
consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, is of the latter type. Similar to the example of the 
“robbery,” what past accounts fail to report about consciousness, human being, and the Absolute 
doesn’t concern specifics about those objects, no matter how philosophically interesting; it 
concerns their very nature. However, different from the case of the “robbery,” consciousness, 
human being, and the Absolute, according to Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel, are objects that 
possess a unique nature. Other objects of interest to philosophers, like numbers, time, moral 
values, meaning, language, etc. possess, of course, a unique nature too. But the nature of 
consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, as seen by Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel is 
 213	  
unique in a still more fundamental sense. What is more, I have defended, in virtue of this nature 
any account that fails to capture the whole (where this is construed as: that fails to situate itself in 
the basic standpoint toward these entities) is bound to misrepresent their nature, not simply to 
fail to capture it. 
 
This unique, elusive, foundational nature of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute as 
seen by Sartre, Heidegger, and Hegel helps to explain why it’s important to take the best past 
accounts about them to be partially true rather than false. The best past accounts are precisely the 
best in so far as they display a sense of the fact that consciousness, human being, and the 
Absolute are standpoints toward entities rather than entities, i.e.. According to Sartre, both 
Descartes and Husserl (among others) understood that consciousness isn’t an entity along others, 
but the “entity” that allows all other entities to be encountered in the first place. According to 
Heidegger, both Descartes and Kant (among others) understood that human being isn’t an entity 
along others, but, similar to the case of Sartre, the “entity” that allows all other entities to be 
encountered in the first place. According to Hegel, both Kant and Fichte understood that the 
Absolute isn’t an object along others, but, once again, the “object” that allows all other objects to 
be encountered in the first place. What is bad about the best past theories is that they don’t 
succeed in achieving the basic standpoint required to study these perspectives. What is more, by 
mistakenly adopting a secondary standpoint, they still encounter consciousness, human being, 
and the Absolute as something entity-like rather than standpoint-like. In other words, because 
these past philosophers fail to realize that the theoretical insights they achieve are made possible 
by a standpoint toward consciousness, human being, and the Absolute which is more basic than 
the one they use, what they achieve is only partial truth about these entities, i.e., they achieve 
insights that are true of only a part of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute,  i.e., they 
are true of only a secondary aspect of consciousness, human being, and the Absolute, not the 
basic one.  
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